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 ABSTRACT 
 
Among the counter-revolutionary figures who emerged after the French Revolution, the figure 
and works of Louis de Bonald (1754-1840), unlike those of Joseph de Maistre, remain shrouded 
in obscurity. Yet, he was in his own time recognised as the foremost critique of the excesses of 
the revolutionary period. His attempt at articulating a traditionalist philosophy of society and 
authority deserve to be better known among scholars if only because of the originality of his 
doctrine of the primitive revelation, which seeks to give an account of human knowledge based 
upon a particular understanding of human reason, and of the nature and function of language. 
His works also contain most invaluable insights about the ways in which societies are 
constituted, through a trifunctional and tripersonal understanding of the structure of social 
hierarchy. From his engagement on the questions of relations of the religious and the political, 
Louis de Bonald’s works seems ideally framed for providing a fresh perspective to the study 
of political theology. The acknowledged indebtedness of some of the modern proponents of 
political theology, e.g., Carl Schmitt, is sufficient a motive for attempting a delineation of the 
main features of Bonald’s political, social and epistemological doctrines in the light of an 
analogy of social forms. However, Bonald’s vindication of the traditional social and customary 
institutions is also to be complemented by a commitment for a jusnaturalist understanding of 
the dignity, freedom and rights of human beings as put forward by the luminaries of the 
Aristotelean-Thomist school, namely Jacques Maritain and Charles Journet. The present 
attempt at redefining political theology, in the light of Bonald’s thought, regards the social as 
a fundamental category of being. It is from the perspective of the permanence of society, in its 
immutable structure and logic of self-conservation, that man’s social nature can be properly 
understood.  
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Prolegomena 
A. Introduction  
The aim of the present study taken as a whole is to give an account of the contribution of Louis 
de Bonald (1754-1840) in connection with what may be broadly termed “theologico-political 
themes”, and the object of these prolegomena, in turn, is to attempt to delimitate the scope of 
such themes, to give an outline of a certain perspective upon the status quaestionis with regards 
to political theology, and to show where a more extensive engagement with the thought of 
Bonald could lead to an enrichment in the understanding of the field.  
The continued presence, or fact, of religion, whether in the struggles of the homo religiosus 
against himself and the times, or in the form of the conventional institutions and engagements 
(churches, religious orders, schools, charities, and other comparable organisations and 
endowments) or in less traditional bodies and endeavours (lobbies, think-tanks, pressure 
groups, interest groups, identity groups, armed groups) both at the domestic and international 
levels, or still, in the permanence of certain symbols and ceremonies, presents a constant 
challenge to one of the fundamental principles of Western modernity: the separation of religion 
(as an organisation or a system of thought) from politics. The contemporary history of the West, 
and of Europe in particular, is no doubt fraught with profound continuities and discontinuities 
that tentatively may be characterised as being between traditions and manners retained from 
the old Christendom and the Ancien Régime, and the attitudes of self-assertive Modernity that 
arose towards the end of the Middle Ages.   
It could be argued that the ways in which theologico-political themes have been addressed or 
the manner in which theologico-political inquiries have been prosecuted have all depended to 
a significant degree upon the diverse opinions and perspectives relative to these continuities 
and discontinuities. In other words, theologico-political thinking has reflected the particular 
philosophy of history that arose in the context of the political and philosophical changes that 
came to a crescendo in the revolutionary periods of the 18th and 19th centuries. In terms of the 
dialectic of continuities and discontinuities, the old world was begun and ended a number of 
times, in a temporal arc from the coronation of Charlemagne by Pope Leo III and the Treaty of 
Rome of 1957 (and subsequent treaties, including those of these current times), including the 
struggles between the Empire and the Papacy, between the national Kingdoms and the Papacy, 
and the Empire. It also includes the national revolutions, the wars, the loss of territories, the 
reconfiguration of borders, the destruction of empires, the extension of the imperial idea outside 
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of Europe, the creation of new nations. “Political theology” as a genre of political writing can 
only make sense from the self-conscious apprehension of the significance of the end of Western 
Christendom, occurring as it did not in one single event but rather in stages spread out across 
the centuries, and of the beginnings of a new experience that was outwardly, in the institutions 
and the laws, different1. In other words, the theologico-political thinking and enquiry are 
eminently preoccupied with the questions of history and time, with the eventuality of change 
and the evidence of permanence.  
This last point, the evidence of permanence, is crucial in order to grasp the theological aspect 
of such thinking and enquiry. The permanence in question here is not so much that of the 
continuities between past and present forms of political thought, as the general permanence 
and stability of reality, of the essence of things, guaranteed by the creative and sustaining 
activity of a superior and supreme principle, or God. Unless one is committed to a decidedly 
anti-theological or meta-theological understanding of political theology, one who embarks 
upon theologico-political enquiry needs to address theological themes as expressing bona fide 
positions in terms of religious belief and philosophical conviction in terms of truth-claims. In 
other words, theologico-political enquiry can only be impoverished by a limited understanding 
of theological themes as mere repositories of symbolic content that do not express or relay 
genuine experiences of and beliefs about reality. Therefore, attention must be given to the ways 
in which practitioners of politics relate their political practice to their theological worldview. 
However, an understanding of theological themes in terms of human experience alone may not 
be sufficient. A purely phenomenological apprehension of theological experience and of 
theological thinking, grounded in the subjectivity of the human agent, might not do justice to 
the objectivity of the truth communicated and manifested in such experience and thinking. 
Thus, theologico-political enquiry ought to take theology seriously, both as a science and as a 
practice, with all that this implies of the cultural, ritual and material aspects. There may come 
a time when the alienation of the West from its own traditions may lead to a state where the 
theological notions, concepts and symbols in all their plurality and variety may not be 
recognised or easily accessible to the student of political theology, otherwise theological-
                                                          
1 This statement is not to be taken to mean that political theology can only ever be comprehended from within the 
historical context mentioned. Theologico-political themes are no doubt found in the historical experience of other 
branches of Christianity (for example, Byzantine Christianity and “Caesaropapism”, the position of the Armenian 
and Georgian Churches in the Ottoman and Persian empires, etc.), and indeed, in other civilisations. For the 
purposes of this study, however, the stress upon the connection between the history of Western Europe and 
theologico-political thinking and enquiry remains central. In this connection, see below in section B.3 on 
Maritain’s account of the question.  
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political themes, with all their subtleties, may be reduced to a set of commonplaces and clichés. 
For theology itself, as much as politics, is not a univocal concept: a proper political theology 
must address both natural and revealed theology, and even extend its consideration to 
exegetical, ascetic and mystical branches theology. Additionally, the attempt must be made to 
locate the disputes and changes, the unresolvable tensions in the practice and orientation of 
theology (between churches, or between movements within the same churches) within a 
general articulation of the theologico-political problem.  
Any attempt, therefore, at giving an unambiguous and clear definition of political theology, if 
at all possible, must be prefaced with an adequate overview of the status quaestionis through 
an analysis of those works that have had a lasting impact upon the direction and the nature that 
theologico-political enquiries have assumed at least since the French Revolution, and in 
particular, the impetus given to the field in the 20th century. It must be stressed, however, that 
the attempt at circumscribing the historical circumstances of the discipline, which is a recurring 
feature of the present study, is not an end in itself, nor is it a substitute for the theoretical 
consideration of the truth of theologico-political propositions. The attention to the temporal 
circumstances in which certain concepts or systems emerged does not here imply the belief that 
the truth of such concepts or systems is necessarily dependent upon the circumstances. It is the 
conviction of the author of this thesis that the works of Louis de Bonald contain a wealth of 
theologico-political tropes that are not simply the reflection of the polemics of a particular age, 
and that, an extraction and presentation of general philosophical principles from his entire 
oeuvre is as necessary for a tentative understanding of theologico-political studies as the 
restitution of the historical context of his engagement as a political theorist.  
 
B. Overview of the Status Quaestionis 
It was inevitable that the historical circumstances of the mid-20th century, marked by two World 
Wars, would have led men to further engage with theologico-political themes. The restoration 
of Europe after the Second World War, the liquidation of the colonial empires, and the general 
reconfiguration of the world order in the context of the Cold War were bound to have an effect 
on theologico-political studies. The Catholic Church had survived the two World Wars almost 
unscathed and set out to engage with contemporary ideas in such a sympathetic manner that 
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signalled a break with the past2. The influence of Jacques Maritain and Charles Journet, and of 
a group of theologians that was hitherto held in deep suspicion by the Roman authorities (the 
“Nouvelle Théologie” movement sought to return to a more patristic style of theologising and 
to a deeper engagement with the predicaments of modernity), on the proceedings and contents 
of the Second Vatican Council were rather significant. The pre-eminence of Thomism as the 
official theological school of the Roman Church was challenged by other strands that were 
more sympathetic to modern philosophies. The Protestant Churches, especially the German 
Lutheran Church, also had much cause for self-reflection in the face both of the integrity and 
heroism of some of its members (Bonhoeffer and the Confessing Church) and of the alliances 
of others with Nazi dictatorship (the so-called “German Christians”). The experiments of the 
Worker-Priest movement in France led to greater contacts and sympathy between the clergy 
and theologians on the one hand, and workers and Marxist thinkers on the other. The prospects 
of cooperation spread to other regions of the globe, including South America, in particular, 
where a theoretical and practical synthesis between the Marxist critique of capitalism and the 
evangelical message of Christianity was attempted and pursued under the name of “Liberation 
Theology”. This movement, in its theological component, reflected the influence of certain 
trends of the Nouvelle Théologie, especially in the transcendental method of Karl Rahner, and 
of his disciples, most notably, Johann Baptist Metz. As with other authors of the Nouvelle 
Théologie, such as Lubac and Congar, but also with a Neo-Thomist such as Maritain, the 
concern of the more “modern” theologians seems to be one of understanding the conditions of 
modernity in the general framework of theological anthropology and sociology. Francis 
Schüssler-Fiorenza in 1977 attempted to classify the field into three broad categories 
corresponding to the above-mentioned movements3 (German, Liberation Theology, Catholic). 
He characterises the German variety as one of critical resignation to the changes of modernity, 
in particular, of secularisation, and as seeking to rise up to meet its challenge while keeping in 
mind the necessity of the Gospel. The theologico-political theme specific to Liberation 
theology appears to be a greater demand for Church involvement in politics for the sake of the 
poor, combined with a Marxist critique of the liberal-market subversion of traditional social 
structures. In Schüssler-Fiorenza’s classification, Catholic political theology comes out as one-
sided: it is presented exclusively in terms of the counter-revolutionary reaction. This not only 
                                                          
2 Cf. Sylvio Hermann de Franceschi. Ambiguïtés historiographiques du théologico-politique. Genèse et fortune 
d’un concept. Revue Historique, vol.309, fascicule 3(643), pp.653-685: July 2007, p.654. 
3 Francis Schüssler-Fiorenza. Political Theology as Foundational Theology. Proceedings of the Catholic 
Theological Society of America 32 (1977), pp.142-177.  
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ignores the significant overlaps between the afore-mentioned types, but it also neglects the 
more mainstream work of recognised theologians such as Charles Journet. Furthermore, in 
view of the developments of theologico-political themes by theoreticians of postmodernity (e.g. 
Giorgio Agamben), the typology would require some updating. Nevertheless, the positive 
contribution of Schüssler-Fiorenza lies in his endeavour to articulate the question of political 
theology in terms of foundational theology. Political theology would thus belong to that area 
of enquiry where theology is looking at itself, at the conditions in which it produces knowledge, 
and at the interactions and engagements with politics occasioned by such knowledge. In other 
words, the self-awareness that foundational theology demands of theology is, by its nature, not 
merely historical, but also profoundly social.  
The development of theologico-political themes is, thus, connected to the changes not only in 
the understanding of politics but also and above all to those affecting theology. It could well 
be that, throughout the entire history of West, these two lines of development followed a 
parallel course to one another punctuated with occasional but significant intersections, or that 
the development of politics is seen as the periodic recurrence of a movement of union and 
retreat from the theological. A history of the term “theology” and its use in connection with 
political problems (which is, alas, beyond the scope of this study) would no doubt provide 
precious insight into this relation. The critique of the truth of myths and fables as carriers of 
authentic theological meaning, which Plato puts in the mouth of Socrates, was an organic part 
of an overall critique of society and politics, together with the conceptualisation of a 
hypothetical model, or pattern, of an ideal city4. The Augustinian vision of the two cities itself 
depends on the critique, modification and appropriation of the classical pagan concepts of 
theology. With Augustine, the polytheistic foundations of the Varronian tripartite theology 
(mythical, natural and civil) are exposed and overturned in the service of the monarchy of the 
one God of the Christian revelation5. Thus, he mounts a defence of the correct discourse on the 
divine contained in revelation against the falsehood found in the pagan rites of the civil religion. 
True piety lies not in the execution of what Augustine considers to be the truly blasphemous 
rites of the pagan cities but in the pursuit and cultivation of the correct notion of the divine. It 
is only in Christianity that this correct notion is to be found, together with an explanation of 
                                                          
4 In The Republic (379a), Socrates envisions the education of the Guardians as providing them with the “patterns 
or norms of right speech about the Gods”, intimating that the true theology is the one in which the idea of Divine 
and of the Good has been purified of the false attributes found in the works of the poets.  
5 Augustine of Hippo. The City of God against the Pagans. Ed. and trans. by R.W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1998. Books 6 and 7 are specifically devoted to the critique of the theologia tripertita.  
6 
 
the sufferings and struggles of this life, and the aspiration towards both earthly and heavenly 
peace. The only true theology is the Christian theology as much as the only authentically 
Christian politics is the one that directs the pursuit of the earthly peace to heavenly peace6. The 
cooperation of Christians, as a society, with the non-Christians is couched in terms of the 
common pursuit of earthly peace, which the Christians know to be ordained to a heavenly 
peace, which the object of the promise of Christian revelation. A theologia civilis properly 
transformed in a Christian way would require and consist in the profession of the orthodox 
Christian creed, and in the recognition and pursuit the common good, namely, peace. The 
transcendence of the heavenly peace to which earthly peace is ordained is a crucial element of 
Augustine’s critique of the pagan city. The restriction of the gods to the city and to nature (in 
natural theology) immanentises the whole idea of divinity. The sense of transcendence is lost 
while the city can exact a claim to the total dedication of man’s life and limb. For Augustine, 
on the other hand, all that is earthly is ultimately dependent upon a transcendent realm of divine 
sovereignty, which is the source of all truth and goodness. The scriptural trope according to 
which all earthly power is from God is not be understood simply in terms of the legitimacy of 
such power, but also in terms of natural and providential dependence7. This life is truly, for 
Augustine, but the course of an earthly pilgrimage towards the one abiding City, in which 
alone, a lasting peace is to be found and enjoyed. Truth, justice and piety, as manifested and 
communicated in Christianity, are at the centre of Augustine’s worldview, and of his “political 
theology”. The natural right of the state is acknowledged, while deemed to be limited by the 
call and demands of a radical transcendence. This recognition of the natural right of the state, 
of the political community, within eschatological horizons, will be expanded by Aquinas as 
part of the theme of the conceptualisation of the relations between grace and nature. Grace is 
understood as perfecting not obliterating nature. The fixing of the limits of the sacra doctrina 
in the very first question (art.3) of the Summa Theologica contains in essence the potentiality 
of a theologico-political science: theology treats primarily of God, and then only of creatures 
insofar only as they are referable to God considered as their principle or as their end8. All the 
edifice of natural law will ultimately depend not only on nature as such but also on this relation 
between God and creatures. Although it forms a subsidiary part of theology as the science of 
God, this relation, in itself and in its pertinence in political praxis, is essential for a properly 
theological understanding of theologico-political themes. 
                                                          
6 Cf. Augustine of Hippo. Ibid. Book 19, chapter 18, pp.946-947. 
7 Cf. John 19:10, 11; Romans 13:1-3; 1 Timothy 2:2; 1 Peter 2:17.  
8 St Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica – Somme Théologique. Paris: Desclée & Cie 1925, p.31. 
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C. Political Theology  
i. Scepticism and Anarchism: Spinoza and Bakunin 
The terms “theologico-political” and “political theology” are not the inventions of recent 
centuries nor are theologico-political studies entirely new. The publication of Spinoza’s 
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus in 1670 was certainly a milestone in the history of theologico-
political studies both on account of its explicit title, its contents and of the controversies that it 
generated. His critique of revealed religion through the critical exegesis of scriptural texts, his 
advocacy of the separation of philosophy from theology, and his promotion of a positive 
political control of organised religion, would inspire the ways in which the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment and the French revolutionaries of the 18th century (and their heirs and followers 
in the 19th century, such as Proudhon) would address these subjects9. The use of a concept of 
“political theology” can be found, among the heirs of the revolution, in some of the writings 
of the Franco-Russian revolutionary, Mikhail Bakunin. For Bakunin, the affirmation of God’s 
existence is also the affirmation of man’s servitude: man can only attain to freedom and 
integrity when he stops to worship God, and the acceptance of the universal rights of man can 
only mean the rejection of the rights of God. In order to extirpate superstition, that is, religion 
from the masses, Bakunin proposes the cultivation of rational science and of socialistic 
propaganda. The aim of the rational science is to reform the mass of human knowledge by 
rejecting the claims of metaphysics and the very forms of metaphysical thinking. Metaphysics 
and theology, Bakunin claims, depend upon an aristocratic methodology of revelation and 
contemplation that mirrors the modus operandi of the hierarchical societies of centralised 
states, with an ordered chain of command. The alliance of throne and altar of his day (in 
Imperial Russia; in the struggle for the unification of Italic peninsula) seemed to be in support 
of a totalising and oppressive nationalistic ideology, which he rejected. For the alliance of 
church and state was itself but the historical manifestation of an essential similarity between 
the two institutions, for submission to God was really submission to the men appointed by God 
to teach other men and to lead them to religious truth. The distinction of the teacher and the 
taught is analogous to that of the ruler and the ruled. Science and socialism, by virtue of their 
rationality and universality, were to be the means whereby man would free himself from the 
                                                          
9 Cf. Jonathan Israel. Radical Enlightenment. Oxford: At the University Press, 2001. The author deals not only 
with Spinoza’s ideas and influence, but also goes into the specific details of the reception of his works, especially 
the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, in the different parts of Europe, through translations and networks of diffusion.  
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joint oppression of church and state10. Bakunin’s views on church and state must be taken for 
what they are: they are more the occasion for the statement of anarchic principles than an 
intentional description of the historical realities of the relationship between church and state. 
Indeed, Bakunin’s revolt is primarily against an ideal state of synergy between altar and throne 
that could exist in the wild dreams of the Slavophile party within Russia. But beside this ideal 
state, he was well aware of real continuities between the theological and the political – 
continuities that transcended the politics of his day, and which he was willing to put on the 
account of the enduring hold of superstitions on the human mind. If the political regimes that 
emerged in the 19th century could see in religion a factor for social cohesion, they were no less 
engaged in the establishment of a legal order that was consistent with the ideology of popular 
or national sovereignty.  
The detheologisation, in favour of which the extreme radicals were agitating, was slowly but 
surely introduced into the very legal apparatus of the state and of society. The autonomy of the 
law, which is a resultant of the doctrines of the autonomy of man and of the state, was related 
to the ideologies of popular or national emancipation and sovereignty that took hold of Europe 
in the revolutionary fervour of 1848.  
ii. Juridical Political Theology: Carl Schmitt  
Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), as a jurist who was born in the later part of the 19th century, grew 
up in Imperial Germany, saw its defeat in the First World War and witnessed the transition to 
the Weimar Republic, was acutely aware of this detheologisation of the juridical order. He dealt 
with this particular problem and with other theologico-political subjects in many, if not most, 
of his works, including Political Romanticism (1919), The Dictatorship (1921), Political 
Theology (1922), Roman Catholicism and Political Form (1923), The Concept of the Political 
(1932) and Political Theology II (1969-1970). While it could be argued that Spinoza created 
the modern genre of theologico-political speculation, political philosophers and publicists did 
not pay much heed to it, nor was it in any need of it as such, having already internalised the 
Spinozist critique of all revealed religion11. Carl Schmitt played a crucial role in the revival the 
                                                          
10 Mikhail Bakunin. Fédéralisme, socialisme et antithéologisme, in Œuvres, tome 1. Bibliothèque sociologique, 
N° 4. Paris: PV Stock Editeurs, 1895, pp.68-70. This edition of his works also contain his other theologico-political 
pamphlets such as “Dieu et l’état” (tome 1) and “La Réponse d’un International a Mazzini” (tome 6). This latter 
was incorporated in his “La Théologie politique de Mazzini et l’Internationale” published in 1871.  
11 Cf. Franceschi, op.cit., p.659. 
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genre has experienced in the previous century, so much so that even to this day, the very 
approach to the subject requires a treatment of his contribution.  
In Political Theology (1922), Schmitt’s starting point for the articulation of his political 
theology was first through a formulation of his own notion of sovereignty accompanied by a 
critique of the normativist understanding of the concept of sovereignty put forward, and then, 
through the development of the secularisation thesis. To the normativist understanding of an 
abstract or pure legal order that is grounded upon a basic norm, above which there was no 
superior norm, opposed a decisionist understanding wherein sovereignty consisted in the ability 
to derogate to the existing juridical order and define the exception to the law. In Schmitt’s own 
words: “The decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense of the word. Because a 
general norm, as represented by an ordinary legal prescription, can never encompass a total 
exception, the decision that a real decision exists cannot therefore be entirely derived from this 
norm”.12 If the exception is taken to refer to a situation that occurs outside the criteria and 
provisions of the legal order, then any understanding of sovereignty in purely normative terms 
is deficient. Sovereignty, by its nature, that is, by necessity, operates both within and outside 
the prescribed limits of the juridical order. As such it cannot be defined simply in terms of the 
highest norms of that order. Sovereignty is never that of laws as such, for laws, even the highest 
among them, require the instrumentality of a human agent in order to be promulgated and to 
be applied. The system of laws within a political society is not sui juris: it is neither self-
generated, nor is it self-applicable. The juridical order is to be understood not so much in terms 
of a hierarchy of independently operative norms as in those of a hierarchy of agency 
culminating in that agent in whom the powers of supreme derogation to this order is vested. 
The sovereign is the person in the state who can both create the legal order, through the 
promulgation of norms, and transcend it, through the decision on the exception to the order. 
Schmitt believed that the liberal order established in Germany after the defeat of 1919 intended 
to “repress the question of sovereignty” by subjecting the Reichspräsident’s emergency 
powers to the control of the Reichstag.13 The question of sovereignty is repressed precisely 
through the introduction of measures designed to collectivise the competency to decide upon 
the exception, and which, in practice, aim at making it extremely difficult to reach that decision. 
It could well be that what Schmitt alleges to be the liberal occultation of the nature of 
sovereignty proceeds from the liberal need to identify the state with a particular legal order. 
                                                          
12 Carl Schmitt. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Translation of Politische 
Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität, 1922. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005, p.6. 
13 Schmitt. ibid., p.11. 
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Thus, any period of emergency wherein the state still continues to exist while the legal order is 
suspended, would point to the true nature of sovereignty and the true locus of authority within 
the political society. Furthermore, the care with which liberal constitutions endeavour to 
circumscribe and provide for the exercise of emergency powers is a tacit recognition of the fact 
that the legal order can indeed be suspended, and that when it happens, the separation between 
the state and itself will be made manifest. However, this care can be understood as the legal 
order preparing the terms of its own suspension in order to ensure its survival once the 
suspension has been lifted. Beyond a question of their separation during the exception, it would 
seem that the problem of sovereignty viewed from a decisionist perspective reveals the 
difference between the political community as such and the regime of norms that may be 
transposed upon it. Thus, it is possible that the greatest challenge for liberal regimes, or for any 
regime that rests upon a priori normativist principles, is to make the legal order coincide with 
the state.  
The third chapter of Political Theology, is entitled “Political Theology” in which Schmitt 
expounds the elements of his theologico-political doctrine at length. The first paragraph itself 
deserves to be quoted in its entirety as it seems to express both the normative and the 
programmatic aspects of a theologico-political science: “All significant concepts of the modern 
theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical 
development – in which they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby 
for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver – but also because of their 
systematic structure, the recognition of which is necessary for a sociological consideration of 
these concepts. The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology. Only 
by being aware of this analogy can we appreciate the manner in which the philosophical ideas 
of the state developed in the last centuries”.14 The secularisation thesis is here formulated in 
terms of a determinism that unites the course of European political history with the structure 
and the content of the intellectual engagement and reflection upon politics. As such the 
secularisation thesis, or the process of secularisation, offers a tool for the understanding of the 
history of political ideas. Schmitt’s demonstration of the thesis takes the form of an a posteriori 
schematisation of the changes that characterised the development of European thinking on the 
political15. But beyond this descriptive function, the thesis is also deeply critical. The definition 
of sovereign as the one who decides on the exception sets for the ground for the development 
                                                          
14 Schmitt, ibid., p.36. 
15 Montserrat Herrero. The Political Discourse of Carl Schmitt: A Mystic of Order. London: Rowman & Littlefield 
International 2015, pp.158-159.  
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of political theology as the type of enquiry that considers the problem of power, authority, 
legitimacy, and, indeed, sovereignty in terms of an analogy between the concepts of theology 
and politics. In the course of the process of secularisation, the very possibility of analogy is 
precluded by the claims of detheologisation that operate within the ideology of progress and of 
man’s emancipation from religion. The normativist liberal theory of sovereignty through its 
identification of the state with the liberal legal order conceals not merely the decisionary nature 
of real sovereignty but also downplays the possible analogy between political and divine 
sovereignty.  
As much as the Enlightenment rejected miracles, that is, direct divine interventions outside of 
the scope of the laws of the natural world, the liberal regimes rejected the personal and 
decisionary authority of a monarch, whether hereditary or elected. But the example of the 
analogy between the miracle and the exception is only one feature of a broader domain of 
analogy between the theology and the juristic. For Schmitt, it was Leibniz who first recognised 
the striking similarities between the juristic and the theological16. In both of these, a dual 
principle seems to obtain: on the one hand, reason or nature (natural theology and natural law), 
and on the other, scripture and written laws (divine commandments and positive laws). It was 
the Catholic authors of the counter-revolution who, in the context of the revolutionary turmoil 
of the late 18th century and of the 19th century, developed the themes of the analogical 
convergence of the political and the theological. These “Catholic philosophers of the counter-
revolution” are Bonald, Maistre and Donosos Cortes, in whose works Schmitt recognises “a 
conceptually clear and systematic analogy, and not merely that kind of playing with ideas, 
whether mystical, natural-philosophical, or even romantic, which, as with everything else, so 
also with state and society, yields colourful symbols and pictures”.17 In this endorsement of 
these particular writers and the rejection of other types or styles of approaching the subject, 
Schmitt identifies his own project with the rigorous and clear method of the “Catholic 
philosophers of the counter-revolution”. In the rest of the chapter, contrasts this methodical 
approach to political theology, understood as a sociology of concepts, with other attempts, past 
or contemporary, at apprehending the nature of the state. In this sustained critique of Kelsen, 
Schmitt argues that the analogy of theological and juridical concepts cannot be analysed by 
applying the method of the natural sciences. Such analysis would only be partial and would fail 
to take into account the nature of the similarity (and difference) between the two sets of 
                                                          
16 Schmitt, ibid., p.37. 
17 Schmitt, ibid., p.37. 
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concepts. For the method of the natural sciences, based upon the scepticism of the 
Enlightenment, is inherently critical of the possibility of the truth of theological propositions. 
It would fail to do justice to the meaning ascribed to theological concepts. Unless, of course, 
one’s aim was precisely to promote a particular concept of the juridical (and of the political) 
defined by its emancipation from theological thinking.  
The question of the relations between the theological and juridical disciplines and domains of 
thought is also connected to the question of the causal relation between the philosophical ideas 
of the Enlightenment and the political conditions of the revolutionary era. For Schmitt, both 
the spiritualist deterministic philosophy of history and the materialistic one, taken separately, 
inevitably tend to “construct a contrast between two spheres, and then they dissolve this 
contrast into nothing by reducing one to the other”.18 The Schmittian sociology of concept, on 
the other hand, aims at considering both simultaneously without reducing the one to the other: 
“It aims to discover the basic, radically systematic structure and to compare this conceptual 
structure with the conceptually represented social structure of a certain epoch. There is no 
question here of whether the idealities produced by radical conceptualisation are a reflex of 
sociological reality, or whether social reality is conceived of as the result of a particular kind 
of thinking and therefore also of acting”.19 Thus, the concern here is with the simultaneous 
comprehension and demonstration of “two spiritual but at the same time substantial 
identities”. The sociology of concepts aims at showing the correspondence between particular 
juridical concepts with the wider and dominant social ideologies of the various epochs of 
history. This correspondence expresses itself in the systemic agreement between the structural 
concepts of one politics with the metaphysical concepts of theology: “The metaphysical image 
that a definite epoch forges of the world has the same structure as what the world immediately 
understands to be appropriate as a form of its political organisation”.20 Every successive stage 
of the secularisation of the European mind-set is accompanied by a consistency between 
dominant beliefs and the political organisation of European society. Throughout the process, 
the gradual expulsion of the idea of a transcendent God from the public life of societies 
proceeds concomitantly with the immanentisation of the notion of sovereignty (and, therefore, 
legitimacy) as developed by Bodin and Hobbes. This immanentisation is itself really the 
application of the doctrine of “popular sovereignty” to the concept of sovereignty as such. In 
democratic constitutions, the supreme decisionary agency is immanentised and neutralised, 
                                                          
18 Schmitt, ibid., p.43. 
19 Schmitt, ibid., p.45. 
20 Schmitt, ibid., p.46.  
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through the depersonalisation characterising the economic and technical organisation of 
society, and the conversation or discussion about literary and philosophical commonplaces that 
never end and are never resolved21. Thus, the problem of politics, which depends upon the 
decision between moral opposites, is also forever delayed and never solved. At such a juncture, 
even the question of legitimacy disappears before the absolute imperative of the decision, 
which can only be the act of a dictator. In other words, the survival of the state depends on its 
monopoly on politics understood as the supreme exercise in decision.  
Schmitt did not confine the application of his theologico-political sociology of concept to the 
problem of sovereignty. In Roman Catholicism and Political Form, the book immediately 
published after Political Theology in 1923, he renews his criticism of the technical and 
economic depoliticised world dominated by liberalism by pointing to certain aspects of the 
Roman Catholic Church. Against the inward-looking and world-denying nature of 
Protestantism that is ever retreating to the private sphere, the Catholic Church places itself in 
the arena of public life and organises itself as a public entity with juridical personality: “The 
political power of Catholicism rests neither on economic nor on military means but rather on 
the absolute realization of authority. (…) the Church is the consummate agency of the juridical 
spirit and the true heir of Roman jurisprudence. Therein - in its capacity to assume juridical 
form - lies one of its sociological secrets”.22 The connection between the Roman Church and 
“political form” proceeds from the Church’s power of representation, in that it represents both 
the living, historical connection with the central dogmas of the Christian faith, but also the city 
of man. This is what make of it, in Schmitt’s view a complexion oppositorum, a place where 
opposites coincide. In a way, the Church unites its “person” both the scriptural tropes of the 
heavenly and earthly Jerusalem with the unique Roman legal spirit. The unity and cohesion of 
the juridical and bureaucratic organisation of the Church, united with a particular notion of 
authority made it both the object of the envy and of the hatred of those forces which promoted 
the detheologisation of politics. The depersonalised notion of representation, derived from this 
detheologisation of politics inherent in the liberal-economic social model, has deprived 
democratic institution of any real power in purely political terms. 
 In purely human terms, it is precisely this autonomous capacity for juridical self-understanding 
and self-organisation that has enabled the Church to navigate historical change. For it is a 
                                                          
21 Cf. Schmitt, ibid., p.65. 
22 Schmitt. Roman Catholicism and Political Form (Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form, 1923). 
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996, pp.18-19. 
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capacity that lends itself to adaptation while maintaining the hierarchical structure of authority. 
For Schmitt, the liberal-economic “politics” of the regimes of the early 1920s was no politics 
at all: it is merely the management of the processes of production and consumption, determined 
by the capitalistic structuring of the world economy. In his opinion, the accommodation of the 
Church with such regimes will only be fruitful and advantageous for the Church when and if 
those regimes gain political form. Should they even, due to historical circumstances, lose it 
after having struck such an alliance, the Church would still be able to provide for what is 
lacking in the state, namely, a principle of authority23. This imperative for the state to find 
political form derives from the theory of the societas perfecta, of the two perfect societies, 
according to which, the Church and the state are meant to coexistence together as perfect 
societies. How can the state be a perfect society if it is wanting in the formal condition of the 
political form and in the exercise of representation? The absence of political form in the state 
will result in an inevitable imbalance in the relationship between the two societies. The worst 
that could happen for society would be the simultaneous retreat both of religion and of the state 
in the private sphere through the depoliticisation of institutions and the privatisation of beliefs. 
Then, political form would be truly absent from the public organisation of society, and the 
liberal project, in Schmitt’s view, would have arrived at its conclusion. Against the critics of 
the Roman Church (here Dostoevsky), he points out that even the juridical mode of the 
Church’s representation of Christ is oriented towards the eschatological form of the Last 
Judgement. The juridical conception of the Church together with the Christian pursuits of peace 
and justice presents a truly unique historical instantiation of the complexio oppositorum, which 
itself is but an element in the formalised dualistic structure that pervades the whole of Schmitt’s 
thought, together with the friend-enemy distinction, and later, the emphasis of duality in the 
very Godhead. The very structure of secularisation itself implies the distinction between that 
which is to be secularised, that is ever liable to secularisation over and against that which is 
already secularised. The dialectical nature of the sociology of concept here emerges as one of 
the enduring characteristics of Schmitt’s political theology.  
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Schmitt, op.cit., p.25. 
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iii. Two Responses to Schmitt: Peterson and Blumenberg  
In this section, two responses, more or less direct, to the political theology elaborated by 
Schmitt (especially as contained in Political Theology of 1922) will be analysed. The merit of 
these two responses is that they are not merely reactive: they carry with them, or were written 
in the context of, truly original contributions to the study of theologico-political themes.  
Erik Peterson  
Erik Peterson, a Lutheran convert to Catholicism, had established his academic reputation in 
the study of the texts and practices of Christian antiquity. While still a Lutheran, he was 
involved in the debates regarding modernism (such as propounded by Harnack and Bultmann) 
and other, more conservatively oriented, currents (as articulated in the works of Barth) that 
prevalent or emergent in Lutheran, or broadly, Protestant theology24. Even after his conversion, 
he carried on with his reflections on the nature of the church, which were the occasions of mild 
controversies among his new co-religionists. It was in 1935 that he published the essay entitled: 
“Monotheism as a Political Problem: A Contribution to the History of Political Theology in 
the Roman Empire”. Peterson starts by surveying the connections between the concepts of 
monarchy and monotheism in the ancient Greek classical tradition, particular in Aristotle’s 
analogy between the necessity for a single principle in the universe and human monarchical 
rule, as expressed in the famous quotation from the Iliad, quoted at the end of Book XII of the 
Metaphysics: “Beings do not want to be governed badly; ‘the rule of many is not good, let one 
be ruler’”.25 Aristotle’s analogy is fundamentally metaphysical inasmuch as his notion of God 
is that of the ultimate cause and end of the entire universe, “the transcendent goal (telos) of all 
movement, and only in that sense king, only in that sense monarch”.26 After Aristotle, starting 
with the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De Mundo, the transcendentally causal ground of the 
analogy becomes more immanent as the powers of God are conceived as acting in a very direct 
manner in the world, while God himself remains outside of the world. Here, Peterson contrasts 
a putative Aristotelian unity (cosmic power deriving from the divine principle) that itself would 
make of divine monarchy the principle of political authority, on the one hand, with a distinction 
between power and principle based on Platonic dualism, in which case, the relation between 
                                                          
24 This section relies principally on the translation of Peterson’s Theologische Traktate (originally published in 
1951) by Michael Hollerich entitled “Theological Tractates” published at the Stanford University Press in 2011. 
Some details of Peterson’s biography may also be gleaned from this book.  
25 Erik Peterson. Theological Tractates. Trans. Michael Hollerich. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011, 
p.69. 
26 Peterson, op.cit., p.70. 
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the activities of kingship and those of the Demiurge would be radically different, not 
comparable and not liable of being analogised. With the Stoics, and later, Philo of Alexandria, 
the meaning of the divine activity in the world is liked to that of the ruler of a city: it is the 
world itself that is likened to a city (polis) and God deemed to be its leader and king (hegemon 
kai basileus). But for Philo, the issue is not merely one of an analogy between natural theology 
and politics as such. For “he is interested in neither the question of the unity or multiplicity of 
metaphysical principles” given that “the theologico-political problem is set against the 
background of Judaism”. Philo is concerned primarily with the explanation of the Jewish 
teaching on monotheism as contained in the Jewish Law (the Torah) to an audience of 
Hellenistic proselytes. The expression “monarchy” thus comes to designate the specific 
content of the Jewish revelation, namely, the oneness of God, with all its theologico-political 
implications. And, it is as such, according to Peterson, that the expression is transmitted to 
early Christianity, as evidenced in the works of Justin Martyr. Divine monarchy, in this sense, 
becomes a motif of Christian apologetics in the debates with pagans. However, by virtue of the 
very developments of the Christian beliefs in the divinity of Christ in the ante-Nicene period, 
the concept of a divine monarchy became more problematic. How could the divine monarchy 
be preserved while at the same time professing the trinity of divine persons? In the 3rd century 
A.D., Pope Dionysius of Rome, in a letter addressing the Sabellianist movement, refers back 
to the Aristotelian notion when he writes of the divine monarchy not in terms of kingly rule but 
in terms of first principle: the Father, as first principle, was never without the Logos and the 
Holy Ghost. Thus, for Pope Dionysius, monarchy was to be understood cosmologically and 
metaphysically, and not politically27. This is the path that would be followed in the next century 
by the Cappadocian Fathers (Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Gregory of Nyssa) in 
their articulation and defence of Nicene trinitarianism against Arians and Semi-Arians. 
However, against the pagans such as Celsus who argued that Christianity was ultimately 
subversive both of the established order of the Roman Empire, the Christians apologists had to 
show the transcendental continuity between the church and the empire. Eusebius of Caesarea, 
following Origen of Alexandria (who debated against Celsus) would seek to reintroduce the 
notion of the political monarchy by an articulation of a philosophy of history whereby the 
coming of Christ and the pacification of the oikoumené or inhabited world by the Roman 
Empire were seen as necessarily concomitant events of world history. The universalism of the 
Christian religion, based upon religious monotheism, is compared to the universalism of the 
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Roman Empire, which dissolves national particularism and unites all peoples under the 
monarchy of the emperor. With the promulgation of the Edict of Milan and the defeat of 
Licinius in 313 by Constantine, “political monarchy was re-established and at the same time 
the divine Monarchy was secured”.28 In Eusebius’s theology of history, the advent of Augustus 
after the last Civil Wars of the Roman Republic foreshadowed and prepared the advent of 
Christ. One brought about earthly peace while the other was himself the Prince of Peace. With 
Constantine, the two strands of world history were, as it were, united together, in preparation 
for the second coming of Christ. As it will be seen in Chapter II, this providential understanding 
of the Roman Empire would remain if only to be adapted in the self-understanding of mediaeval 
Western Christendom and the subsequent theories regarding the translatio imperii. Eventually, 
however, the weakness of the Eusebian political theology or “Augustus theology”, as Peterson 
called it, would be revealed in the barbarian attacks against Rome in the late 4th and 5th centuries 
until its collapse. For Peterson, the pagan polemicists were right: orthodox Nicene Christianity 
had appeared as a revolt against the metaphysical and political foundations of the Roman 
Empire. Arian Christianity, on the other hand, with its unequivocal idea of the idea of divine 
monarchy, which was exclusive of the divinity of Christ, appealed to the political sense of the 
Roman emperors who supported it. In Peterson’s words, “Orthodox Trinitarian doctrine in 
effect threatened the political theology of the Roman Empire”.29 It was left to Gregory of 
Nazianzus to synthesise the doctrine of monarchy with that of the Trinity. In the third of his 
famous Theological Orations, he argued that the in the Christian confession of the divine 
monarchy, the latter term must not be understood to apply to only one person of the Trinity, 
but rather that it apply all three persons who are bound together by the unity of essence. Such 
a conception of unity has no equivalent, no correspondence in the order of creation30. And it is 
precisely because of the proclamation of this Trinitarian dogma, of triunity, which exists only 
in the Godhead, that the possibility of any Christian political theology based upon monotheism 
is foreclosed. As much as Gregory had disposed of the theological arguments for a Christian 
political theology of the Roman Empire, Peterson would argue that it was Augustine who 
would question the Eusebian understanding of the Augustan peace, and wider theology of 
history, in his treatise on the City of God.   
What comes out of Peterson’s rich demonstrations is that the theologico-political theme of the 
divine monarchy is radically changed in the proclamation of the Trinitarian dogma. With the 
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introduction (or, from a theological perspective, the revelation) of the trinity of persons within 
the divine unity, the ground for the analogy between the divine government of the world and 
the human government of the city disappears. For a monotheism (such as that retained by the 
Enlightenment) and a divine monarchy that does not take the Trinitarian dogma into account 
and somehow cannot alter the ground of analogy to accommodate it becomes utterly 
indefensible from a Christian theological perspective. The similarity is reduced to shared 
semantic signs with corresponding assonant, if not dissonant, concepts. For Peterson, a deep 
equivocity attends any attempt at a Christian political theology. The continuity between the 
image of the government of the world and the image of the government of the city is 
suppressed, and a radical difference between politics and theology is affirmed. In his essay 
“Christ as Imperator”, Peterson argues that the Christian appropriation of imperial symbolism 
in the Book of Revelation and in subsequent Christian authors is meant as an implicit challenge 
to human rulership: “the juxtaposition of Christ with the emperor is not some timeless piece of 
symbolism but a polemical symbol of an actual struggle”.31 Christ is the imperator, the military 
commander leading his troops, leads his army of martyrs to fight the powers of the world not 
with swords and weapons but in the confession of faith in his kingship. The eschatological 
horizon of the outcome of this struggle is unmistakeable, for “the Church regards Christ as 
imperator in anticipation of his kingship of the world to come”.32 The Christian appropriation 
of the symbols of emperorship and kingly rule, and their attribution to Christ is neither because 
of the continuity between the Empire and the kingdom of Christ, nor yet because there is a need 
to legitimise the Empire upon theological grounds. The eschatological perspective expressed 
here meant that the struggle was not to be on the usual human terms of armed confrontation. 
The liturgy as the work of the Church in anticipation of the kingdom evoked and invoked the 
membership of the angels, past martyrs, and the saints in the Church triumphant. And this work 
of anticipation itself is based upon the Christian profession of faith and the witness to Christ’s 
kingship. So, it is the Church, as the supratemporal body of all believers, of martyrs and of 
angels that is identical, or at least, continuous with the Kingdom.  
The foreclosure of political theology put forward by Peterson is inherently theological, that is, 
it is inscribed in a worldview that is strictly theological – the apprehension of the political is, 
therefore, also strictly theological, and strictly limited in its historical scope. This is so because 
he had to demonstrate how early on in the history of the Church the development and 
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19 
 
stabilisation of the Trinitarian dogma precluded the possibility of theologico-political analogy 
of continuity not only as understood by Schmitt, but more generally. His demonstration of the 
theological impossibility of a political theology is nonetheless directed explicitly at Schmitt 
whose arguments in Political Theology (1922) he characterised as being not systematic33. A 
part of Schmitt’s arguments in his treatise Political Theology II is directed to Peterson’s 
critique.34 What Schmitt reproaches Peterson is that the latter has constructed on the basis of a 
theological formalisation of the arguments put forward in Political Theology (1922) a 
definition of political theology as such that is limited both in its substantial content and formal 
description. The foreclosure of political theology limited to the 4th century thus precludes the 
very existence of certain modes of theologico-political themes from a Christian perspective 
throughout history. For Schmitt, it is clear that Peterson failed to appreciate that what he was 
doing in the treatise of 1922 was to delineate a historical sociology of juridical concepts on the 
basis of an analogy with theological concepts, not from a theological perspective, but from a 
juridical one. Peterson’s dismissal of Schmitt’s treatise is itself theological, or indeed, religious, 
and raises the question of the right relation between disciplines, in this case, theology and 
jurisprudence. It is in the interdisciplinary arena where canon law and civil or secular law meet 
that Schmitt situates the first Political Theology.35 It is therefore a question of competence – 
who and on what authority can one pretend to write any political theology? Or, as he himself 
put it: “Who answers in concreto, on behalf of the concrete autonomously acting human being, 
the question of what is spiritual, what is worldly and what is the case with the res mixtae, 
which, in the interval between the first and the second arrival of the Lord, constitute, as a 
matter of fact, the entire earthly existence of this spiritual-worldly, spiritual-temporal, double-
creature called a human being?”36  
It could be countered that Schmitt at first refuses to address Peterson’s critique, on theological 
grounds, by taking refuge in the “thickets of the law”37 qua discipline, and reduces everything 
to his formulation of decisionism. He did respond by giving his own interpretation of the 
passage from Gregory of Nazianzus (Third Theological Oration, ii) that Peterson used to 
express the foreclosure of any Christian political theology. Schmitt focuses on a part of a 
sentence where Gregory is discussing the action of the One (or Unity) in producing plurality: 
                                                          
33 Cf. The last footnote to “Monotheism as Political Problem”, pp.233-234, in op.cit.  
34 Schmitt. Political Theology II: The Myth of the Closure of Any Political Theology. Originally published in 1970. 
Cambridge: Polity Press 2008. 
35 Schmitt. Political Theology II. Chapter 3: The Legendary Conclusion, p.109.  
36 Schmitt, ibid., p.115.  
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“to Hen stasiazon pros heauton polla kathistasthai”. He translates “to Hen stasiazon pros 
heauton” as “the One is always in uproar against itself”.38 Whereas for Peterson, the recourse 
to Gregory was meant to show the stability of the theological dogma of the Trinity, Schmitt 
sees in this uproar of the One against itself the very possibility of instability within the deity, 
compounded by the fact that the word stasis, from which the verb stasiazon is derived, can be 
interpreted either as rest or unrest (or still, revolution or civil war). Gregory’s notion implies 
that the divine life itself is fraught with dialectical tension, which would make of it the locus, 
indeed, the primeval locus of conflict, and therefore, of the friend-enemy distinction. The 
conflict would be between a God of creation and a God of redemption, or between the God of 
the New and the God of the New Testament. This putative theologico-political stasiology 
(discourse on revolution or unrest) would, however, be based not on the orthodox resolution of 
dualism and plurality within the deity, but on Gnostic dualism that posits the absoluteness of 
the duality. Nevertheless, it is this structural problem of Gnostic dualism that remains at the 
heart of earthly conflicts in an immanentised form: here, Schmitt moves from a divine 
stasiology to a political one. Ultimately, politics is a contest between those who want change 
(the image of the redeemer god) and those who resist it (the image of the creator god): both the 
Reformation and the revolutionary movements, and the responses to them, can be understood 
in terms of this duality. It should be clear that Schmitt is looking at the latent political problem 
of plurality within the deity from a formal and structural perspective, whereas Peterson’s thesis 
of foreclosure proceeds from a profession of faith in the orthodox definitions of the Trinity. 
The latter is clearly not concerned with the political consequences of this choice, namely the 
exclusive profession of a doctrine. Or, rather, from his essays on the Church, the angels and 
Christ39, it is clear that he is resigned to the eventuality of martyrdom for those who subscribe 
to revelation in an absolute sense, but even there the potentially political decision to inflict 
martyrdom is seen sub specie aeternitatis. He refuses to be drawn in the decisionary question 
that Schmitt seems to find at the heart of the res mixtae, in the juridical interface shared by 
church and state. Peterson’s conclusion on the foreclosure of any political theology is, however, 
not a denial of the legitimacy of theologico-political reflection. But such reflection can never 
be resigned to a state of theological indifference or neutrality with respect to the substance of 
the theologico-political themes to be studied. Peterson denies the possibility of theological 
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neutrality, seeing history as the foreground for the cosmic battle between truth and falsehood, 
whereas for Schmitt, all claims to neutrality are inherently political.  
His is a negative or anti-political theology that locates the ultimate ground of conflict not in 
God, but in creation, between the city of God and the city of man. The Augustinian influence 
is palpable in the entire essay, even though the Bishop of Hippo is sparingly mentioned40. But 
St Augustine and the other authorities mentioned by Peterson either only knew a pagan state 
that was hostile to Christianity or one in which the relations between the emperors and a 
legalised Christianity were ever volatile. It appears, therefore, that the foreclosure does not take 
into account what would turn out to be the mediaeval experience of the Christian city. And it 
this city that would remain the pattern from which modernity would seek to emancipate itself.  
 
Hans Blumenberg  
It was precisely this emancipation and the autonomous world of self-representation that 
Blumenberg, the noted philosopher and historian of ideas, wanted to vindicate. Blumenberg’s 
book “The Legitimacy of the Modern Age”41 was originally directed towards Karl Löwith’s 
views on the secular expressed in the latter’s book from 1949, “Meaning in History”.42 For 
Löwith, the modern age still carries within itself the seed of the conflict within Christianity and 
paganism, and its historical self-understanding retains secularised elements (the idea of 
progress as secularised eschatology) that properly belong to the Christian worldview. 
Modernity is, in this, respect seen as an illegitimate offshoot of the Christian tradition, for 
modern history so far has shown itself to be “Christian by derivation and anti-Christian by 
consequence”.43 This anti-Christian aspect of modern history is paradoxically due to the 
application of Christian principles, whereby the desacralisation of the world operated by 
Christianity comes to be applied to Christianity itself. This derivation of modernity out of 
Christianity implied a substantial unity and continuity of history that precluded the eruption of 
the genuine emancipation and autonomy of the human sphere at once from the physical itself, 
and from the past. Rather, for Blumenberg, the similarity between the modern and pre-modern 
western civilisations is due to the reoccupation by modernity of concepts, symbols and spaces 
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that Christianity had relinquished. With the advent of the Copernican revolution and the 
fragmentation of the mediaeval church into denominations, Christianity was revealed in its 
failure to provide a true image of the world to man. It was incapable of answering man’s deepest 
questions about the world and his place in the world. With the cosmotheological venture of 
Christianity and its failure, the consciousness of man “has been overextended then 
disappointed in regard to the great questions and great hopes”.44 The reoccupation itself was 
not an act of continuity with Christianity but one of historical opportunity, and the fact that, 
through the secularisation theorem, the legitimacy of this reoccupation is question shows there 
was no “successful transition to self-disposition”. This was certainly enabled by the persistence 
within language of metaphors, and, indeed, one could say fictions that are mistaken for the 
signs of a hidden meaning, and the perdurance of a pre-modern substance within modernity 
itself. Blumenberg finds that the secularisation theorem finds its strongest statement in 
Schmitt’s first Political Theology in the proposition: “all the significant concepts of the modern 
doctrine of the state are secularized theological concepts”.45 Sovereignty understood as the 
decision on the exception is one such significant concept (if not the most significant in that 
particular treatise), which also at the same time points to a particular failure of the 
Enlightenment in the elaboration of modern politics. This, for Blumenberg, it is not so much 
the evidence of a secularised theological concept as that of a “dualistic typology of 
situations”46 united in the common employment of the same metaphor of sovereignty. The 
persistence of metaphors, during the French Revolution, for example, pertains to the 
requirements to perform the tasks dictated by the imperatives of the times: “it is a choice of 
elements from the selective point of view of the immediate need, (…), for background and 
pathos”.47 Basing himself on Schmitt’s own statement to the effect that his assertions on 
political theology have been “about a systematic structural kinship between theological and 
juristic concepts that obtrudes itself both in legal theory and legal practice”,48 Blumenberg 
argues that this “formulation reduces to the secularisation thesis to the concept of structural 
analogy”, and that, while this systematic structural kinship makes something visible (the 
relation between the concepts), it “no longer implies any assertion about the derivation of the 
one structure from the other or of both from a common prototype”.49 The structures are neither 
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temporally nor substantially continuous with one another – in other words, they are neither 
essentially cotemporal nor consubstantial. It is possible to acknowledge the justice of these 
assertions while at the same time maintaining the integrity of certain aspects of Schmitt’s 
political theology. For what is at stake in the debate on political theology between Blumenberg 
and Schmitt is not so much the question of secularisation as that of the similarity between 
politics and theology, between jurisprudence and canon law. The secularisation thesis is meant 
to explain how the structural analogy between the theological and the political is made present 
in society. It is not itself the explanatory core of political theology. For either the structural 
analogy stands or it does not – the intrinsic relation between the substances have to be 
necessary, while the relation between their respective outward forms is left to the contingence 
of historical situations, as Schmitt pointed out in Roman Catholicism and Political Form. The 
secularisation thesis is an attempt to pierce through the historical contingencies, and arrive at 
the proper relation, or better, ground of comparison between theology and politics. It is also 
because the relation is an analogical one, safeguarding the ontological, and therefore causal, 
distinction between the domains, that any political theology is at all possible. Instead of 
conceiving of the similarity between the domains in terms of shared attributes, Schmitt instead 
stresses the comparable systematic structures, and the proper proportionality between the 
analogates. God’s creative relationship to the cosmos is not a metaphor for political 
sovereignty, neither is the miracle a metaphor for the exception. What God is the cosmos, so 
the sovereign is to the polity, and what miracle is to the natural order, so the exception is to the 
legal order. Yet, it could be countered that for political theology to be properly theological, and 
not simply conceptually descriptive, it would need to include a consideration of the attributes 
of God, and how these attributes come to be instantiated in the political realm. Thus, the use 
and understanding of analogy will depend ultimately on one’s understanding of the nature and 
goals of political theology. For Blumenberg’s attitude to political theology is one of mild 
indifference as long as it is not intrinsically directed at contesting the legitimacy of modernity. 
Even if it be granted there is no necessary connection between political theology, the 
secularisation thesis and the argument of the illegitimacy of the modern world still does not 
and cannot preclude the critical assessment of this modernity on the basis of the metaphysical 
structure of politics. That Blumenberg seems to overlook this possibility follows from his 
univocal understanding of modernity as emancipation from all metaphysical modes of 
questioning such that any metaphysics and any theology are no more possible as adequate 
accounts of the world. The denial of scientific status to theology and to political theology 
ensures that they are properly neutralised and made harmless with respect to the claims of 
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modernity. It is questionable not only whether this could happen on Blumenberg’s terms, that 
is, organically and progressively, or more importantly, whether it could happen in a manner 
that would prevent the friend-enemy distinction from being shown to be operative. In other 
words, the detheologisation, and for Schmitt, the inevitably concomitant depoliticisation, of 
the world must itself proceed from a political decision. Thus, it is not certain that the modern 
age could ever avoid from being described from the perspective of what it opposes and rejects. 
And in this, the situation is comparable to that between Christianity and ancient paganism, in 
that the former will never be able to avoid being understood in the light of the latter. But this, 
as such, is not a problem for Christianity as it locates its ultimate ground of legitimacy both 
inside and outside of history.  
 
iv. Ecclesiological Political Theology: Maritain and Journet  
As much as the focus of juridical political theology was primarily the state and political form, 
that of ecclesiological political theology is primarily either Christianity, or the Church and its 
relations not only to the state or politics, but to the world more broadly.  
Jacques Maritain  
The historical circumstances surrounding the compilation (out of lectures given in Spain in 
1934) and the publication of “True Humanism” by Jacques Maritain in 1936 are complex and 
varied50. The 1930s were full of political and revolutionary ferment. After the fall of the 
monarchy and the establishment of the republic, Spain was already in the throes of the latent 
conflict that will flare up in the Civil War. In 1933, Pope Pius XI, renewing with his 
condemnations of communism, had issued an encyclical denouncing the spoliations and 
exactions that the new republican regime, with its base of communist and anarchist supporters, 
was visiting upon the Spanish Church. In 1926, the same pope had also condemned the Action 
Francaise and Charles Maurras (with whom Maritain had been on friendly terms after his 
conversion to Catholicism in 1906) on the basis that integral nationalism, its view of religion, 
and Catholicism in particular, in the service of this nationalism, as incompatible with the 
Catholic faith. These external historical events and the imperative to avoid what were perceived 
and condemned as extremes, combined with his own particular philosophical trajectory, 
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convinced Maritain to attempt to articulate the “problems incident to a new realisation of 
Christendom”.51 Furthermore, because the world that came out of the Renaissance and the 
Reformation “has since been torn by powerful and truly monstrous energies, where truth and 
error are strangely commingled and feed upon each other (…) It is the duty of those who love 
wisdom to seek to purify these unnatural and destructive energies, and to rescue the truths that 
they have so distorted”.52 Maritain’s aim in the book is twofold: first, it is to recover a particular 
truth that became confused with error in the period after the Renaissance and the Reformation 
(this corresponds to the first part of “True Humanism”), and to articulate the problems and the 
general principles of a putative new Christendom (dealt with in the second part of the book). 
His definition of humanism will form the basis of his later critique of the developments of the 
concept of humanism from the 16th century down to his own day. Humanism is what 
“essentially tends to render man more truly human and to make his original greatness manifest 
by causing him to participate in all that can enrich him in nature and history. (…) It at once 
demands that man make use of all the potentialities he holds within him, his creative powers 
and the life of reason, and labours to make the powers of the physical world the instruments of 
his freedom”.53 Maritain himself recognised that his definition was capable of divergent 
interpretations. But this divergence precisely comes from the fact that the truths contained in 
this definition have been mixed with errors. These truths need to be “purified” and represented 
in order to address the challenges that come from systems of thought that still rely upon the 
admixture and to articulate the pattern for a new Christendom. This leads Maritain to look for 
the origins of the corruption or admixture of truth and errors in the immediate history of the 
Western world, starting with the Renaissance and the Reformation. These origins can be 
located in the reaction and opposition to the answers to the questions regarding man’s being, 
his relation to God and to his destiny given in the mediaeval (mostly, Augustinian and 
Thomistic) synthesis of Christian revelation and Greek wisdom. This synthesis reflected a keen 
awareness of man as being at once a natural and a supernatural being, endowed with 
personhood. The whole life of the human being was seen in the context of the fulfilment of his 
nature according to the dispensations of nature and of revelation. The self-awareness of the 
human creature was mediated through an awareness of his place in the order of the universe, 
and of his obligations and duties, natural and supernatural. However, the dissolution of the 
mediaeval order, and the heroic humanism that defined it, was signalled by the despair 
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occasioned by the Great Plague (expressed in the late mediaeval “Dance of Death” motif in 
art and poetry), together with the political and religious troubles of the 15th century. The 
certainty about man’s place in the world order was shaken both by these events and by the 
advances in the sciences and in navigation. Man abandoned himself to “the subjective 
resources of his greatness or the subjective determinism of his misery” both of which form the 
respective core of the Renaissance and of the Reformation. For the later, it is no more the world 
and society that furnish the stable ground of man’s relationship with God; instead, it is his 
despair in front of the spectacle of his own utter depravity and inability to obey the divine law 
that determines his self-perception. On the other hand, what with the suppression of free will, 
man’s response to God’s grace is entirely predestined, either to salvation or to damnation. The 
Renaissance’s insistence on the intrinsic dignity of man will lead to the notion of natural 
goodness and of the supremacy of reason. Man, being a naturally good and rational animal, 
surveys the mechanical structure of the world and holds his destiny in his own hand. The 
theology of the Reformation is that of “grace without freedom” while that of Renaissance 
humanism is that of “freedom without grace”.54 Maritain, thus, distinguishes between two 
kinds of humanism: one that is theocentric, which only an outspoken Christian humanism can 
be, and another that is anthropocentric, which came out of the dialectic between the 
Reformation and the Renaissance. This anthropocentric humanism is premised upon a 
naturalistic understanding of human nature and of human freedom.  
From the inception of anthropocentric humanism, Maritain postulates a history of Western 
culture that is comprised of three phases or moments. The first phase is that of Christian 
naturalism, where it was expected that a purely rational human order, still conceived in a 
Christian style, would replace the decayed mediaeval world. This is the phase of man’s 
supremacy over nature and over the world. In the second phase, the purely natural human order 
that is being articulated demands and obtains its emancipation from the Christian style, which 
had remained as a mere ornament of the real mechanistic structure of a world constantly being 
discovered. It is accompanied by the extension of man’s imperialism over natural forces. 
Maritain calls this phase “the moment of rationalist optimism, the bourgeois hour of our 
culture.”55 The third phase is that of revolutionary and atheist materialism that seeks to 
overturn all traditional values and establish a new humanity. The death of God is announced 
by the technical mastery of man, to which, he readily subordinates himself and society.  
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Against this deployment of atheist technicity upon society and civilisation, Maritain opposes 
two Christian positions, one Barthian, the other Thomist. He rejects the Barthian position as it 
is a recasting of the classical reformed tropes about the utter depravity of man, the rejection of 
all philosophy and the promotion of grace that is exclusive of human freedom. This position 
also includes the rejection of the Catholic understanding of the Church, which is dismissed as 
being too human. The other position, adopted and adapted by Maritain himself, was the 
Thomist, “integralist” or even “progressive one”. Its avowed aim, as he understands it, is to 
rescue and reclaim humanism from anthropocentricism, and to operate a renewal of society 
and culture. It is under the aegis of the Church that this renewal is to happen. But this 
proposition opens a new set of problems or questions about the right relation between the 
spiritual and the temporal, religion and civilisation, religion and politics, the Church and the 
state, and between the Church and the Kingdom of God itself.  
Against the ancient pagan positions, Christianity posits the transcendence of religion, as 
belonging to the supernatural order: “it is not part of man, nor of the world, nor of a race, nor 
of a culture, nor of civilisation, - it belongs to the inner life of God”.56 While man, and the rest, 
can be a part of it, the temporal and supernatural orders can never be merged, for their not 
formally identical. The natural order is concerned with man’s earthly life, while the 
supernatural order is concerned with his eternal life. However, while the two orders are distinct, 
the Christian view, in the Thomist sense, is that the natural must have reference and be 
subordinate to the supernatural order. The infinite superiority of the supernatural order does 
not mean that the natural order, in being made subordinate to it, should lose its natural 
specificity of object and end; rather, the end of the natural order it itself raised to a higher plane. 
A theocentric perspective, in placing man and the natural order in their rightful places, does 
not diminish or still less negate their dignity, but raises it.  
The distinction and the subordination of the natural to the supernatural order ultimately places 
the problematic of the relations between the orders in the eschatological perspective of the 
expectation of the Kingdom of God. It is at this point that Maritain enters into an explicit 
discussion about political theology. He starts out by making a distinction between the meaning 
of the German term “politische theologie” and the French term “théologie politique”. This 
latter terms expresses, for Maritain, the fact that politics, in as much as it bears and engages 
with moral and spiritual values, falls within the purview of theological enquiry: “Thus, there 
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is a theology as there is a philosophy of politics, a science whose object is secular and 
temporal, and which judges and knows that object in the light of revealed principles”.57 
“Politische theologie”, on the other hand, would see the political, inherently secular and 
temporal, as in reality, itself holy or sacred. In this vein, he describes Schmitt (whose 
connection with the Nazi regime is mentioned) as having tried to show the transposition of 
essentially theological themes in the major political and juridical ideas of modern times58. 
Maritain argued that such attempts could lead to the idea that political realities belong to the 
supernatural order; in other words, from a purely speculative perspective, it could lead to the 
confusion of orders. He regarded this definition of political theology as being intricately 
connected with the apology of a new German sacrum imperium, which is subtly linked to the 
rise of the Nazi party to power. In this respect, he also mentions Peterson’s contributions to the 
question of the relation between the Church and the Kingdom of God, as dissenting from the 
prevalent apology of the then new regime in Germany.  
Maritain identifies three errors with regard to the question of the Kingdom of God in relation 
to the distinction of the orders. Satanocracy, the first error, consists in regarding the whole 
world and, therefore, the earthly city, as being hopelessly evil, to be equated with the Kingdom 
of Satan. This error finds an echo in the extreme Protestant belief that the world and humanity 
are not saved together. Rather, the world, the natural order is left to Satan while men, namely, 
the elect, are aggregated to the supernatural order. It also find an echo in Catholic naturalism 
or rationalism whereby the orders are not only sharply distinguished but also held to be separate 
in a way such that nature and grace do not interact. Nature is left to its own devices, powerless 
in the face of temptation. This error goes against the basic Christian belief in Christ as the 
Saviour of the world. The second type of error, the theophanic or theocratic which consists in 
the insistence upon the more or less substantial manifestation of the Kingdom of God in the 
present time, cotemporal, if not consubstantial with the mass of a Christianised society, or in a 
particular church, to the exclusion of others. According to Maritain, even though there were 
instances where mediaeval Western Christendom tended to accept this error, the distinction of 
orders was always vindicated and taught. Another form, a utopian one, of this error is the belief 
or at least the expectation of the realisation of the Kingdom of God in the earthly city itself. 
The claim of a potestas directa in temporalibus on behalf of the papacy, the nationalisation of 
churches (e.g. in Gallicanism, in Protestant Erastianism, etc.) and Hegelianism (including its 
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Marxist emanations) are also manifestations of this error. The third error proceeds from the 
premises of atheism: God does not exist, therefore, man’s salvation, or progress towards 
happiness, is in his own hands, and the earthly becomes the exclusive space in which this 
happiness is to be sought. The distinction of orders disappears simply because the existence or 
legitimacy of the supernatural order is denied. Maritain finds an instance of this in the system 
of Comte in which everything in history tends towards the realisation of the kingdom of pure 
humanity on earth, ridden of priestcraft and superstition. The error, however, is not necessarily 
expressed in terms of rejection and denial of the supernatural. It can take the subtler form of 
indifference and theological relativism.  
It is important, in order not to fall into these errors, to recognise the deep ambiguities that mark 
any consideration of the relation between the orders. First, there is the cosmological dimension 
whereby each order is viewed in and of itself as it is in its nature, with its internal arrangements 
and proper ends. Then, there is the historical dimension which is connected to the 
eschatological – the orders in relation to sacred history, to the Christian dogma of salvation 
through Christ, and the constant fight against the Devil. It is, after all, the dialectic of the two 
cities. The reasons for the failure of Christendom can be seen from three perspectives: that of 
the extreme dualism of the modern age, whereby the orders are seen in strict opposition to one 
another. There is also the danger of the naturalisation of Christianity whereby, in a 
Christianised society, it is reduced to an instrument in the pursuit of purely human goals. 
Finally, Maritain also ascribed the failure to a lack of an authentically Christian philosophy 
that could operate a synthesis of the various lessons gleaned from the past about the interaction 
of the two orders.  
After this impressive schematisation of the history of the relation between the two orders, 
together with the register of errors to be avoided, Maritain proceeds to articulate his vision of 
the ideal of the a new Christendom. This vision implies a “secular Christian” conception of 
the temporal order. That is, the temporal order will not be sacralised nor consecrated; in this, it 
will constitute a sort of reverse image of the sacrum imperium. Such a secular Christian order 
will be opposed to all the errors of the previous phases of historical humanism. It will be the 
guiding principle of this renewed humanism, its theocentric core, will not be founded on any 
idea of “God’s holy empire over all things, but rather that of the holy freedom of the creature 
whom grace unites to God”.59 Whereas Christendom in the middle ages ever aspired to unity 
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and floundered upon the schism between church and state, the new Christendom will be a space 
of pluralism: the secular Christian perspective, itself, being inherent a pluralist one. This 
pluralism implies that the secular Christian perspective is also one of the autonomy of the 
temporal, expressed in a “Christianly constituted lay state”.60 While this lay state will be 
subordinate to the supernatural ends, and, therefore, to the Church, it will not be so, as in the 
Middle Ages, in the capacity of an instrumental agent, but as a principal agent on an inferior 
plane. It is as such that it fulfils the duty of assisting the Church in propagating the Gospel, that 
is, not in the explicit pursuit of a supernatural end, but in the regular pursuit of its own proper 
earthly ends. The freedom of the human person will also be a central consideration of this lay 
state. Freedom here must not be understood in either only as freedom of choice, or as the 
freedom of the person as part of the state. Rather, it is “the autonomous freedom of the person, 
which is at one with his spiritual perfection”,61 which must rank higher than the state itself in 
the order of the political and temporal world. Thus, the autonomy and the inviolability of the 
consciences of persons will be scrupulous respected and protected. In this way, the pluralism 
can enlarge to accommodate a wide array of beliefs and commitments, which must still, 
however, be united for the common good. Hence, if, following upon this, it possible that this 
lay state will have both Christian and non-Christian citizens, including unbelievers, how, then, 
are they to be integrated in the life of the earthly city? The notion of the pursuit of the common 
good must be refined. It will be neither by seeking a common doctrinal minimum or a theoretic 
common minimum; rather it is by seeking to arrive at a common practical task that the 
integration of people with different beliefs will be effectuated. Maritain wants to find in this 
quest for the common practical task the fulfilment of evangelical commandment to love one’s 
neighbour, whoever he may be.  
 
Charles Journet 
The great Swiss theologian, Charles Journet (1891-1975) has left a work on theology, and 
ecclesiology in particular, that is remarkable in its fresh expression of doctrinal continuity with 
the Catholic Church, in the light of the teachings of Augustine and Aquinas. He was also a 
friend of Maritain with whom he shared a number of views, and with whom he sustained an 
extensive correspondence.  
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Journet, like Maritain, was also preoccupied with the question of a Christian politics, and of 
the right relation between the religious and political orders, in an age where the Christian faith 
was openly challenged by totalitarian ideologies such as Communism and Nazism, and tacitly 
so, by a vestigially anticlerical liberalism. Journet does not pose the question of political 
theology directly as such, that is, by explicitly using the term “political theology”. Instead, he 
asks whether one could speak of a divine politics62. Divine politics can be taken to mean the 
government of the city by God. But what is the city that is governed by God? Journet answers 
that God governs his Church, which is his kingdom in formation here on earth, by a special 
providence. The temporal cities are governed by him through a common providence, which is 
subordinate to the first, the special providence. This subordination of the common providence 
to the special providence can itself receive different forms. The diversity of the ways in which 
divine providence acts upon polities proceeds from the inner complexity of the polities 
themselves as social organisms. Within God, himself, however, it is from a single divine act 
that the multiplicity of things, including the different forms of polities, are created. In the light 
of the distinction between the special and common types of providence, there emerges a 
tripartite understanding of politics.  
First, there is what Journet calls properly “divine politics”.63 Divine politics is first revealed in 
the scriptures as the intervention of God in the history of one people, whom he has chosen to 
be the vessel and the instrument for the coming of his own kingdom. Historically, then, the 
promise of this new divine kingdom occurs in a particular geo-political context of the empires 
and kingdoms of the Eastern Mediterranean region and of Mesopotamia. It is to be a kingdom 
of justice that appears not through violence, but by an effect of divine grace. It will also signal 
the end or the limits of the power of temporal kingdoms, in that these will not be able to prevail 
against it, and that, in the eschatological horizon of the fullness of this kingdom, at the Last 
Judgement, they will simply cease to exist. For the history of divine politics is strictly that of 
the city of God, of the Church in its eschatological fullness. Therefore, it cannot be the history 
of the human attempts at instantiating what was believed to be divine rule, for that which was 
thereby established was not the city of God. Such instantiations were limited by particular 
temporal and geographic circumstances, which the Church, by virtue of its universality, 
necessarily transcends.   
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The second type of politics emerged when most of Europe became Christian. First, the Roman 
Empire itself adopted the Christian religion, and when it disappeared, the kingdoms that came 
to fill in the void, not only adopted the Christian religion but also organised themselves as 
Christian political entities. In this articulation of a European political system, whether 
internationally or nationally, the distinction between the temporal and the spiritual, together 
with the idea of the necessity of the subordination of the former to the latter, was often blurred. 
For Journet, Christianity as a spiritual entity is distinct from Christendom which is a historical 
and temporal entity: the pope was the head of the first, while the Emperor was the theoretical 
head of the second. What, then, led the popes not only to claim a power superior to that of the 
emperors, but also to exercise it with all that it implies of the use of force and coercion. Journet 
argues that popes were motivated to the exercise of such power only when it was clear that 
emperors (and other rulers) were not fully seized of their duties with respect to the Church (For 
example, in the case of Innocent III against King John, or Emperor Frederick II) and in the face 
of external dangers that threatened Christendom, such as an imminent Ottoman invasion64. In 
a sacral regime, heresy, understood not so much as a sin against the unity of faith as the 
subversion of the Christian constitution of the state, becomes a punishable civil offence. The 
question of coercion and conversion, and hence, of conscience, becomes a complex issue of 
truly theologico-political problems that will contribute decisively to erode the already fragile 
mediaeval unity. Journet is also insistent that it was not the assumption of regal powers that 
made the Church a kingdom. The temporal power of the papacy is only incidental to its true 
mission of leading souls to God. Thus, the history of sacral regimes, which is the history of 
Western Christendom, is that of men who seek to achieve the kingdom of God on earth but 
who constantly fail. The sacral model of Western Christendom ought not to serve as a model 
or pattern for future Christian political action; on the contrary, its study serves to warn people 
engaged in such an action about what must be avoided in the articulation of a new Christendom.  
Christian politics, the third type of politics identified by Journet, is one that seeks to conduct 
the affairs of the earthly city in the light of the teaching of the Gospel. The aim of a polity 
governed in this way is to identify those political ends which are legitimate, and compatible 
with Christianity, and to orient the action of the state in the pursuit of those ends. Here both 
Journet and Maritain agree on the need for pluralism and for the respect of consciences and 
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cautions about the dangers of what he terms “dogmatic tolerance” which relativises the value 
of all forms of belief and unbelief equally.65   
On the subject of the non-sacral Christian city, Journet’s thought agrees much with Maritain’s 
articulation of the new Christendom. However, while for Maritain the philosopher, the 
perspective was that of the human agency in the making of that new Christendom, Journet, the 
theologian, stresses the action of divine providence and the role of the Church; hence, the 
distinction between the special and common types of providence mentioned above.  
It is in the light of the historical acts of divine providence that the favours showered by God 
upon certain nations need to be understood. Effectively, Journet sketches here the contours of 
a sacred history, not just of Israel and of the Church, but of all peoples (or nations in the pre-
revolutionary sense) who are receptive to the motions of providence and to some divine calling. 
The rise and decline of these peoples are intimately connected with their receptivity and their 
enactment of that divine calling or vocation66. The Church is possessed of its own self-identity 
as the bride and body of Christ. It is already covered by God’s own special providence, which 
is constantly present to its mind through the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. It is otherwise with 
the peoples or nations, who can either fall within the divine scheme of special or of common 
providence. It can happen that God will allow a particular nation to grow and flourish according 
to its own intrinsic laws in order for a particular cultural element to be perfected and 
incorporated into the Church. Journet gives plainchant and the technical linguistic expression 
of dogmatic formulations (or, its entire juridical genius, as Schmitt might argue) as examples 
of the elevation and aggregation of elements of Roman culture to the common patrimony of 
the Church. In that they contribute to the earthly advancement of the Church, the elevation and 
subordination of these elements of a national character transcend the natural ends of national 
societies, and thus, truly belong to sacred history. On the other hand, it belongs to the scheme 
of common providence that all nations should not only pursue their own natural ends as 
autonomous units, but that they should also seek to organise the temporal relations that bind 
them to other nations, and unite them to the rest of humanity67. If the Church itself is not the 
basis of the cultural and political unity of humankind, it is nevertheless within it, that human 
nature and culture are uniquely acknowledged, promoted, transformed and elevated.   
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A Christian politics must, therefore, be constantly mindful of the different ends of the two 
cities, of the inevitable pluralism of modern politics, without ceasing to devise new areas of 
common action. For both cities are ordained to some good. It must be possible, therefore, to 
find a “community of similarity, or of proportion, in technical sense of the word, of analogy” 
with respect to practical ends within the natural order.68  
D. The Present Task  
A number of theologico-political themes have emerged from the foregoing. The most 
immediate images that present themselves in the syntagma “political theology” are those of 
the simultaneous utterance of infinitude and finitude, of divinity and humanity, of 
transcendence and immanence, considered as formal relations embedded in historical 
circumstances. Until and unless the practitioners of political theology find most compelling 
reasons to discard the images of this juxtaposition as they have been received in the Western 
tradition broadly understood, in the Classical and Scholastic traditions in particular, these 
images and the broader tradition ought perhaps to be given the benefit of the doubt. One of the 
reasons to study Bonald is because precisely he puts a hermeneutic of faith at the heart of his 
philosophical system. This attitude of faith, loosely understood, with respect to tradition 
pertains not only to the ability to recognise a theologico-political code, to above all, to the 
conviction that the code itself belongs to a self-possessed public culture that is aware of its 
origins and of the stakes of political and institutional change relative to the identity and 
continuities of societies and cultures. In this sense, again, the value of Bonald’s system 
manifests itself in that it endeavours to give an account of all levels of society (domestic, 
political, religious) in themselves and among one another that is consistent with the tradition 
of this public culture.  
Political theology thus understood is an exercise that is constantly informed by the demands of 
revelation, tradition, institutional science and public life. The Augustinian theme of the Two 
Cities unconceals the fundamental tensions that underlie those demands, while the Thomist 
theology of free will and law endeavour to effect a reconciliation. The dialectic of similarity 
and difference, of separation and distinction, of union and confusion, proceeding from the 
ambivalence of the field, nevertheless, strive towards the manifestation of the rationality of 
social and political arrangements. If analogy is essential for the attempt at the explanation of 
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the mystery of God himself, it is all the more necessary for the comprehension of the limits of 
the relationship with his creatures. Thus, analogy as the expression of the social relation 
between the Uncreated and the created lies at the centre of the broad theologico-political 
perspective of the current thesis. The images of the Two Cities, of the Two Swords, of 
Maritain’s “Christian-secular” and of Journet’s “Christian politics” already imply the social 
analogy. In Schmitt, the study of the juridical structure of political and theological sovereignty 
itself yields a sociology of analogical concepts. In Bonald, still, in spite of the deficiencies of 
some aspects of his philosophical system, the image of analogy is painted in bolder strokes. 
The violence of revolutionary fervour is still felt and the determination to prevent it from 
happening by sheer political and theoretical exertions ensure a depth of insight and intention 
almost unrivalled since. Perhaps, what political theology has missed so far has been an insight 
in the necessary social character of being as such: that being is given to us as social fact, as 
social being.  
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Chapter 1 
Historical Circumstances  
A. Note on the Life and Times of Louis de Bonald 
The principal source of information about the life and times of Louis de Bonald is a notice 
written by one of his sons, Victor de Bonald, which was affixed to the editions of his works 
published after his death69. Bonald was born on the 2nd of October 1754, into an old family of 
the ancient province of Rouergue. Having lost his father at an early age, he was brought up by 
his mother until he was sent to Paris to study at the Oratorian college in Juilly. After his studies, 
Bonald enrolled in the famed company of musketeers until it was disbanded in 1776, after 
which he returned to his native province, married and assumed various magistracies and official 
functions, most notably, that of mayor of Milhau (he was elected in 1785), one of the principal 
towns of Rouergue.  
Bonald won the approbation of the National Assembly when in the later part of the year 1789, 
in the face of increasing public disorder and rumours of the impending progress of marauding 
bands, he succeeded in setting up and organising the defence forces of his département. The 
words that he addressed to the municipal council of Milhau on that occasion were already 
pregnant with the concerns that he would further elaborate in his subsequent writings: he 
invited the other cities and communes of the region to “unite more closely in a confederation 
of honour, of virtue, and of the respect of laws, in order to make infractions to public order 
cease and all such acts of violence that jeopardise the life and property of citizens”.70 In 1790, 
he was elected to the regional assembly and soon was chosen to be the president of the regional 
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70 “De la Vie et des Écrits de M. le Vicomte de Bonald” by Victor de Bonald, in vol.1 of Œuvres de M. de Bonald.  
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administration. It was in July of the same year that the National Assembly passed the Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy. The constitution was thought by most of the leading churchmen 
(including the Abbé Sieyès, the author of the famous pamphlet “What is the Third Estate?”) 
to subordinate the Church of France entirely to the state, leaving it with little liberty and 
resources. Louis XVI, in delaying to give his assent to the bill, tried to negotiate with the Pope 
Pius VI, who refused his approbation and ultimately condemned the constitution in early 1791. 
Bonald could not, in conscience, accept the constitution and, therefore, resigned as president 
of the departmental administration, professing his loyalty to the King while protesting the 
decisions of the National Assembly. His letter of resignation contained the expression of the 
most moving attachment to the Church and of his submission to her teachings.  
After his resignation, Bonald retired to a strictly private and domestic existence. Soon after, 
however, he was induced to join the flow of the Emigration, and left France for Germany, 
where he settled in Heidelberg with his sons. It was there that he penned his first work, “The 
Theory of Political and Religious Power” in 1796. We are told by his son that Bonald never 
intended to embark upon a writing career: the precarious leisure afforded by emigration 
coupled with the desire to fight the ideas of the Revolution were the initial conditions in which 
he took up the pen. Bossuet’s Discourse on Universal History, the works of Tacitus, 
Montesquieu and Rousseau were his constant (and, because of the vagaries of exile, his only) 
reference and study, as evidenced by his repeated critical engagements with those authors, 
especially the latter two, all throughout his early works. “The Theory of Political and Religious 
Power” was published in Constance in 1796 but the copies sent to France were immediately 
seized on the orders of the Directory, with the result that the first diffusion of Bonald’s thought 
was severely restricted. The following year Bonald returned to France only to find that most of 
his properties, estates and houses had been sold, with the exception of an estate of little value. 
He decided to move to Paris, where he lived in seclusion, dedicating himself to study and 
writing. Bonaparte’s ascent to power ushered a period of relative stability and quiet in France 
that allowed émigrés to return.  
The year 1800 saw the publication of the Analytical Essay on the Natural Laws of Social Order 
(Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l’ordre social), which Bonald himself describes as 
a condensed recapitulation of the main points advanced in his first work. The Analytical Essay 
was closely followed by the publication of the short monograph on divorce and of Primitive 
Legislation (Législation primitive) in 1802. The next major writing appeared in 1818, entitled 
Philosophical Studies on the Primary Objects of the Moral Sciences (Recherches 
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philosophiques sur les premiers objets des connaissances morales), which can be described as 
a philosophical summa of Bonald’s thought, containing among other things a lengthy 
exposition of the doctrine of primitive revelation. Finally, the Philosophical Demonstration of 
the Constitutive Principle of Society (Démonstration philosophique du principe constitutif de 
la société) was published in 1830. The main body of Bonaldian doctrine can be said to be 
contained in the writing mentioned in the foregoing lines. While occasional reference will be 
made to his other works, the current studies intend to follow the arguments in those four works 
closely. Of these, the Philosophical Demonstration is seen as the definitive re-statement of 
Bonald’s doctrine, and indeed, as his testament. Beside those major works, Bonald became 
thoroughly engaged in the literary and political life of France, publishing other shorter 
monographs, pamphlet and speeches. Alongside Chateaubriand and other eminent literary 
figures of the early decades of the 19th century, he wrote for the Mercure de France, and with 
others of the ultra-royalist party, later contributed articles to the Conservateur.  
The collaboration with the Mercure de France started in the late 1790s when Bonald was 
invited to join the journal by Louis de Fontanes, who would later on become the grand master 
of the imperial University. It was also Fontanes who brought Bonald to the attention of 
Napoleon and his entourage, and who offered him a place on the Council of the imperial 
University. Bonald, by virtue of his royalist convictions, did not immediately accept; he only 
reluctantly did so two years later. It is possible that he, in more or less the same manner as 
Fontanes, saw the Napoleonic reforms as a necessary and providential preparatory stage before 
a fuller restoration of the state of France. Around the same time, he was invited by Louis 
Bonaparte, Napoleon’s brother, and somewhat unwilling King of Holland, to become the tutor 
of his son. The letter that Louis Bonaparte sent to Bonald is full of expressions of admiration 
and praise for Bonald and his work. Louis Bonaparte writes that “after having looked 
everywhere, I have thought, Sir, that, despite not knowing you personally, you were one of the 
men I esteem the most; it appeared to me that your principles were in agreement with my 
sentiments”.71 Towards the end of the letter, he declares that should Bonald not accept his offer, 
he would still be honoured to have made his acquaintance. Louis’s conduct as King in Holland 
seem to be quite consonant with the claim regarding the agreement of his sentiments with 
Bonald’s principles: during his short reign, he tirelessly defended and promoted the interests 
of the Dutch people, not fearing to incur the wrath of his brother, Napoleon, for doing so, and 
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ultimately, costing him his throne, and, also costing the Dutch people, a King who was 
concerned with the preservation of their nation.  
In 1814, Bonald welcomed the restoration of the royal monarchy with the return of the Bourbon 
dynasty on the throne of France. Still, the enthusiasm of restoration was marred with the 
introduction of the Constitutional Charter. It seemed to Bonald that the Charter promoted that 
nefarious principle, which he had constantly fought in his writings, namely, the division of 
power. The former constitution, which upheld the unity of power, was now forgotten. In a letter 
to Maistre, he decried the “madness that written constitutions were”, seeing it as the triumph 
of an “irreligious and impolitic philosophy”. He was aghast at the intrusion of representative 
institutions, and other related features of liberal regimes, such as the freedom of the press, into 
the Charter, which thereby lost the character of a genuine programme of restoration of the 
ancient institutions of France. Even Napoleon had resisted such intrusions. Nonetheless, 
Bonald submitted to the new regime, in dutiful obedience to the King, thus illustrating in his 
own life what he had always advocated.  
Bonald was nominated to the Chamber of Deputies and took an active part in the work of this 
assembly early on. His first target was divorce, and it is largely thanks to his efforts, through 
his speeches in the Chamber and in his writings, that the statute allowing divorce was repealed. 
The next subject on which Bonald was to devote his energies was that of the properties that 
had been confiscated under the Revolution and had become public property. Bonald pressed 
for the restitution of some of the properties thus taken, in particular to the Church. He 
considered the expropriation and despoliation of Church lands to be a grave sacrilege which 
demanded reparation. He felt it would have been fitting that the inaugural act of the restored 
dynasty should have been the restitution of the county of Avignon to the papacy. Bonald felt 
that Louis XVIII was too lethargic in dealing with such problems, and too reluctant to 
implement measures that would have led to an authentic restoration along purely royalist lines: 
“constitutional kings”, he opined, “are prone to fall asleep in the arms of their ministries, 
laying the burden of their own responsibility upon these. They forget that they are but ministers 
themselves, responsible to that King of kings who did not intend to give them the sword in 
vain”.72 With the promulgation of the Charter and the maintenance of the Napoleonic 
institutions such as the legal codes and the administrative structures, Bonald felt that too much 
of the revolutionary and Bonapartist past were allowed to intrude into what he deemed to be a 
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new, regenerative era for France. He also felt that the deliberative element hindered rather than 
helped the government to follow coherent lines of policy and implement them. He decried the 
interminable debates and the turbulent atmosphere that reign in political assemblies: men 
should only be suffered to be assembled in the military camp and the church, for there, at least, 
they listen and obey.  
Yet, if he was not successful in preventing what he saw to be the worst excesses of 
parliamentarism to infect the work of the Restoration, he received official recognition for his 
work and for his attachment to the dynasty. He was elected in 1816 to the Académie Française 
to replace Cambacérès, who had been excluded by royal decree on account of his revolutionary 
activities.73 Bonald was made a minister of state in 1822 and the following year he was elevated 
to the peerage. At the request of Charles X, he presided over the committee on the censorship 
of the press, and oversaw the preparation and implementation of new regulations to that effect. 
The 8th article of the Constitutional Charter had provided for such freedom of the press as was 
compatible with the laws of the realm. The struggle between the ultra-royalists and the liberals 
were not confined to the debates of the Chamber of Deputies; it soon spilt onto the arena of 
public opinion, and initiated such movements of political activism that threatened the stability 
of the ministries under the restored kings. It is under circumstances that Bonald was called 
upon to preside over the committee of censorship. In the context of the reconstruction and 
regeneration of France that was at the heart of the Restoration, the ultra-royalists, even though 
they themselves made use of the press, were for the censorship of a public opinion, whose 
volatility could endanger the stability sought by them. Bonald’s work for the committee 
consummated the rift between himself and Chateaubriand who advocated an unlimited freedom 
for the press. It also brought to light the fundamental difference between the two men, not only 
in terms of temperament, taste and style, but also, in their respective approaches to the French 
Revolution, and their understanding of what the Restoration should consist. In 1830, the 
Bourbon dynasty fell, and their Orléans cousins replaced them on the throne. But it was a much 
changed throne – the new dynasty professed greater belief in constitutional monarchy and 
pledged to reinforce the Charter. The new monarch, Louis-Philippe, styled himself “King of 
the French” to underline the popular aspect of the new regime.   
Bonald had left Paris shortly before the July Revolution; he refused to swear allegiance to the 
new regime, and was deprived of his peerage. He spent the last ten years of his life in his lands 
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near Milhau. When he left Paris, he also left public life, and settled himself in a rustic retreat, 
where he continued his studies and meditations. We learn from his son’s account that Bonald 
preserved all his mental and physical faculties to the end, which occurred on the 24th of 
November 1840, when he was 86 years old.  
 
 
 
B. The Context of Bonaldian Thought 
i. Introduction 
As seen above, Bonald’s intellectual career did not start until the French Revolution. It is in 
reaction to it that he felt called to articulate the philosophical basis of his political beliefs. He 
can thus, and indeed, conventionally, has been, ranked among the authors of the counter-
revolutionary movement. This, however, hardly helps us to situate Bonald with any greater 
precision in the history of political thought, especially, if the significant variety of views and 
commitments within the counter-revolutionary movement itself are taken into account.  
Thus, Jacques Godechot74 tries to trace the variety of counter-revolutionary thought to three 
ideological currents that were present in French conservative thought from the late 17th century 
onwards: historical conservatism, enlightened despotism, and integral absolutism. No single 
author of the counter-revolution appears to have carried over one of these currents to the 
exclusion of the others in his writings. Instead, it would seem that these currents were all 
present, in varying degrees of affirmation and negation, in thinkers ranging from the more 
liberal Mallet du Pan to Bonald.  
Antoine Compagnon75 would rather see the counter-revolution as the political and historical 
enactment of the more comprehensive antimodernist movement, expressed philosophically by 
adherence to the Counter-Enlightenment, and theologically in an attachment to varying shades 
of Augustinism. For Compagnon, then, the concept of antimodernism is a richer one than the 
counter-revolution, in the sense precisely that it encompasses the counter-revolution, and 
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eschews the engagement in an irresolvable dialectic relation with the Revolution. Bonald did 
not shrink from direct dialectical engagement with revolutionary ideas; instead, he laid out as 
clearly and systematically as possible the fundamental principles of political and religious 
society, striving to show their necessary character, over and against the revolutionary 
worldview. The antimodern attitude would reject this sort of dialectical engagement, and, in 
rejecting modernity, would seek to fight it, irrespective of the shape or form it would take. The 
antimodernism at the heart of Bonald’s counter-revolutionary thought is undeniable – it is, 
admittedly, an antimodernism that is rooted in the reaction against a situation that can only be 
described as a paroxysm of modernity. That such a reaction is based upon “modernity” itself 
pertains to the inevitable historical character of all human thinking and acting; the dependence 
is here at once historical and logical. For, from a reactionary point of view, the reaction is itself 
but a reminder of truths held to be perennial, that have always been available to humans, and 
that will continue to be preserved. Bonald was reacting against what he perceived to be the 
erosion of the sense of society understood in a strictly hierarchical way. It was, therefore, 
incumbent upon himself, in the face of such erosion, to restate the principles of social life and 
organisation. Reaction is understood as a positive intellectual and political engagement – the 
enunciation of principles with a view to the conservation, if not restoration of traditional social 
structures. Conservation requires human agency, and thus, engagement of some kind. As seen 
in the preceding section, it could not be held against Bonald that he fell short of the ancient 
maxim accordingly to which one should live first and then philosophise. René Rémond, in his 
historical survey of French right-wing politics, acknowledges that Bonald, at least throughout 
the Restauration was occupied both with “political reflection” and “parliamentary 
practice”.76  
Antimodernism, on its own, however, is too indefinite and, therefore, too unhelpful a term to 
be retained in this attempt at giving an account of Bonald’s thought. It is ultimately derived 
from the principles that animate the whole of Bonald’s counter-revolutionary engagement, 
namely, those of the conservatism and traditionalism of Bonald, and it is those principles that 
will be sketched. This quest for principles falls in line with the essential character of the 
Counter-Revolution: the survey of history, of the past in search of universal principles, which 
particular forms of government and regimes only instantiate in varying degrees, coupled with 
the judgment of the present on the basis of those principles. The ways in which Bonald 
articulated the principles of conservatism ultimately depend upon the history of the 
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conservative ideal in Europe and its reception and interpretation. Already for some of the 
foremost critics and men of letters of the nineteenth century, namely Sainte-Beuve77 and 
Faguet78, the concerns voiced by Bonald in his work seemed rather distant and foreign. The 
social reorganisation that accompanied the progress of the Revolution, reaching its climax and 
consummation in the Napoleonic legislation and codification, was arguably by then firmly 
established; even among the more unbending of conservatives there was no desire to repeal 
them and restore the previous order.  
Bonald’s attempt at the formalisation of the structures and institutions of the Ancien Régime, 
unadorned by the then fashionable and Romantic appeal to sentiment, imagination and the 
senses, found little sympathy among his contemporaries and subsequent generations. His first 
published work, the treatise on the theory of political and religious power, famously likened 
by Chateaubriand to the pyramids of Egypt, those “palaces of death”,79 was perceived to 
embody the ultimate effort to articulate the values of the old order, and, therefore, was deemed 
to belong to the comparative history of ideas rather than to the truly epoch making political 
theorising, say, of a Rousseau, or even, of a Constant. The negative aesthetic judgement, oft 
repeated, upon the laconic simplicity of his style, delivered in the age of Romanticism, 
facilitated the marginalisation and rejection of the content of his system. It was not only that 
the content of his system was politically antagonistic to the liberal ideology that was at once 
the ground of the ideas of the French Revolution and the driving force for the subsequent 
propagation of the same ideas in less revolutionary form in following eras. The antagonism 
between the two can be said to be of theological and cosmological (in the sense of a reasoned 
worldview) significance. Bonald’s system reposes upon theism, and emphatically not upon 
deism, to which most of the revolutionaries, their Enlightenment forefathers and their liberal 
grandchildren rendered some form of worship. The theism of Bonald, his conviction that God, 
while being over and above history, still acts and intervenes in and through it, is what 
principally distinguishes him from most critics of the French Revolution, with the probable 
exception of Joseph de Maistre and of their respective collaborators and disciples. 
Conservatism for Bonald is not a question of the preservation of any order, but it is rather a 
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matter of duty, an imperative to preserve the right order, delivered to Man by acts of divine 
revelation. Bonald’s opposition to the constitutional settlement of the Restoration and his 
attempt at resistance from within follow upon this very conception of order, whose exposition, 
illustration and defence furnished the major and most recurring themes of his literary career.  
ii. The Counter-Revolution  
As mentioned in the foregoing section, the Counter-Revolution was never a single doctrinally 
or practically uniform movement. For example, some of its earliest exponents, Rivarol, Mallet 
du Pan, and even, Burke, for example, all articulated their opposition to revolutionary ideals 
based on grounds that did not depend on Tradition or Authority in the fundamental and 
external, coercive and definitive sense that the Theocrats would assume. Burke, after all, was 
a defender of the Revolution of 1688 and of the constitutional settlement that it produced, and 
used the contrast between 1688 and 1789, to build his argument against the ideas of 1789 and 
all the subsequent changes that followed it. The traditionalism of Burke is not one that is based 
on abstract principles of what society should be, or even what society is in essence, but rather 
on the experience and evolution of society. There is here an opposition between metaphysics, 
between the contemplation of what is, and history, the temporal unfolding of human 
experience, and Burkean traditionalism is solidly rooted in the latter.   
Godechot80 finds the same opposition in the thought of Rivarol who maintained that philosophy 
and politics are two different sciences that must remain separate. Rivarol opposed the French 
Revolution on aesthetic, linguistic and historical grounds; the Revolution both as a popular and 
bourgeois movement, fraught with all the associated violence and crudeness, was contrasted 
sharply with the sweetness of life and refinement of manners of the pre-Revolutionary period, 
of which, his Dissertation sur l’universalité de la langue française (1784) furnished a subtle 
defence. The Revolutionary ideology was one according to which politics sought to control 
such aspects of human life and experience with which even the Bourbons, at the height of their 
absolutist frenzy, imagined or real, would never have dreamt of meddling. Rivarol was not 
against reforms as such, but he was certainly not for the type of upheaval brought about by the 
confusion of disciplines and domains that characterised the French Revolution. Instead, it 
would seem that he was in favour of enlightened despotism such as Voltaire himself 
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propounded; an enlightened despotism that would be the great architect of social and political 
reforms introduced gradually to improve the lot of hitherto backward populations.  
Neither was the exiled Genevese publicist Mallet du Pan initially against the reforms, even 
those brought in at the earliest stages of the National Constituent Assembly. Mallet du Pan was 
resigned to the fact that in the inevitable course of history changes occur, and that the right 
attitude under such circumstances was to make the best of the changes. His advocacy, as much 
in his writings as in his active lobbying, was towards the moderation of the revolutionary 
movement and the urgent necessity to address the more nefarious aspects of public 
administration, namely the unequal fiscal regime, under the Ancien Régime.  
He shared with Burke (and, not unsurprisingly, with most writers of the Counter-Revolution) 
a profound scepticism as regards the Declaration of Rights of 1789. Burke’s scepticism was 
based upon his understanding of the Declaration as an enunciation of abstract and 
metaphysical claims that had no bearing on human experience whereas for Mallet, the 
opposition to the Declaration is couched in terms of whether it had any chance of being applied 
at all or remain a dead letter. If applied, he foresaw the Declaration would have catastrophic 
consequences for French society. In the celebrated journal, the Mercure de France (to which 
Bonald would later contribute), he published a detailed critique of the Declaration that 
subsequently would gain a wide currency in Émigré circles. The framers of the Declaration, he 
contended, should have contented themselves with giving statutory expression to the Golden 
Rule: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”, which, for him, is the summary 
of all human rights. Yet, Mallet is very much distrustful of the implicit concept of statutory 
instruments that underlies the Declaration: doctrines and principles should inspire laws, but not 
be made into laws. Unlike most writers of the counter-revolutionary school, whether 
conservatives or theocratic, Mallet held that the Enlightenment, and by extension, the 
Philosophes were not to be blamed for the course and spread of the French Revolution and its 
ideas: it was not, for him, a matter of “la faute à Voltaire, la faute à Rousseau”. Unlike Burke 
and the others, he refused to subscribe to any deterministic explanation of the causes of the 
Revolution, whether it be the influence of the Philosophes, the decline of moral and religious 
sentiment, or the irresponsibility of those in power. He accepted the ends of the principles of 
1789 but rejected the means that came to be used in their furtherance, and which, to a degree, 
had become undistinguishable from them. On the other hand, like Maistre and Bonald, he 
recognised the providential character of the period, and deplored the humiliation of the Catholic 
Church and the persecution of her ministers. Thus, in more ways than one, he furnishes the 
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example of a Counter-Revolutionary who disagreed significantly with them on the grounds of 
doctrine and policy, and helps, from the outset put the basic principles of the theocratic school 
(of the Counter-Revolution) in sharper relief.  
On the other hand, while Maistre did write to Bonald that “I have thought nothing that you 
have not written, and I have not written anything that you have not thought”,81 significant 
differences between the two emerge upon a closer comparison of their respective ideas, 
showing that even the theocratic school of the Counter-Revolution is not one block of doctrinal 
uniformity. While they both formulated their opposition to the principles of the French 
Revolution from the vantage point of tradition and, in a way, of theology, they held crucially 
different conceptions of the same. Bonald’s understanding was more universal, based on the 
idea that human beings are everywhere the same and that one model should suffice for all of 
them. Maistre, on the other hand, believed that where the Revolution most signally failed was 
precisely in putting forth an a priori constitution and expecting that all human beings, 
irrespective of clime and condition, would conform to it. In other words, the universalism of 
Bonald is to be contrasted with the historicism of Maistre in their respective understanding of 
tradition, politics and theology are interconnected. Maistre’s admiration for the unwritten and 
conventional character of the English constitution, which is itself an echo of the influence of 
Montesquieu, finds little sympathy in Bonald. Based upon investigations into epistemology 
and the theory of the mind, the Bonaldian theory of the primitive revelation has no counterpart 
whatsoever in Maistre’s system, which seems happy to relay the classic and traditional 
understanding of the Platonic theory of innate ideas. The Bonaldian theory, as will be seen 
later, postulates a complex synergy of God, Man and Society to account for language and for 
the transmission of the content of the primitive revelation. More explicitly than Maistre, Bonald 
readily engages in the appraisal and criticism of the philosophy of his day, and of the preceding 
centuries: his Recherches Philosophiques represents a serious engagement and confrontation 
with post-Cartesian, Malebranchian and Enlightenment philosophy.  
The theocratic phase of Counter-Revolutionary thought inaugurated by Bonald and Maistre 
does recapitulate in itself the extrinsic critique of the formal aspects of the French Revolution 
formulated by Burke and Mallet du Pan from the perspective of what could be termed 
traditionalist liberalism, or simply, conservatism. What it emphatically does not share with 
traditionalist liberalism is the evolutive understanding of history that builds upon the successive 
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events of the pass, accepting them as long as they do not effect any fundamental change. This 
is the perspective from which Burke could accept the so-called Glorious Revolution, and Mallet 
du Pan, the Genevese Revolutions of the latter half of the 18th century. Such a concept of 
history would seem to be too devoid of a proper axiology and, ultimately, of ethical content to 
be fully accepted by the theocrats. Ultimately, history cannot pass judgment upon itself; this is 
the task of reason as an organ of tradition and society. In moments of great crisis, Reason can 
only re-assert itself on the course of events in a providential manner. This is why both Maistre 
and Bonald entertained great hopes of the Restauration of the Bourbon monarchy after the fall 
of Napoleon.  
Godechot in the section of his book dealing with Bonald repeats the commonplace according 
to which Maistre is the better writer, more witty and brilliant than Bonald, whom he dismisses 
as a romantic, who had lost all touch with reality82. The latter charge, unless it were meant 
flippantly, is somewhat challenged by Copleston83 who shows clearly the difference between 
Bonald and the second generation of Counter-Revolutionary thinkers, some of whom would 
become the spearheads of the Romantic movement, most notably, Chateaubriand. While the 
rational character of the arguments of Bonald and of Maistre could be challenged from the 
point of view of the current philosophical standards of rationality, the fact that they expressed 
those arguments in a logically coherent way, showing the necessary connections of 
propositions, especially, in Bonald’s case, cannot be questioned. It is not to emotion and 
sentiment, it is not to the senses and feelings, that Bonald appeals to in order to articulate his 
theory of society, of primitive revelation, and indeed, to build his political theology, even 
though he did not call it that. His appeal to history, to the Ancien Régime, is never one of 
sentimental attachment or nostalgia, even where that would have been legitimate, but it is 
always one of illustration of his understanding of how government should, and actually, in 
reality, does function. Political romanticism has no place in Bonald’s system, and cannot be 
used to describe any aspect of his thought. For Bonald, the truth of the Catholic faith, and of 
the Ancien Régime is not a matter of aesthetics; he does not need to survey the ruins of the 
basilica of Saint Denis to perceive and know the many virtues of that faith, and the power of 
that regime. Bonald himself did not make a virtue of irrationality, striving to adhere constantly 
to certain standards of rationality; if a faithful picture of his intentions in the appraisal of his 
work is to be made at all, his commitment to rationality must be taken seriously. In the same 
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83 Frederick Copleston. A History of Philosophy. Vol.IX. Maine de Biran to Sartre (London: Search Press, 1975), 
pp.9-10. 
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manner, and in the same section, Godechot used “metaphysical” as a term of disparagement 
when comparing the works of Bonald with those of Maistre. To use the word “metaphysical” 
in such a way betokens certain philosophical, and even, ideological commitments84, to the 
extent, that, what enhances the value of Bonald’s work in our eyes is precisely its metaphysical 
character. The positivity (and, indeed, creativity) of his response to the French Revolution 
precisely lies in the metaphysical account of sociality, and in the theological grounds of that 
account, which, together with a unique epistemology and theory of revelation, forms the heart 
of his system. This metaphysical and theological positivity is certainly the least transient aspect 
of Bonald’s thought, and it did throughout the subsequent centuries implicitly underpin those 
important phases of the continuing reaction to the revolutionary ideology of the Enlightenment, 
namely, the Action Française from the late nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth 
century.  
iii. The Dilemma of Limited Politics: “Parliamentary Practice” and “Political Reflection” 
under the Restoration 
At the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in 1814-1815, the Ultras, the Ultra-royalist 
traditionalist and conservative party, to whom Bonald belonged, were faced with an almost 
existential dilemma. The then ministry, in agreement with the wishes of Louis XVIII, was in 
favour of retaining the institutions and laws that emerged under the preceding revolutionary 
and imperial regimes, which was unacceptable to the Ultras who were determined to undermine 
this synthesis of old and new regimes. In 1816, for example, Bonald was successful in seeking 
and procuring the abolition of divorce. A return as such to the Ancien Régime was impossible 
but the Ultras were convinced of the necessity to abolish the centralising institutions of the 
Bonaparte era in order to recover the ancient liberties that were the touchstone of the 
aristocratic and organic ideal of society to which they all subscribed. Their dilemma consisted 
precisely in that such a return could only be effected by a quasi-despotic exercise of the 
centralised power they excoriated so much85.  
These ancient liberties were those of the ancient parlements and estates of the French 
provinces, and the remnants of the feudal system that perdured down to the eve of the French 
Revolution. Under such a system, or rather, a network of systems, before the rigid centralisation 
that took place under Louis XIV, the monarchy in France, while being the seat of sovereignty 
                                                          
84 Cf. The Anti-Metaphysical spirit as analysed by Vittorio Possenti. Nihilism and Metaphysics: The Third Voyage 
(New York: SUNY Press, 2015).  
85 René Rémond, op.cit., pp.53-60.  
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and the arbiter of all privileges, and in that sense, absolute, was, in fact, limited by the 
fundamental laws of the realm, among which was the famous Salic Law, fixing the succession 
to the French Crown through agnatic male primogeniture. While such a vision was susceptible 
to the anachronistic distortions of romantic imaginations, it nevertheless rested on the firm 
ground of the principle of a style of politics that was inherently wedded to the notions of 
subsidiarity and organicism. The Ultras no doubt realised that both royal centralisation, 
especially of the preceding two centuries and the revolutionary and imperial ventures had this 
in common: they were both actuated by the belief that society can and ought to be changed 
according to abstract ideas, either of unlimited sovereignty or of boundless rationality. The 
Ultras were inclined to be sceptical of both. And it precisely such a scepticism that can be said 
to lie at the very heart of a conservative attitude towards a revolutionary style of politics. The 
Ultras were, therefore, faced with a very particular philosophical problem, which remains the 
primary and abiding challenge for conservative thought.  
They had, in the words of O’Sullivan86, to “show that the world imposes limitations upon what 
either the individual or the state can hope to achieve without destroying the stability of 
society”. In O’Sullivan’s understanding, the conservative resistance to change is expressed 
precisely in terms of an ideological opposition to the beliefs of the Enlightenment: in the 
commitment to a notion of the imperfectability of man, and in the consequent need for a limited 
style of politics. Theologically, the two ideas were connected: the imperfectability of man, 
linked as it was to original sin, meant that if politics were to be conceived as a purely human 
activity (as the revolutionaries claimed) not in need of redemption, it could not possibly hope 
to escape the stamp of imperfection and of sin. The history of Christendom is the story of 
attempts to create a system of states around notions of spiritual unity accompanied by parallel 
attempts to effect the emancipation of politics from the demands of Christian revelation and to 
articulate the principles of national unity and international cooperation on grounds that are not 
explicitly theological.  
The trope of the emancipation of politics from theology, and more broadly, religion, which 
informed the political imagination of the Enlightenment has deep roots in the history of the 
relations between the religious and the political in European history. Thus, in order to be able 
to locate and appreciate the context of the theological antecedents of both the Enlightenment 
understanding of politics, and its conservative critique, and, as mentioned in the foregoing 
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section, the place of Bonald in this chapter of the history of ideas, an attempt at understanding 
the evolution of the national state together with the concomitant emergence of conservative 
thinking must be undertaken.  
 
iv. Church and State   
Historically, this idea of a limited style of politics can be related to the emergence and growth 
of the centralised nation-state, which tentatively corresponds, if Dawson is to be followed87, to 
the period going from the end of the 13th century to the Protestant Reformation. It was then, 
Dawson argues, that the great synthesis of Christendom, from the reforms of the Ottonian and 
Gregorian eras down to the mid-13th century when those reforms had been solidly entrenched, 
began its decline. Christendom carried in itself, and displayed on the outside, all the 
characteristics of an international society united under the religious guidance of the papacy, 
and the nominal leadership of the Holy Roman Emperor. This was the old notion of the diarchy 
as expressed by pope Gelasius I in his epistle to the emperor Anastasius88. The kingdoms of 
France and England were then entering into a phase of national consolidation that would result 
in the enlargement of royal power in all spheres of life. The malaise at the heart of Christendom, 
palpable in the Investiture Controversy, manifested itself in a most visible and physical way in 
the Avignon Papacy and the Western Schism.  
The attempts at finding a durable resolution of this crisis was attended by the twin manifestation 
of conciliarism (the grounds for which had been prepared in the preceding centuries) and the 
early inceptions of what would later develop into nationalism. The Council of Constance, for 
instance, with the explicit support of the secular powers, held itself to be superior to the roman 
pontiffs, and to be empowered to judge and to depose them. Conciliarism, in this respect can 
be considered as the ultimate attempt to adapt the fine balances of power that characterised the 
old structures of Christendom to the new political condition characterised by administrative 
and fiscal centralisation around within a national unit. Thus, church reform came to be 
conceived from the perspective of the emerging political order, from within the church itself. 
As Dawson put it: “…now the danger of secularisation came from within… The reforming 
party began to look to the state as the power that might free the Church from the incubus of 
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88 Cf. Pope St. Gelasius I, Famuli Vestrae Pietatis: in Andreas Thiel (ed.), Epistolae Romanorum Pontificum, 
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material wealth and leave it free to devote all its energies to its spiritual functions”.89 The rise 
of monarchical absolutism and nationalism happened at the same time so that some of the social 
functions performed by the Church in the old model of Christendom are taken from it and 
assumed (not immediately) by the secular powers. While such social functions are not always 
materially tangible, and their transfer to the secular authorities not always recognisable, they 
are at least very often symbolic. The valorisation of “national” languages over and sometimes 
against the Latin language, the consolidation of civil, common and customary laws vis-à-vis 
canon law, and the conflicts regarding the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical and royal chanceries 
in fiscal matters, are all instances where functions fulfilled by the Church were effectively 
secularised through the offices of a royal administration that itself was an imitation of the 
centralised, international and competent papal bureaucracy.  
Dawson also describes the Conciliar Movement as “the culmination of mediaeval 
constitutionalism in its attempts to give constitutional form to the ideal of Christendom as a 
single religious society, divided political among a number of national kingdoms”.90 Thus, the 
proponents of Conciliarism wanted to preserve the unity of Christendom in the face of the 
ongoing political evolution, as much as the Christian humanism of an Erasmus would later seek 
to preserve its unity in the face of the challenges of the “New Knowledge”; but it is significant 
that it sought to do so by relying as much as possible upon national units. It may well be argued 
that in a Christendom rent apart by the Great Schism, the leaders of the movement could not 
possibly have done otherwise. Yet, the effects were far reaching, since this policy relied on a 
close identification of the particular churches with their respective national units.  
The old idea of Christendom, indeed, had relied, not upon the notion of a strict and 
impermeable separation, but that of independence of the Church with respect to the political 
structures. It was the idea of the libertas ecclesiae, which had been at the heart of the reforms 
of the 11th and 12th centuries. Indeed, the idea of Christendom was based on the balance 
between the autonomy of Church and that of the political entities that had embraced 
Christianity resulting in a system of mutual recognition of privileges and jurisdictional 
limitations. By the 15th century, however, such an autonomy, instantiated as it was in the very 
efficient system of administration mentioned above, had become to be perceived as a threat to 
the centralised royal administration. While this autonomy was a constitutive feature of the large 
feudal society made up of a diversity of corporations and estates, it was regarded increasingly 
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as anomaly in the kingdoms that were pursuing policies of “national” unification and 
centralisation91. While some rulers were genuinely interested in ecclesiastical reform, others 
promoted it when they saw that this could be a way to further despoil the Church for their own 
benefit. That reform was necessary was disputed by few: the Church both as a supranational 
organisation and as a feudal body within the national units of Christendom was a major 
landowner and controlled large amounts of resources, natural, fiscal or human, and the clerical 
corruption decried by the friars (for example, Savonarola) was rife. The aim of the reform 
movements from the 11th century onwards (Cistercian, Franciscan, etc.) was precisely to return 
to a stricter observation of the evangelical counsel of poverty. The question was how can the 
Church balance the ownership of such resources with the commandments of the Gospel. The 
affirmation of papal power in the Italic peninsula after the Great Schism and the wars of the 
pontificates of Alexander VI and of his successors involved a fair amount of display of the 
temporal wealth and power of the Bishop of Rome92.  
There is little doubt that this was the culmination of a process of mutual transfer of symbols 
and ideas pertaining to the respective self-understanding of the Church and of the State. On the 
one hand, the canonists, especially decretalists, had been mining the corpus of Roman imperial 
civil law, not only to establish the claims of the papacy, but also to fix the notion of the Church 
as a juridical society. The secularisation of the visible organisation of the Church was 
accompanied by a concurrent sacralisation of the state by civilians and other jurists who were 
keen to apply ecclesiological notions and images to the state. Ernst Kantorowicz gave a most 
authoritative review of the ways in which this happened in his famous study “The King’s Two 
Bodies”.93 Regarding the shift that took place in the mediaeval notions of kingship, he noted: 
“Once the idea of a political community endowed with a mystical character had been 
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articulated by the Church, the secular state was almost forced to follow the lead – to respond 
by providing an antitype. This view does not detract from the complexity of other stimuli which 
were perhaps even more effective: Aristotelian doctrines, Roman and Canon Law theories, the 
political, social and economic development at large during the later Middle Ages. But those 
stimuli seem to have worked in the same direction: towards making the polity co-eternal with 
the Church and bringing the polity – with or without a king – to the centre of political 
discussion”.94 The secularisation of the visible organisation of the Church variously took the 
shape, for example, of ecclesiastical polities within the Holy Roman Empire, and, also, of the 
consolidation of the Clergy as one of the estates of some realms, even, in the case of France, 
gaining the position of first estate, above the nobility and the commoners. The old scriptural 
image of the Body, of the corpus, was being formalised in the legal understanding of the secular 
jurists, and was degraded as a mere indication of antiquarian interest among canonists. The 
material and worldly interests of the organisation of the Roman Church as a human and 
physical organisation and association, inserted within the jus commune of Christendom, 
somewhat obscured the deeper theology of the trope of the corpus mysticum95 as the locus 
where ecclesiology and sacramental theology were intermingled. The forgetfulness, or rather, 
marginalisation of such a trope within ecclesiology (in favour of the concept of societates 
perfectae) was doubtless related to an immanentising tendency to equate the divine constitution 
of the Church with the contingent historical forms ecclesiastical organisation happens to 
assume throughout history, which itself was a result of the need to articulate the legitimacy of 
the worldly claims of the Church over and against comparable secular claims and 
encroachments. And this latent theological predicament would not take long to manifest itself 
in concrete moments of crisis, where abuses would reach climactic points, followed by 
denunciations and attempts at correction and reform.  
 
The Cases of Germany and England  
Abuses were doubtless widespread in Germany where the feudal structure of the Holy Roman 
Empire was too loose for the Emperor (in spite of the centralising tendencies of the Hapsburg 
imperial policy) to exert any significant power upon the multitude of vassals, tenants and cities 
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that comprised it; it was also where, in no small part due to papal fiscal policy and curial 
nepotism, hatred of Italians was prevalent. It is in this context that the Lutheran reformation 
erupted in 1517, and it would be no exaggeration to say that the subsequent course it took was 
largely responsible, among other things, for the decline of the empire96. The political situation 
was supplemented by the scandals of simony, the sale of indulgences, the plurality of benefices, 
non-residence, nepotism etc. The powerlessness of Charles V to prevent the spread of Lutheran 
ideas and their adoption by some of the princes signalled effectively the beginning of the end, 
not only for the Holy Roman Empire, but also and above all for the idea of Christendom with 
the Empire at its – theoretical – centre. The theological restlessness of Luther found an echo in 
the political restlessness of some of the German princes. In 1525, the grand-master of the 
Teutonic Knights, with the encouragements of Luther, secularised the Order and gathered its 
possessions (outside of the Holy Roman Empire) into a new state known as the Duchy of 
Prussia, held in fief to the King of Poland. Luther’s theological ideas, such as his anti-
hierarchical understanding of the priesthood of believers, was also taken up by the leaders of 
the concurrent Peasants’ Revolt. Here, however, Luther, realising that the Peasants’ Revolt 
might unleash forces destructive of the empire itself, made common cause with the Princes. 
And this type of political positioning, indeed, was to become a feature of Lutheranism in the 
Empire subsequently: theological radicalism (or, as per the perspective, heresy) that allies itself 
to a rather strict social conservatism. The reference for such a social conservatism is no longer 
the old notion of Christendom, but rather the individual political entities, understood as 
Christian societies over and against the hierarchical, sacramental and juridical idea of the 
Church espoused by the Catholic Church97. This state of affairs, which itself would be later 
articulated as in the maxim cujus regio, ejus religio, was formalised at the Diet of Augsburg in 
1555. It is unthinkable that such a principle could have held any sway under the classical model 
of Western Christendom, the Gelasian diarchy, whereof the overarching authority of the Pope 
was a fundamental, integral and non-negotiable feature98. The principles of Augsburg would 
help maintain peace between Catholics and Protestants (except in the Netherlands) until the 
late 1610s when war erupted, at first within the Empire itself, and then, between states, until 
around 1648. At the end of the war, the fragile fabric of the Holy Roman Empire, and by 
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extension, of Western Christendom, was even more compromised, to the benefit of national 
units (France, Prussia, etc.).  
But the new Protestant German states were not the first to reject papal authority. Already, in 
1534 Henry VIII had Parliament declare him “Supreme Head of the Church” and the Church 
of England thereby lost the independence it had enjoyed from the centralising control of the 
Crown. The English Reformation could be understood at once in the context of the imperial 
pretensions of the Tudor monarchy over the British Isles, and the means they used in the 
prosecution of the same. The feeling of dynastic insecurities and the quest for legitimacy of the 
early Tudors led them to lean heavily on Parliament as a means to define, exalt and assert their 
authority. While the monarchs saw the whole parliamentary process as an instrument, and a 
popular one, the Houses of Parliament, and especially, the Commons, started to consider 
themselves the partners of the Crown in government. This in itself was neither the immediate 
result nor the intention of Tudor policy; rather it was part of an ongoing process whereby the 
relationship between the different estates of the realm and the monarch was being articulated 
in terms of body and corporation, based on the scholastic conceptions of corporeity and their 
adoption into the law99. The Tudor monarchs were reputed skilful in dealing with Parliament; 
the following dynasty would prove less so.  
The Stuarts inherited not only what may be loosely termed “Tudor absolutism” but also 
brought with them ideas of monarchy and kingship that were fashioned by their experience of 
the Reformation in Scotland, and especially by the impact Presbyterian ideas had on the polity 
of both church and state. According to Kenyon100, the opponents of the monarchy under the 
early Stuarts, far from being extreme radicals, “were for the most part sturdy reactionaries 
who wanted nothing more than to restore the ‘ancient constitution’ of a century, perhaps even 
two or three centuries before”. His contention was that both royalist and parliamentarian 
factions adhered to more or less the same understanding of the English constitution but differed 
on the practical division of powers and jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it remains highly likely that 
the parliamentarian faction was not actuated solely by an antiquarian desire to revive the true 
constitution of the realm but also by religious convictions that sprang out of Calvinism, and 
that were the very opposite of what Charles, through Laud, was promoting within the Church 
of England. In other words, it is not unlikely that both Crown and Parliament were adhering to 
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two different trends of Protestantism (one Lutherano-Arminian, the other Calvinistic), which, 
in turn, coloured their respective interpretation of the constitution. It is significant that even 
after the execution of Charles I, in the Act purporting to abolish the kingly office, the abolition 
is presented as a necessary step in the return to the ancient constitution101. While the abolition 
of the monarchy was in line with the doctrinal positions of the more extreme elements both 
within and outside of the New Model Army and of Parliament, it was here nevertheless justified 
by way of appeal to a view of the primitive constitution of England, redolent of the antiquarian 
conservatism (if still somewhat tinged with Puritanism) of the Cokes and Pyms of the preceding 
generation. In the “Instrument of Government” of 1653, supreme legislative power was vested 
both “in one person, and the people assembled in Parliament”.102 The executive power was 
vested in that one person, namely, the Lord Protector, who was to exercise the chief magistracy, 
and who also was to be considered the fount of all honour and justice in the Commonwealth. 
In this, a transfer of all the former functions and properties of kingship to the Lord Protector is 
evident. The latter, enjoying his tenure for life, was to govern with the advice of a Council and 
the consent of Parliament. The typical Protestant and Puritanical advocacy of sola scriptura and 
nostalgia for a primitive and purer Christianity finds its expression in Article xxxv of the 
Instrument stipulating “that the Christian religion, as contained in the Scriptures, be held forth 
and recommended as the public profession of these nations” (i.e. England, Scotland and 
Ireland). In addition, in Article xxxvii liberty of religion is assured those who “profess faith in 
God by Jesus Christ (though differing in judgement from the doctrine, worship or discipline 
publicly held forth)” to the exception of Catholics and those advocating an episcopal ecclesial 
polity. Government with the consent of Parliament and the settlement of the Protestant religion 
(especially with regards to the succession to the throne and to public offices) are the primary 
features of the revolution of 1688, later to be understood as the cornerstones of the British 
constitution. The change in that constitution from the late 15th century to the late 17th century, 
namely, the evolution of Parliament itself from being the instrument of the Tudor monarchy to 
being a partner, and the politically significant partner, in government is to be noted: from the 
instrument that would enable the royal supremacy in religious matters (and other matters) to 
the force that sees itself as the guarantor of the Protestant settlement even in the face of that 
royal supremacy. Thus, the ideas of 1688 were not exactly novel, nor yet ancient, and they do 
                                                          
101 Kenyon, ibid., p.340: “And whereas by the abolition of the kingly office provided for in this Act a most happy 
way is made for this nation (if God see it good) to return to its just and ancient right of being governed by its own 
Representatives or National Meetings in Council, from time to time chosen and entrusted for that purpose by the 
people…” 
102 Kenyon, ibid., p.342.  
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not so much represent a radical break from the past as constitute one of the two main competing 
strands of conservative thought and action. On the other hand, the ideological antagonists of 
the demagogues of 1688 were those who adhered to kingship, as settled in the Stuart dynasty, 
as the divinely appointed form of government of the realm, whose right to rule no earthly 
authority could negate, and that was theoretically limited only by divine law. While Jacobitism 
and the Nonjuring schism were instances of the prosecution of Stuart legitimism to their 
respective political and ecclesiastical conclusions, royalist conservatism had to adapt itself, not 
least on account of the eventual failure of the Jacobite adventure and the consolidation of the 
Hanoverian succession. Thus, even before Burke had contrived to articulate a synthesis of royal 
and parliamentarian conservatisms, of the Old Tory and Old Whig positions, the Country Party, 
as opposed to the Court party, represented a harmonisation of these two strands103. In the 
process of harmonisation, the ideas of 1688, enumerated above, caused the fundamental belief 
of the Stuart monarchy, namely, the divine right of kings, to be muted and to retreat from the 
mainstream of British political culture. The royalism of the new conservative synthesis thus 
came to rely upon arguments based on laws, customs and conventions to defend the monarchy. 
The latter was no more coterminous with sovereignty, which was understood to be vested not 
in the people, nor in the Crown, nor in the legislature singly, but rather, in the King-in-
Parliament.  
 
France, Revolution and the Civil Constitution of the Clergy  
In France, the assertion of the sovereignty of the Crown over its feudal vassals (and at an early 
stage, vis-à-vis, the Holy Roman Empire) was a process that roughly started with the first 
Capetian Kings and ended during the revolutionary period. Over this long period of time, the 
Kings of France pursued a policy of extension of the royal demesne from their original 
possessions around Paris to include much of what is comprised within the current continental 
territory of the French Republic. Thus, it was during this lengthy process that the Ancien 
Régime came to assume what Bernard Barbiche considers to be its fundamental characteristics, 
                                                          
103 The collaboration of Bolingbroke, the Jacobite freethinker and the Whig Pulteney on the periodical the 
Craftsman is, in this respect, indicative of the rapprochement. Cf. Andrew Mansfield. Ideas of Monarchical 
Reform: Fenelon, Jacobitism and the political works of the Chevalier Ramsay. (Manchester: at the University 
Press, 2015), especially the first two chapters.  
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namely, the fusion of powers, the system of privileges, absolutism, monarchical administration, 
the development of centralisation, and the growth of the state104.  
Legislative, executive and judicial powers were all vested in the King and in his agents – the 
competencies and jurisdictions of courts, assemblies, estates overlapped and often conflicted 
with one another. At the local level, judicial and administrative functions were fused: 
magistrates were administrators, and administrators had judicial functions. Pluralism and legal 
particularism were embedded in the fabric of society itself, which was a collection of estates, 
corporations, guilds, provinces, municipalities, etc., each endowed with their own provincial 
statutes and customs, bye-laws, regulations, privileges. The royal administration of the 
kingdom was, therefore, mediated in and through these intermediary bodies, and it was 
principally in and through them that the whole regime of rights, privileges and obligations 
informed the lives of individuals and families. The king was the ultimate arbiter of the 
kingdom, all disputes relating to this regime of privilege were to be settled by him alone, 
through his agents and his courts. It is precisely through this supreme function of arbitration 
that the notion of royal absolutism ought to be understood105. Thus, from such a perspective, 
the exercise of royal absolutism is seen as being necessarily connected with the existence of 
subordinate and subsidiary, dependent and quasi-autonomous jurisdictions and bodies within 
the French realm. There could be no appeal against its authority within the boundaries of the 
realm.  
It is easy to see how this principle could occasion awkwardness and ambiguity when the first 
estate of the realm is the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church. The post-Reformation and post-
Tridentine period in France was one in which the state and the Church, each with marked 
centralising policies and overlapping jurisdictions, were embroiled in controversies and 
disputes106 regarding their respective spheres of authorities. The issue with the Church of 
France was that it was at once an internal component of the constitution and a part of the Roman 
                                                          
104 Bernard Barbiche. Les institutions de la monarchie française a l’epoque moderne. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1999, p.3. 
105 Barbiche, op.cit., p.10: “Sous Louis XVI comme sous François I, le pouvoir absolu était une fonction suprême 
d’arbitrage”. Cf. Peter R. Campbell, ed. The Origins of the French Revolution. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006. The Introduction is quite comprehensive, esp. pp.14-16 with respect to absolutism.  
106 There was the question of the implementation of the decrees of the Council of Trent, which was delayed in 
France, due in no small measure to the civil strife of the Wars of Religion and the gallicanism that was entrenched 
in the parlements. Later, the awkwardness between the king and the papacy would also manifest itself in the 
disputes regarding the reception of the decisions of the Council of Trent within the French Church, and those 
concerning the Droit de Régale, that is, the right whereby the revenues of vacant sees were appropriated by the 
royal treasury for the duration of the vacancy. Originally, this right was limited to a few dioceses, until Louis XIV 
extended it to the whole of the realm.  
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Church, whose visible head, the Pope, was not only a figure of spiritual authority, but also a 
monarch. Ecclesiastical issues, thus, involved question both of domestic and international 
issues. Gallicanism was also, however, not so much the affirmation of royal arbitration over 
the Church of France, as much as the vindication of its rights not deriving from royal or papal 
decree, but from ecclesiastical canons, laws and customs, enshrined in the customary laws of 
France. Gallicanism was inherently political inasmuch as it relied upon the support of the 
monarchy, was expressed in the deliberations of the Assembly of the Clergy and enjoyed the 
favour and protection of the parlements and sovereign courts. These, in turn, whether of Paris 
or of the provinces, were almost entirely controlled by the nobility of robe, as much as the army 
was controlled by the old nobility of sword.  
Certainly, the style of individual kings and the circumstances of their reigns left a stamp on the 
ways in which the “gothic government”107 of France was carried out. The style in which Louis 
XIV understood and enacted his absolute power was unique and no doubt influenced his 
successors. But this style, and the ideas of royal majesty underlying it, did nothing, or rather, 
were quite powerless, to address the inherent, systemic problems of the French state – on the 
contrary, the attempts by his successors to imitate him led to a heightening of those internal 
crises. At the death of the Sun King and with the advent of the Regency during the minority of 
Louis XV, the parlements, having also been the refuge of Frondist sentiment, came back to the 
fore of political life108. Furthermore, the parliamentarian party and its pretensions vis-a-vis the 
monarchy regarding the interpretation of the fundamental laws was supported by the 
intellectual activity of memorialists, historians and publicists such as Saint-Simon, 
Boulainvilliers and Montesquieu. The parlements and the nobles in general could not but resent 
the appointment of commoners as chief ministers and royal counsellors. The attempts of the 
various ministers and superintendents to reform the finances of the realm and the tax system 
were seen as assaults upon the privileges and liberties of the parlements, and through them, of 
the nobility109.  
But the ways in which the various parties interpreted and understood the old fundamental laws 
of France underwent significant changes. The change in interpretation also affected the 
conceptions of the realm as a community comprising of the monarchy and the three orders. 
                                                          
107 Cf. Montesquieu. The Spirit of the Laws. Book XI, chapter 8.  
108 The dissolute manners and mores, including the personal conduct of princes, of the Regency era and of the 
reign of Louis XV did much to strip the monarchy of its traditional sacred aura.  
109 Cf. Daniel Roche. France in the Enlightenment. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1998, in particular Chapter 
14 “Crises in State and Society”.  
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Cobban110 notes a change in the parliamentarian arguments of the first half of the 18th century 
(and earlier) and those of the later half. In the earlier arguments, the supporters of parliamentary 
privileges justified their position within the realm and their limited understanding of the 
monarchy on the basis of custom and history, even purporting to retrace the date of the 
institution of the parlements to the Carolingian, if not to the Merovingian dynasty itself. In the 
Grandes Remonstrances of 1753, the parliamentarians of Paris put forward the argument that 
the sovereign and the people are together bound by a contract, and that, if the people owe 
obedience to the king, he, in turn, owes obedience to the laws. In order to support their claims 
against the actions of the Crown, they appealed directly to an abstract right of the people, and 
not to history or to custom.  
The change also expressed itself in the evolution of the notion of nation as applied to the French 
polity. According to Furet and Ozouf111, the question of nation originates in the struggles in 
French society in the face of increasing royal centralisation and the reinforcement of 
absolutism. The question thus emerged in times such as the Wars of Religion and the Fronde 
when the differences and opposition between society and state power came to the fore of 
political life. Louis XIV’s style of absolutism was based upon a contradiction, namely, the 
maintenance of the orders within French society coupled with the political neutralisation of the 
orders taken individually (parlements, assemblies of the clergy, urban and rural authorities, 
guilds, etc.) or collectively (in the Estates General)112. This contradiction persisted and even 
reached its paroxysm under the following two reigns, where absolutism, requiring the support 
of the orders, still refused to associate them with the government of the realm. Thanks to the 
philosophes and the publicists, the old constitutional notion of France as a society organised in 
orders governed by the king gradually gave way to the more modern idea of a nation, the main 
qualification to be a member of which, was not membership of an order, but of the national 
community. This idea was already politically evident in the self-posturing of the parlements as 
the sole representatives of the nation (condemned by Louis XV in the famous Séance de la 
Flagellation, or Session of the Scourging of 1766)113 from the Regency to the immediate pre-
Revolutionary period, and, in a more latent manner, in the demands for the convocation of the 
Estates General. The orders into which society was divided eventually came to be seen as 
                                                          
110 Alfred Cobban. Aspects of the French Revolution. London: Paladin, 1971, pp.75-77. 
111 François Furet and Mona Ozouf. Deux légitimations historiques de la société française au XVIIIe siècle: Mably 
et Boulainvilliers. Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 34e Année, No.3 (May - Jun., 1979), pp.438-450. 
112 Cf. François Furet. The French Revolution 1770-1814. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992, 1996, pp.8-10.  
113 Cf. Daniel Teysseire. Un modele autoritaire: le discours de “la flagellation”. Mots, n°43, juin 1995. Acte 
d’autorité, discours autoritaires. pp.118-127. The text of the declaration is also included with the article.  
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constituting the principal obstacle to the realisation of national unity, for they were founded on 
socio-political inequality and fostered it in turn.  
This new idea of nation was most regularly expressed in the pre-Revolutionary period by those 
who wanted to introduce more equality in the fiscal regime and reduce the exemptions from 
the royal fiscal and financial policies on the basis of concessions and privileges. The genius of 
Sieyès, first in the Essai sur les privileges published in 1788, was to equate the first two orders 
of French society, but more specifically, the second order, the nobility, with the entire system 
of privileges. In this sense, those who possess privileges and defend them put themselves 
outside the project of national unification and signify their refusal to belong to a nation defined 
primarily by the equality of its members. Following a contractarian logic, in order for the nation 
to be sovereign, it requires the aggregation of the equal and individual sovereignty of its several 
members. Seeing that privileges are exceptions to common laws, in other words, exceptions to 
the general and sovereign will, they have no place in a nation of equals. This equation of 
privileges with the second estate was factually incorrect, and probably intentionally misleading, 
in that the third estate, or rather, those bodies (towns, corporations, guilds, etc.) that composed 
the third estate were also endowed with privileges and exemptions from taxes114. The next step 
for Sieyès, in Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État?, consisted in arguing that the mass of allegedly 
unprivileged Frenchmen was actually the one segment of society that materially supported the 
whole through labour, industry, trade and investment, and that it could thus claim to be a nation 
unto itself: the first two orders are a burden to the third estate, and they could never properly 
belong to the nation115. 
The destruction of the society of orders and the concomitant “transfer of sovereignty”,116 
supported principally by the intellectual ground set by Sieyès, eventually took place in a series 
of episodes, from the abolition of the privileges (4th of August 1789) to the promulgation of the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (approved by the National Assembly on 
the 26th of August 1789 and by the King on the 3rd of November of the same year), which itself, 
was used as the preamble to the Constitution of 1791. As per Article III of the Declaration, the 
principle of sovereignty is said to reside essentially in the nation, from which emanates all 
authority in the state. Power, authority and legitimacy are all vested in the nation. The political 
                                                          
114 Cf. Yves Durand. Les privilèges selon Sieyès ou le triomphe de la désinformation. Histoire, économie et 
société, vol.11, No.2, 1992, pp.295-323. 
115 Emmanuel Sieyès. Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état? Genève: Librairie Droz, 1970, pp.120-126. 
116 Jeremy Jennings. Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in France since the Eighteenth 
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imperative became less the reform of the old order than the creation and implementation of a 
new one that would be as different as possible from the Ancien Régime. The independence of 
the provinces was broken, their courts and estates indefinitely prorogued, and their privileges 
suppressed. The administrative divisions of the whole country were reorganised, with many of 
the former provinces themselves divided into départements most of which were named after 
features of the local geography and landscape (e.g. rivers, la Dordogne, or mountains, Hautes 
Alpes), to the detriment of the local traditions and history. The remnants of the feudal rights, 
dues and fees were all abolished together with the old system of land tenure that went with it. 
The physical divisions of the territory and the system of land ownership were now made to 
reflect the new reality of the nation.  
The clergy and the Church of France had somehow to be integrated into the nation. The 
majority of the representatives of the clergy in the first estate voted to join with the third estate, 
and thus, instrumental in the formation of the National Assembly. In a series of measures, 
including the suppression of tithing, the extensive financial autonomy hitherto enjoyed by the 
Church was ended, and most of ecclesiastical revenues and proceeds were channelled towards 
the payment of the national debt. The appropriation and sale of ecclesiastical property by the 
state to the public helped reinforce the commitment of a significant proportion of the French 
people, through their newly acquired property, to the Revolution117. In early 1790, the 
Assembly dissolved most religious orders and congregations, except those devoted to the care 
of children and of the sick, and prohibited religious vows. This reorganisation of the Church of 
France eventually culminated in the Civil Constitution of the Clergy passed by the Assembly 
on the 12th of July 1790 in spite of the protestations of some of the bishops and of the Pope. 
The desired effect of the new ecclesiastical legislation by the Assembly was the assimilation 
of the Church into the state as a department of government and administration. This was not 
exactly unprecedented in nominally Catholic realms, especially in the 18th century. Already in 
the early 1780s in the Holy Roman Empire (or least in those territories directly under the rule 
of the emperor), Joseph II initiated a series of measures that brought the church and religious 
orders into the control of the state, in line with Enlightenment ideas.  
It is also not exactly clear whether this new state of affairs for the Church was directly the result 
of Gallicanism understood as a set of principles as much as an attempt to synthesise Gallican 
                                                          
117 François Furet. op.cit., p.81. A similar situation occurred in England at the dissolution of the monasteries by 
Henry VIII in the late 1530s and early 1540s. The sale of alienated church property to the gentry and merchant 
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principles with the new ideology of the nation. No doubt there was a brand of Gallicanism 
wedded to the Jansenist movement, popular in the parliamentary circles, that wanted the 
Church of France to be as independent as possible from the Roman pontiff – be it, at the cost 
of being completely submerged within the structure of the state. The old Gallicanism of 
Bossuet, expressed in the Declaration of the Four Articles in 1682 stipulated the temporal 
independence of kings with respect to the papacy, confirmed the ancient liberties and customs 
of the Church of France, and more significantly, reaffirmed the Conciliarist teaching of the 
council of Constance and of the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges. This Gallicanism118 was at 
home in the society of orders, permeated with subsidiarity and customs, in which the Church 
was recognised as an autonomous corporation within the state, with its own deliberative 
assembly. Under the new regime, the liberties and the financial autonomy were gone; only the 
control of the state, now maximised, and indeed, rendered absolute, remained119.     
Resistance to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy also came from the Assembly itself. The 
Archbishop of Aix, Boisgelin, who previously had supported the revolutionary movement, 
published “Exposition des principes sur la constitution civile du clergé” in which, while 
recognising the need for reform, he questioned the competency of the National Assembly to 
legislate on spiritual matters without the concurrence of the episcopate; he also called for a 
reunion of provincial and national councils that would potentially restore some deliberative 
autonomy to the Church vis-à-vis the new regime. Louis XVI delayed giving his assent to the 
Civil Constitution while he was engaged in negotiations with all concerned, most notably with 
the Holy See, but finally succumbed to the pressure of the Assembly and of public opinion, 
and gave his assent in December 1790. Included in the Civil Constitution was an oath that 
bishops and priests were bound to take before being consecrated or ordained to their respective 
orders. It stipulated not only loyalty to the King and the French nation, but also, support for the 
Civil Constitution. In other words, it was designed to ensure that bishops and priests would not 
question precisely the competency and power of the National Assembly to legislate on 
ecclesiastical matters. The National Assembly’s attitude in this matter demonstrated a radically 
immanentist and localist understanding of the Church, that flew in the face of traditional 
ecclesiology that taught the transcendental and universal nature of the Church, alongside its 
                                                          
118 Cf. René Epp. Un jugement sévère de 1819 sur la Constitution civile du clergé. Revue des Sciences Religieuses, 
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more human aspects. In other words, the Church presented a significant challenge to the 
ideology of the nation. The Church and the Nation (through the National Assembly) both laid 
claims to totality; but both also articulated their respective claims to totality in different ways. 
The Church claimed for itself the supernatural life of Man while the Nation claimed his natural 
life. However, the Church also recognised the natural life and all its legitimate pursuits, and 
has seldom - with any consistency, at least - sought to legislate on every aspect of human life, 
except where it coincided with the spiritual or supernatural. The Nation, on the other hand, 
sought to circumscribe the whole life of Man in a way such that negated its supernatural 
dimension as traditionally understood; ecclesial governance and administration were to be 
comprehended within the legislative powers of the Nation, irrespective of the existing 
constitution of the Church. The constitution of the Church, in turn, was not only an, abstract, 
spiritual one, but also a concrete, universal, and, thus, international one, with the Roman Pontiff 
as its visible head. The inevitable antagonism expressed itself primarily in a procedural form: 
the disregard of canonical standards and the rejection of the possibility of convoking a national 
council by the National Assembly. But behind this question of procedure was a real conflict of 
principles. The Gallicanism of the Ancien Régime was tolerable, from a theological and 
canonical point of view, as long as the Church of France was the first estate of the realm, 
endowed with deliberative power, and enjoying communion with the Roman Pontiff, as 
mentioned above; this state of affairs did not fundamentally challenge the constitution of the 
universal Church.  
From a theological point of view, the main question was that of the competency of the National 
Assembly to reorganise the Church, and that question could not be answered, by the majority 
of French Bishops and by the Pope, in a way that recognised and legitimised the pretensions of 
the Assembly. In spite of including a number of bishops and priests amongst its members, the 
National Assembly was not an explicitly Catholic body, and it had even refused to recognise 
Catholicism as state religion. In addition to Boisgelin’s Exposition, the Bishop of Boulogne, 
Jean-René Asseline, issued a pastoral letter in which he opposed the Civil Constitution on the 
basis of the proper distinction between the spiritual authority of the Church and the temporal 
power of the state. The conversion of princes to Christianity do not institute them as rulers over 
the Church; rather, as members thereof, they are bound both to protect its liberties and to ensure 
that dissenters and innovators comply with the canons and ecclesiastical decisions. As much 
as the Church has no right to the temporal administration of the political society, the latter has 
no right in the administration of the Church; both are independent in the exercise of their 
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respective rights, while supporting and helping one another. Furthermore, “if every national 
church is in the state, every Catholic state is in the Church”.120 In support of the principle of 
the distinction of ecclesiastical authority and political power, Asseline marshals a number of 
authorities, mostly drawn from the moderate Gallican school of Bossuet and Fénelon, and from 
ecclesiastical historians such as Fleury. In one of the quotations from Bossuet’s Sermon 
preached at the Assembly of the Clergy in 1681 is a direct reference to the principles of the 
distinction of sacerdotium and imperium found in Pope Gelasius’s Letter to Emperor 
Anastasius (vide supra). The Gelasian dyarchy, that was at the heart of the understanding of 
mediaeval Christendom, found itself totally overturned by the National Assembly. According 
to Asseline, the reformation of the Church could never require any usurpation of spiritual 
authority by the political power; on the contrary, such usurpation was tantamount to aggression 
upon the rights and the freedoms of the Church. The duty for initiating any process of reform 
or return to the primitive customs belongs to the bishops, who are the successors of the 
Apostles, and not to any particular, national and political assembly. Thus, in matters spiritual, 
the faithful ought to obey the pastors of the Church, and not the civil magistrate, who has no 
power to ordain anything in the spiritual realm. Towards the end of his letter, Asseline exhorts 
his flock to remain faithful not only to himself and to the other bishops who would not subscribe 
to the mandatory oath, but also to the Pope: “Never lose sight of this truth, that our holy father 
the Pope is the vicar of Jesus Christ upon earth, the visible head of the universal church, and 
common father of all the faithful; and render unto him always the respect and obedience due 
to him on these grounds”.121 
As far as Bonald was concerned, this appeal to the supernatural character of the Church and 
the need for communion with the Roman Pontiff did not fall on deaf ears. As president of the 
departmental assembly of the Aveyron, it would have fallen upon him to ensure that the 
provisions of the Civil Constitution were fully implemented and that the oath be administered 
to bishops and priests. Up to that point, Bonald had been happy to participate in what truly 
reforming movements accompanied these early stages of the French Revolution, while helping 
to maintain order within his region. The promulgation of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy 
marked his break with those reforming movements, as he came to see they were inextricably 
linked to an ideology that was bent upon not merely reforming the ancient institutions of 
France, but, rather change it profoundly according to what could only be termed a hermeneutic, 
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not of continuity, but of rupture, an ideology of the tabula rasa, whereby society was to 
reorganised entirely according to an extreme conception of national sovereignty. The 
promulgation of the Civil Constitution, itself seen as emblematic of the whole revolutionary 
venture, its effects on French society and its long-term significance for the relationships 
between Church and State were the occasion for Bonald to ponder the relationship between the 
spiritual and temporal realm from the perspective of society. The “The Theory of Political and 
Religious Power in Civil Society, established through reason and history” of 1796, his very 
first work, can be said to contain much of the fruits of these ponderings, and such themes as 
will remain constant throughout the rest of his work. An examination of these themes will 
furnish the matter of the rest of this thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
Introduction of Bonald’s Social Philosophy 
The present chapter is an exposition of Bonald’s philosophy of society based upon a reading 
of his first published political treatise: Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux122 (hereafter 
Théorie). This treatise already contains the substance of the themes that will be developed in 
his subsequent works on political philosophy, both in the light of the severely restrained and 
disciplined evolution of Bonald’s own thinking, and in that of the then current political events.  
A. Love, Will and Force in God, Man and Society  
“One cannot consider society without speaking of man, nor yet speak of man without rising up 
to God”123: This programmatic connection of society, man and God in an anagogical ascent of 
knowledge (“rising up to God”) opens Bonald’s first published work, the Théorie du pouvoir 
politique et religieux, which is concerned primarily with the relations between God, man and 
society by way of response to the ideas of the Enlightenment, of Montesquieu and of Rousseau, 
and of certain jusnaturalist positions that inspired the latter, on the same subjects. His aim is to 
show how the fact of society can be derived from the fact of God, creator of the world yet 
distinct from it, and to draw out what he believes to be the necessary consequences of such a 
connection between the two. His method, as stated in the title, partakes both of discursive and 
historical demonstration; it is a method that follows the paths of knowledge (again, of God, 
man and society) opened to us by the experience of society and reflection about it, instead of, 
the experience and contemplation of Being. Yet, what matters to Bonald is not so much to 
prove God’s existence, as to assume it and build upon it, through a series of propositions 
deductively connected among themselves, the edifice of his understanding and of his defence 
of society and tradition.  
The starting point of the Théorie is a consideration of the attributes and activities of God such 
as his spiritual or intellectual nature, his self-knowledge, self-love, self-preservation, will, 
freedom, action, power, and their intimate connection with one another. As a pure and infinite 
intellectual being, God knows himself in an infinite way and with an infinite love, and thus 
wills to preserve himself through an act of his infinite will, and therefore, preserves himself by 
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virtue of his infinite power. God’s infinite self-knowledge, infinite self-love and infinite self-
preservation all converge to the one act of God’s being: all these operations are not distinct in 
God himself on account of divine simplicity. Yet, while not distinct in God, they are distinct in 
their temporal effects in the creaturely realm. Creation is that act of God whereby being is given 
to that which was not being, that is, out of nothing God makes something and imparts being to 
it. Here Bonald sees a correlation between the object of God’s will, his own eternal self-
preservation, derived from his own eternal and pure self-love, and the effect of that will as 
expressed through the act of creation.  
Ultimately, God’s self-love is the motive for his creative activity, and his love for the creatures 
is for him the motive of their preservation. This love expresses itself in different degrees 
depending upon the ways in which the creatureliness of creatures relates to God himself. In the 
scheme of creation, Man was created in the image and likeness of God: this similitude being 
the distinctive feature of Man’s creatureliness, and the basis of God’s relation to Man. God’s 
love for Man as a creature is enhanced by this proximity through the similitude; this love, in 
turn, is the principle of the preservation of Man. Thus, not only did God create Man by virtue 
of his own ineffable self-love, he also preserves him because of the latter’s similitude to 
himself. In Man, though only analogically, one finds intellect, will, love and power, all 
elements of the spiritual being of Man for “the love of beings similar to himself is in God the 
power that preserves beings”.124 Even though God’s existence and self-preservation does not 
depend of Man’s knowledge of him, yet, Bonald thought that God, at a purely empirical level, 
can only be present to Man insofar as Man makes God the object of his thoughts and the end 
of his love. But Man is a composite being made up of an intellectual nature and of a corporal 
one. His similitude to God is restricted to that of the intellectual and rational nature. Bonald 
calls the body the exterior being of Man. Man can only preserve the knowledge of God in as 
much as both his exterior being, his body, his power, is joined for this common end to his 
interior being, his intellect, his will. There is, here, the notion that the harmony between the 
different parts of Man’s being is a prerequisite condition for the undertaking of theology as a 
human activity. Religion, therefore, manifests itself in an interior or spiritual way in adoration, 
and in an exterior or corporal way in public worship. What maintains, or rather, what impels 
Man to maintain and preserve religion, or keep God present to his mind, is his love for God, 
which itself, can only be a response of the love of God for man. “Love” writes Bonald, “is thus 
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neither will, nor power, nor spirit, nor body, but, rather, partakes of both”.125 Love is what 
binds the mind, the intellect to the body, and in a formal manner, will to power, the spiritual to 
the material, in their common directedness towards or desire for an external object. Love, will, 
power: Bonald insists that those three are distinct yet complementary faculties. In God, these 
three faculties are infinite, uncreated, united in one act; in Man, finite, created, and each 
expressed differently. There are, thus, certain relations between God and Man - of uncreated 
will to created will, of uncreated love to created love, of uncreated power to created power - 
that are proportionate to the natures of the beings involved, and therefore, are endowed with 
such a necessary character that they can well be called laws. Thus, these relations form the 
basis of a community between God and Man, which finds its external expression in public 
worship and its interior manifestation in adoration. Bonald calls this community “natural 
religious society or natural religion”, and defines society as “the combination of similar beings 
through such laws or necessary relations as tend towards their mutual generation and 
preservation”.126 If such a community exists between such beings as God and Man, it is likely 
to exist between Man and Man as well. Human beings produce other human beings from the 
love they bear to one another, and preserve the human beings thus generated out of love for 
them. This fundamental community of generation is the family, the domestic society.  
Yet, while natural religion and the family are, for Bonald, the originary and fundamental 
societies, they can only imperfectly discharge the duty of preserving their members, or rather, 
of preserving the relations between their members. This imperfection arises when self-love 
comes to displace the love of others which is responsible for the preservation of society. Self-
love is the principle of generation, but not of preservation. The intrusion of self-love into the 
conservative action of society is but a violation of the necessary relations underlying it, and 
effectively nullifies such conservative action: war between human beings is the necessary result 
of disorders of the will and exclusive self-love. Against human passions, and the obstacle they 
put in the way of the general preservation of humankind, the necessity for a general society 
imposes itself.  
This is what really matters to Bonald who writes “Philosophy [by which he meant the Modern 
and Enlightenment philosophers] asks whether the agreement of all those contrary interests 
was voluntary or imposed. It was neither, replies reason: it was necessary”.127 A general will, 
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general love and general force, replacing all particular wills, loves and forces, form together 
the essence, the constitution of a general society of preservation. Families, then, as domestic 
societies, will be the constitutive elements of the political society of preservation, while natural 
religion, in its domestic aspect, will be the constitutive element of public religion. The former 
is concerned with the preservation of bodies and the latter, with the preservation, and 
ultimately, the salvation of the souls united to those bodies. Bonald’s social philosophy is 
constructed in a manner to exclude from the constitution of society anything that has to do with 
self-interest and self-love – on the contrary, the pursuit of self-interests and self-preservation 
is held to be unable to preserve society. Against Hobbes and Locke, it is crucial to him to 
attempt at locating the instinct of social preservation in the love of others. It could, indeed, be 
levelled against Hobbes more so than Locke, perhaps, that the former took little notice of the 
family as a society, and as a consequence, put forth the idea of a political society that is self-
generative, the Leviathan being the sum of the sovereignties of the individual and several 
humans fighting in asocial state of nature. While it could not be argued with any certainty that 
Bonald had Hobbes in mind while writing the opening chapters of the Théorie (he more likely 
had Rousseau in mind), it is noteworthy that Hobbes opened the Leviathan with a discussion 
of the nature of Man, whereas Bonald opened his treatise by a discussion of the nature of God.  
What we have here in the first few chapters of the Théorie is an articulation of what constitutes 
the object and end of society in terms that transcend society or any other human reality. Mere 
natural necessity is not be accepted as axiomatic: there is something over and above this natural 
necessity that informs and determines it. Bonald delivers a sketch of what he believes to be the 
theological foundations of society, while rejecting both deism and pantheism, the minimal or 
diffused deity that found favour with the radical thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century. It is not in terms of a theologia naturalis that he rejects those, but in what will 
effectively amount to a theologia civilis. In the preface to the Théorie, Bonald points to what 
he perceives to be Montesquieu’s double failure to articulate the first principles of political 
societies, instead contenting himself with describing their spirit, and to credit the climate, 
instead of the passions of men, with the variations in the legislations of these societies. What 
Bonald denounces is the superficiality of the analysis and conclusions of Montesquieu, who, 
while possessing a wealth of information and an undeniable sagacity, succumbed to the sceptic 
prejudices of his age and bequeathed to posterity a political science that hardly reaches to the 
ultimate grounds of political reality. This denunciation will take a particular force in Bonald’s 
later critique of the modern idea of constitution and of the doctrine of the separation of powers.  
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Bonald, as mentioned above, is not so much interested in the proofs of the existence of God, 
as in the assumption of this existence as the basis both of the creation of the universe and of 
political society. He thereby seeks to introduce a causal link between the love of God and the 
very existence and perpetuation of society. The proximate end of Bonald’s tractate on the love 
of God is both to demonstrate and to justify the derivation of society from this love. Divine 
self-love is the only legitimate self-love that is also productive of something else, whereas 
human self-love is not productive, and cannot serve as the principle of any community. Self-
love can only be the love of society for itself, seeking its collective self-preservation. The 
common good can only result from the application of the collective love that society bears 
towards all its members and from the application of this love by the general will.  
 
B. The Constitution of Society  
It is here that we reach the point at which Bonald critically engages with Rousseau’s 
understanding of the general will. He is ready to concede to Rousseau that “only the general 
will can direct the powers of the State in such a way that its true purpose, which is the good of 
all, will be achieved”.128 What Bonald disputes is that the general will should be identified with 
the popular will, becoming liable of a voluntarist (and, ultimately, nihilistic) interpretation, 
and, thus, avoiding any relation to necessity of the general laws of society. The general will, 
Bonald contends, cannot be the will of the people, for even where that will were unanimous, it 
would still remain a sum of particular wills129. Society is endowed with a constitution that is 
not for the wills of men to make or unmake: the general will is not the particular will of an 
assembly, of a people, or even, of a king. To try to rebuild society from first principles, and to 
legitimate such an exercise by grounding it on a voluntarist notion of general will, is tantamount 
to make society take an unnatural course. This is what happened, according to Bonald, at the 
French Revolution, where the general will was conflated with the sum of individual wills, 
whose end, instead of being the general good, had become the pursuit of individual and 
factional interests. As a result, French society descended into chaos, anarchy and human 
misery.  
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It follows, from Bonald’s critique, that the general will is a universal will that obtains in all 
societies, for it is the will whose principal object is the self-preservation of societies. It proceeds 
from the very nature of things, of men and of societies. Since it cannot be embodied in the 
people, in the multiplicity of their wills and interests, however similar, it needs to be vested in 
one person in a stable and permanent manner. What the French Revolution revealed was that 
under a democratic or popularist understanding of general will, any faction that comes to power 
can claim to represent and act in the name of the general will. In other words, the general will 
becomes a mere device used by a variety of factions to legitimise their rule.  
How does Bonald arrive at this fundamental law of the unitary embodiment of the general will? 
General will, as we have seen earlier, is not the sole element of society – there is also the 
general love and the general force. The general and fixed laws of society are the expression of 
how those three faculties relate to one another. Now, on the assumption that society is a being, 
the general will is its inner self, the general force its exterior self, and the general love, the link 
between the two. The question is, thus, not solely one of how is the general will manifested 
and expressed, but also how are the other two faculties manifested and expressed. If the general 
will cannot be embodied in the people as such, neither can the general love and the general 
force. It would go against the natural constitution if the general will were embodied in one man, 
and the two other faculties in the people, or in any combination of the people: “Thus, love is 
the nexus, the mediator between the intellectual part and the material part of society, as it is 
in human beings, and was [embodied in] a man called monarch because, alone he commands, 
and king, because alone he directs the public force”.130 Love being the nexus, it is that faculty 
whose embodiment implies the embodiment of the other two: the love of others which is the 
conservative love of society. Therefore, the being of society must be embodied in one concrete 
person. If there is no such embodiment, there can be no society at all: “Society, which is not 
the same as the mere rallying of the people could not predate the monarch: it could not exist 
before there was a power to make it exist. It is therefore absurd to imagine that society could 
ever dictate conditions to the monarch”.131  
As embodiment of the general will, of the necessary relations of society, indeed, of its laws, 
and ultimately, of the will of God, the monarch is not the creature and the agent of the people, 
and does not depend upon their consent to act in a legitimate manner. Furthermore, the 
embodiment of the three faculties of the social being do not correspond to any tripartite 
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separation of powers, that is, the monarch should not be conceived to be the depositary of these 
three powers that would need to be differentiated subsequently into separate bodies. The 
monarch is here to ensure that the laws of the political society express the general will, which 
ever tends to the preservation of society. Embodying the bond of love that keeps society 
together, he is truly the agent of the general will understood as an emanation of the divine will, 
itself the expression of divine sovereignty, while the people is at once the instrument and the 
subject of this will and sovereignty. The affirmation of divine sovereignty in Bonald seeks to 
be the counterpoint of the affirmation of popular sovereignty that prefaced both the American 
and French Revolutions (in spite of the vague, deistic invocations prefixed to their respective 
inceptive Declarations): “The dogma of popular sovereignty, in overturning this order, and in 
dethroning God, was naturally bound to lead to atheism”.132 To affirm popular sovereignty is 
tantamount to denying that everything comes from God and is ordained to him as final cause. 
In God himself, by virtue of his simplicity, the three faculties of will, love and power are joined 
together in a single and eternal act of being. In man and society, composite beings not endowed 
with such simplicity, the agreement and synchronicity of these faculties is a matter of constant 
struggle and adjustment. Under the rule of a will governed by love and using a degree of force, 
preservation obtains, otherwise chaos emerges. The rule of one is, thus, more conducive to the 
end of preservation than the rule of the multitude in which equal wills armed with unequal 
forces never cease to compete, and the course of such competition is eventually bound to lead 
society to its ruin.  
Bonald is the first to recognise that what he describes is an ideal type, a state of perfection, 
rarely to be found among existing polities, even those that are based upon necessary relations. 
Even such polities, which he calls constituted societies, will, on closer inspection, be found 
wanting in their conformity to necessary relations. If the members of a political society are 
bound together by relations that are not necessary, that are not in accordance with their nature, 
it is to be expected that the laws of such a society will be variable and defective in the extreme. 
Under those circumstances, laws, instead of being the expression of the inner order of society, 
and tending towards the preservation of its members, will be incapable of keeping society 
together for this very end. In such a non-constituted society, beings will be produced but not 
preserved. According to Bonald, the Philosophes wanted to turn the clock back to non-
constituted societies, expecting to find there the purity and perfection of beginnings; in seeking 
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to do so, they did not see that it would lead society to anarchy. The more constituted a society, 
the more perfect it will be.  
How, then can a society be “more constituted”? This seems to imply a scale of 
“constitutedness” among societies. Among necessary relations, some are more important than 
others. For Bonald, the vertical relations, that is, of power to subject in the political society, of 
father to children in the domestic family, are more important than horizontal relations between 
subjects, or between children. As societies tend to become “more constituted”, the important 
relations between their members will be those that are more necessary. Conversely, a society 
will be less constituted to the extent that the relations between its members will be less 
necessary, and thus, more horizontal. In a constituted society, the necessary relations provide 
the basis for the general will to be expressed in fixed and fundamental laws, whereas in non-
constituted societies, the non-necessary relations, themselves the result of particular and 
depraved wills, will yield, as mentioned above, variable and defective laws 133. The 
fundamental laws, thus, are those laws that express the constitution of a polity. They are the 
basis of the political laws which determine the form of government. Political laws express the 
nature of man and of society. Civil laws, in turn, are derived from political laws, and express 
those norms that regulate the social life of men among themselves. It is only in a constituted 
that the general will expresses itself through such a hierarchy of laws134.  
It appears from the preceding that the Bonaldian notion of a political constitution is one that is 
based on the three faculties of will, love and force or power, and their organic unity and 
agreement. He takes the word constitution to mean just that – “the way in which something is 
made up, the arrangement or combination of its parts or elements, as determining its nature 
and character; make, frame, composition”.135 The constitution refers to the inner principle of 
agreement of the three faculties, from which it follows that not all political societies are 
constituted: for where there is no such agreement, there cannot be a constitution. On the other 
hand, most societies, especially non-constituted ones, present outward characteristics that 
correspond to the form of government, and not to the constitution, properly speaking, while in 
constituted societies the form of government is a direct reflection of the constitution. The 
difference between the forms of governments of non-constituted society is to be ascribed to the 
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fact that each of those forms is the result of the non-necessary relations and the rule of the 
particular wills that obtain in such societies. Furthermore, the difference can be narrowed down 
to the ways in which the particular will is exercised. Thus, there where the particular will of 
one is sovereign, and the exercise of power personal, the form of the government is despotic. 
There where the particular will of some is sovereign and the power of some hold society, the 
form of government is republican. Resorting to military similes, Bonald likens republican 
democracy to a state of savagery, one in which all wills, powers and forces collide constantly 
and fight one another, while a pure despotic rule is compared to the state of conquest, where 
only subsist an absolute ruler and a mass of slaves, ever ready to rebel. It is this non-constituted 
society that bears the greatest resemblance to Hobbes’s state of nature, a state of war of all 
against all. Political society, on the other hand, is a disciplined and well-ordered army, in which 
the soldiers are united in the pursuit of a common interest under the leadership of a general, the 
least negligence in whom results in defeat. Ultimately, it is really nothing but the “war waged 
by the good on the bad, and all the life of the former is but a long and perilous campaign”.136 
Monarchical government, according to Bonald, is but an instantiation of this metaphor, which 
obtains not only in ethics (the war of the good against the bad), but also in politics.  
Notwithstanding the diversity of forms of government, and the depraved human wills behind 
them, Bonald believed in the perfectibility of societies (or, the perfectibility of Man in society). 
This belief could sometimes take the usual inevitabilistic tone: “Non-constituted societies 
inevitably and invincibly tend to constitute themselves, and constituted societies to become 
more constituted; that is to say, the legislation of nature tends to destroy the legislation of man, 
and substitute its own laws or necessary relations for non-necessary ones”.137 There is, 
therefore, in societies a natural tendency towards becoming more constituted, and while this 
tendency might not lead to an actual change in the form of government, yet, the general will, 
under the impulse of nature, displaces the particular will or wills and becomes the inner 
principle of legislation. Revolutions and seditions are the outward manifestations of the interior 
struggles that attend such a displacement. In other words, all governments, irrespective of their 
outward form or of the principles professed by the regime, tend towards some monarchical 
unity of will and force, invested in one person, whether that person is publicly recognised or 
not.  
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It follows that constitutions can only be natural: they are the expression of the social nature of 
man. One could not “write”, that is, create ex nihilo, a constitution because a constitution is 
“very existence and very nature”.138 Furthermore, Bonald seems to think that modern 
legislators, by which he meant those who were in charge of creating the “constitutions” of the 
late 18th century, were aware of the absence of any inner constitutive principle in their works,139 
and thus, tried to remedy this absence by putting forth “preliminary declarations of imaginary 
rights and pretended duties”.140 Beyond the domestic impact of the subterfuges whereby the 
real constitution and the true nature of revolutions are concealed behind universal declarations 
of humanity (designed to appeal to the emotions and the passions of the multitude rather than 
to their reason), the international repercussions of the lack of a constitution cannot be 
overlooked. Non-constituted societies will tend to be weak, isolated, and violent, and the 
violence that is inherent in them either devours them up or spreads outside their borders. Bonald 
here agrees with Montesquieu, quoting him, that “republics must [always] have something to 
dread”.141 It is by virtue of this fear and of the need to wage wars that non-constituted societies 
live in constant dependence of other states, whether they be allies or enemies. The principle of 
their very preservation is to be found outside of themselves. Ideally, the international system 
would be a collection of constituted states bound by commercial and friendly bonds, and all 
subscribing to the same fundamental laws. Revolutionary and Napoleonic France was 
constantly involved in wars, waged, it would seem, to defend the “Nation”, the principles of 
1789, and extend “liberty” to Europe, that is to say, to destroy or subdue the continental 
monarchies. Those wars could also be seen as the attempt to export the violence that was then 
stirring the bosom of France, together with the ideas that would eventually inspire and drive 
European and colonial politics for much of the 19th century and beyond.  
 
C. Civil Society  
While Bonald uses the word “political society” quite consistently throughout his works to 
designate what we may call the “state”, he does not thereby mean the entirety of the public 
organisation of society. Instead, he uses the expression “civil society” to designate a more 
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comprehensive entity that encompasses not only the political society but also the religious one. 
Man is both body and soul; the aim of the political society is the preservation of the body, while 
that of the religious society is the preservation of the soul. The public or civil sphere, properly 
speaking, must accommodate not only political ends, but also religious ends, on account of the 
nature of Man, both physical and spiritual. We saw earlier that God and Man were already 
bound in a society, by virtue of Man’s creaturely similarity to God. If God is thus related to 
every individual Man, he is also related to the bodies of Men that form societies. And this 
relation, being an “intellectual”, that is, spiritual, communion of God with the social body is 
also a necessary one, in other words, for Bonald, an incontrovertible one. The relation manifests 
itself through religious laws, and in public worship the recognition of its universal character is 
expressed; together they form public religion. As much as monarchy expresses the unitary 
constitution of political power, so does the public religion express both the unity of God and 
his relation with society, and no alleged act of popular sovereignty could ever release a people 
from the obligation to conform to the natural constitution of civil society. In both branches of 
the civil society, then, there must be permanent agencies that are ordained to the pursuance and 
application of the general will, whether it be for the good of Men’s bodies and physical being, 
or for their souls. Those permanent agencies, occupying the intermediate degree in the 
hierarchy, are to be differentiated from the people; they constitute a distinct class whose sole 
function is to be the agents of the unitary power, whether that of God or of Man. There are thus 
three fundamental laws or normative notes or characteristics of a civil society: unitary power, 
permanent social distinctions and public religion. In civil society, as Bonald understands it, the 
society of Man with his fellows, and the society of God with Man are harmoniously brought 
together, forming an organic whole that allows for the integral enactment of an authentic human 
life by encompassing both the concerns of the body and of the soul, and an authentic human 
life is one that is led in conformity with the laws or necessary relations dictated by nature, and, 
ultimately, God.  
Throughout his disquisitions on civil society, Bonald reminds us that “there where all men 
necessarily want to rule with equal wills and unequal forces, it is necessary that one man rules 
or that all destroy themselves”.142 The equal wills derive from a common human nature while 
the unequal forces are due to the historical circumstances wherein a society and its members 
are to be found. All men want to rule, but not all are entitled or, indeed, able to do so. The 
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desire to rule is something that is bound up with the moral constitution of men, whereas the 
question of what means they have at their disposal is a primarily social one. In other words, 
there needs to be an adequation of Man’s interior motives with his exterior acts. Bonald, in his 
formulation of the dual constitution of civil society, attempts precisely to articulate this 
adequation. The task of the religious society, of public religion, even considered as a form of 
government,143 is to help Man overcome his depraved will through a disciplined cultivation 
and refinement of interior motives, and thus prevent exterior acts that are detrimental to society 
while that of the political society aims at making the depraved will impotent by repressing 
exterior acts similarly detrimental. “The identity of objects intrinsic to both societies manifests 
itself by an identity of effects”144: if the action of one weakens, the action of the other will 
weaken as well. Once a change in the constitution of the one is introduced, the social effect of 
the other will change accordingly, by virtue of their concurrent action on Man.  
Here again, Bonald is convinced that this harmonious combination of the means, effects and 
ends of public religion with those of the political authority can be instantiated only where the 
unity of God and the unity of the social power are recognised together simultaneously as the 
twin foundations of civil society. Drawing from his own reading of ancient history, Bonald 
seeks to find instances that vindicate his theory of the union of religious and political power, 
and, more importantly, of the primacy of religious power within civil society145. In the history 
of ancient Hebrews, he finds the example of a people who was able to preserve itself on the 
sole basis of a religious constitution that was grounded upon the unity of the Godhead, whereas 
the Egyptians only possessed a political constitution, however laden with religious symbols, 
that did not protect them from Greek and Roman domination, and from the admixture of their 
own beliefs with those of their conquerors. It was, thus, significantly providential that the 
accomplishment of the Jewish religion in Jesus Christ should happen at the same time as the 
establishment of the unity of power over a substantial part of the world by the Roman 
principate. On the other hand, it was in ancient Athens, according to Bonald, noting that as the 
twin emergence of democracy and atheism occurred at the same time, from then on, the two 
principles of religious and political nihilism became inseparable in his reading of history. One 
cannot help reflecting here upon the peculiarities of Bonald’s historical demonstration146, 
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especially when it comes to ancient history, which are no doubt due to the vagaries his exile in 
Germany and to an almost exclusive reliance Bossuet’s philosophy of history. What our author 
here seeks to do is to contend that it was only in Christendom that public religion and political 
power were ever recognised to be distinct yet conjoined, and thus, only in Christendom, was 
an authentic civil society ever to be found. His use, primarily didactic, of historical examples 
is ordained to his critique of the present, of the excesses of the French Revolution, whose 
agents, in his analysis, have been pursuing a consistent policy of the destruction of civil society 
in France. We must not forget at this point, that Bonald became finally disillusioned with the 
reforming pretensions of the early revolutionaries with the passing of the Civil Constitution of 
the Clergy147, whereby they tried to absorb the Church into the revolutionary settlement that 
was being put in place. This absorption and subsequent neutralisation of the once powerful 
Church of France would pave the way for the excesses of the next phase of the revolution. By, 
then, seeking to abolish the public recognition of the unity of God as revealed in the Christian 
religion, the revolutionaries of the Terror have but led France back into a state of savagery, that 
is, a pre-civil, or more correctly, an uncivil state, and had thrown it into a state of war with all 
other European nations. 
 The latent or manifest atheism, often conveniently presented as a deism, that was ingrained in 
the revolutionary beliefs did not so indicate the absence of recognition of God in public society 
as much as it led to the establishment of a multiplicity of gods or idols, in other words, the 
substitution of religion for the pursuit of disordered passions: “The most impure idolatry is 
reared next to the most ferocious despotism”.148 Peace at home and abroad can only be the 
achievement of a truly civil society, in which the laws are obeyed and the passions kept under 
check. Polytheism, or atheism negating God’s oneness, and democracy and other popular 
regime denying the unity of social power can only combine to initiate the eventual dissolution 
of society. We have here in Bonald a classic explanation of the necessary alliance of altar and 
throne where the microcosmic and moral unity of soul and body in human beings corresponds 
to the necessary moral and social union of public religion with political power.  
Civil society is characterised by the perpetuity of the means of its own conservation. 
Underlying the three fundamental laws of civil society is the notion of the perpetuity or 
continuity: this is the meaning of conservation, namely, maintenance in accordance with 
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specific laws that are already found in society itself. One such law or principle that allows the 
continuity of society is heredity. The general will, concerned with the conservation of society, 
required that the exercise of power should never be interrupted, and “the monarch could only 
be perpetual through the hereditary transmission of power in one family”.149 The principle of 
an election would interfere with the unbroken transmission, or, indeed, succession, required for 
the preservation of society; the case of Poland, with its elective monarchy and its subsequent 
misfortunes, furnished Bonald for the evidence of the inadequacy of the elective principle. 
Society is primarily a reunion of families, not of individuals, and thus, it is in families that the 
functions essential for the survival of society ought to reside. In his Pensées sur l’économie 
sociale,150 he stressed the relationship between family, society and the state in the striking 
formula: “the heredity of the throne is the guarantee of all heredities, and the safeguard of all 
inheritances”.  
Again, we cannot sufficiently stress that the conservation of society means primarily for Bonald 
the conservation of families, which themselves are dedicated to the conservation of their own 
members. But it is not only the monarchy that is to be invested in one family and be perpetuated 
in a dynasty. The same holds true for those ministers that serve the monarchy and help it in its 
conservative functions and duties. Heredity, thus, helps preserve the public ministry, whether 
political or religious, from the passions of either the despots or of the subjects, and, through 
their action, preserves society from revolutions. These can only happen, it follows, in the case 
of severe dereliction of duty on the part of the public ministry or of its destruction through 
terror and war. The dereliction of duty happens when the public ministry ceases to seek to 
implement the general will, and instead makes itself the vehicle of particular wills. For Bonald, 
society perishes through the passions being unfettered and unschooled, and publicly promoted, 
as it were. In such a situation, the passions of the man occupying the throne who seeks to rule 
not by the general will, but by his own particular private will, will inevitably affect the order 
of society, and lead to troubles. He describes such a state of affairs as oppression: the effect on 
society of the depraved particular will of one man or of a group of men, who dispose of public 
means to enact such a will151.   
The question, then, is posed: how is oppression to be prevented and contained in a constituted 
and civil state of society? In such a society, the opposition to oppression ought not to come 
                                                          
149 Théorie, pp.174-175. 
150 Cf. Oeuvres Completes, Migne. Ed. Col.1291.  
151 Théorie, pp.180-189, the whole of the 7th Chapter of Book 1.  
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primarily through the mass of the people, or through individual members of the public. Instead, 
one should look for the structural means of resistance present in the system itself. What is 
crucial here is the distinction, alluded to in the preceding paragraphs, between the personal will 
of the monarch as a private person and the general will of the monarch as the incarnation of 
public authority and power. The monarch in the latter capacity cannot, by definition, violate 
the fundamental laws of society or the civil laws of the polity, given that he is, himself, a “living 
law”. The difficulty lies in ascertaining the situations during which the monarch will try to 
substitute his own private will for the public and general will. The monarch himself cannot be 
counted upon to make such distinctions, which Bonald ascribes to the simultaneity and 
inseparability of private man and public power in the person of the monarch. Should he be 
called upon to adjudicate upon such a distinction, it is not certain whether his adjudication 
would be impartial, and free from his own disordered private will to power. There should be a 
body of public servants whose tasks it is both to make such distinctions between private will 
and public will. The necessity for making such distinctions will itself arise when the same 
public servants will be called upon to execute the decisions of the general will. The task of 
these public servants or ministers will be to transmit and certify the decisions of the monarch 
as public power. These ministers in turn ought to be responsible to those courts and tribunals 
that are entrusted with the defence and interpretation of laws. The custody and the interpretation 
of laws are, therefore, to be vested in some body other than the monarch, in the case, that the 
latter, as private person should decide to modify the laws for his own personal benefit. Only a 
body made up of many members, too numerous to be seduced as a whole, and powerful enough 
to resist the threats and cajoleries of a corrupt power, is to be entrusted with the keeping of the 
laws. The members of this body ought to be free from the influence and power of any particular 
will, whether it be of the private person of the monarch, or of the members of society. Bonald 
here opines that the ills of France, probably the ills that lead to the Revolution and that attended 
it, were in no small part due to the fact that it became customary for the ministers of the crown 
to accept and execute the private will of the monarch. For him, the ministers of the monarch 
are to be responsible to that independent body, entrusted within the polity with the 
interpretation of the general will and of the fundamental laws, expressed in civil laws. If the 
monarch as public power is himself “living law”, as a private person he is bound and subject 
to all laws, except to criminal laws. This is so precisely by reason of the union of the public 
person of the monarch with his private person. To bring criminal charges against the monarch, 
king and man, amounts to bringing charges against the supreme public authority in the polity, 
which is an impossibility because every judicial act in the polity proceeds from the supreme 
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public authority, whose end is the conservation of society. Now, if and when, the supreme 
public authority appears to be taking measures that seem to compromise this end, it can only 
be because, in his person, at once king and man, his private will has prevailed over the general 
will, who then, as a private uses the public force of society for his own private ends. This, he 
could not do without the assent, however servile and unfree, of his ministers. The monarch 
depends upon them to effect his desire to apply the public force of society to the furtherance of 
his private ends. Their responsibility is, therefore, easier to locate, to identity and to question, 
than that of the monarch. The monarch, as supreme public authority, is not responsible to 
anyone or any particular body in the polity, because he alone embodies the general will, and 
the general will cannot be judged by the particular wills of the members of the polity.   
In order for all, that is, the monarch, the ministers of religion, the ministers of the public 
authority, and the mass of citizens, to perform their respective duties within civil society, they 
must be free from the hindrance of particular wills. All orders in society, as public bodies within 
the polity, must be conformed to the general will, and this can only happen if they are free from 
the influence and power of particular wills. Freedom from oppression is, then, truly freedom 
from particular wills. Similarly, equality is really the equal submission of all to the laws of 
society.   
From the three fundamental laws or notes of all civil societies, and from the attempt to 
understand the constitution of the civil society in terms of the general will, Bonald derives 
twelve political laws that characterise all monarchies: 1. The intervention of religion in all 
social actions; 2. Public education, which comprises both of religious and political education; 
3. The independence of religion and of its ministers from all particular wills; 4. The exercise 
of power is to be fixed by heredity; 5. The personal independence of the monarch; 6. The 
perpetuity of the military profession is also to be fixed by heredity; 7. The independence of the 
public force, or military profession, from all particular wills; 8. The establishment of tribunals 
in whom the custody of laws is to be vested; 9. The independence of these tribunals from all 
particular wills; 10. The nomination of the agents of the public power, that is, of ministers; 11. 
The responsibility of ministers before the abovementioned tribunals; 12. The independence of 
all social professions, ensured by the inamovibility of their members152.  
                                                          
152 Cf. Théorie, p.190. 
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These political laws of a constituted monarchical polity that is coterminous with what Bonald 
deems to be a genuine civil society could be seen as mere formalisations of certain features of 
the Ancien Régime. Indeed, the clear distinction between the orders of society and the social 
professions, their respective functions in the polity and the mode of their membership do harken 
back to the positions occupied by the Church of France, the military and the magistracy, 
together with the agents or ministers of the monarchy. But Bonald is not limiting himself to 
justifying a now defunct system; instead, with his appropriation of the trope of the general will 
and his re-interpretation thereof, he is offering a model of society, with all the characteristics 
of the past regime, into which the criticisms of the Enlightenment have been answered, and to 
a degree, for Bonald, neutered. In appropriating the notion of the general will, Bonald was 
opposing the secularised jusnaturalist tradition that had become prevalent from the Renaissance 
onwards. The theological nature of this re-interpretation is unmistakeable from the very first 
chapters of the Théorie, whose doctrine is but an application of a few primary theological 
principles to the social nature of man and to the nature of society. The merits of Bonald’s 
theological re-appropriation and re-interpretation will form the subject of another chapter. For 
now, the task at hand is to continue to survey the main characteristics of his social philosophy 
and to give an account of a crucial theme that runs throughout his work.  
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Chapter 3 
The Developments of the Bonald’s Social Philosophy 
A. Power, Minister and Subject    
In the works following the Théorie, Bonald will maintain and expand upon his doctrine of the 
ternary structure of society. In the Théorie, this doctrine, as seen in the first section of this 
chapter, is first introduced in a series of deductions accounting for the inner life of God, the 
motives of creation, and the nature of creation, including that of man and of society. There, the 
structure of society is explained in terms of will, power and force. The power in society is the 
agent of the sovereignty of God while the public force, in turn, is the agent of the public power. 
In the Essai Analytique, Bonald seems intent to re-articulate these philosophical faculties of 
will, power and force into the more juridical notion of social persons. Every society, then, “is 
composed of three persons, distinct from one another, that can be called social persons, 
namely, power, minister, and subject, who receive different names in the different states of 
society: father, mother, children, in the domestic society; God, the clergy, the laity, in the 
religious society; kings or supreme chiefs, nobles or public functionaries, tenants or the 
people…”153 According to Henri Moulinié, in the Essai Analytique Bonald moves the focus of 
his analysis from what is innermost and truly profound in the social organism, that is, from the 
very soul of society towards its external and visible manifestation154. This is also evident in his 
use throughout the Essay of method of inquiry that is at once inductive and historical. But this 
not the only change or movement in Bonald’s method and system that will also characterise 
the rest of his oeuvre. In the rest of the sentence just quoted, he goes on to imply a deep 
connection or correspondence between the three social persons and the three grammatical 
persons expressed in the personal pronouns (“I, We, etc.,”, “Thou, You”, “He, She, They, 
etc.”). Through the use of grammatical pronouns, the intelligent (in this context, human) being 
expresses his actions with respect to himself and to others, for, Bonald continues, “…it is 
natural that the fundamental rules of his expression or of his speech should be found in society, 
inasmuch as the essential reason for his being is to be found also”. This enquiry into the 
relations between language and society will from now onwards accompany and, in a sense, 
inform Bonald’s studies on society and politics. This attention to language and to the use of 
                                                          
153 Essai Analytique sur les lois naturelles de l’ordre social, ou du pouvoir, du ministre et du sujet dans la société 
(originally published in 1800; our edition, as of the Législation Primitive, is that of the Œuvres du Vicomte de 
Bonald published by the Société Nationale Pour la Propagation des Bons Livres, Brussels, 1845, p.5. 
154 Henri Moulinié. De Bonald: La Vie – La Carriere – La Doctrine. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1916, p.285. 
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words that was already present in the Théorie and his other early works now starts to take a 
more systematic turn that will culminate in the Recherches Philosophiques (1818) the analysis 
of which will form a substantial part of the following chapter.  
It is now not so much a question of whether the public power is vested with the duty to preserve 
society as of how this duty is to be fulfilled. Bonald’s answer is that it is through the application 
of the twin powers of willing and acting that society is preserved. The public power expresses 
the general will in the making of laws, while public action is the execution of the laws thus 
made. It is through legislating and governing that society is preserved. But the public or social 
action it itself divided into two equally crucial functions, namely, judging and fighting. Those 
two functions are truly general and public functions, comprehending all other particular social 
functions. Judging consists in ascertaining the stipulations of the general will expressed in laws, 
while fighting consists in removing all those things that hinder the execution of laws. This 
function of fighting can be applied both within the polity and outside of its boundaries. These 
functions are to be exercised by a determined body of public functionaries. They are to be 
distinguished from the ministers charged by the public power to conduct and direct some aspect 
or other of public policy and administration. The public functionaries Bonald has in mind are 
to be divided between the judiciary and the military. Unlike those in charge of public policy, 
these two bodies are most directly invested with the application of the conservative action of 
society upon the subject, and thus, are more appropriately, called “public ministry”.155  
In the ternary structure of the Théorie, the three terms are will, power and force, which 
correspond to God, king, and public ministry respectively. In the Essai Analytique, God is not 
forthrightly a term of the ternary structure anymore. His existence and presence is tacit in the 
public power and the necessary relation of the latter to the general will. The subject is now 
introduced as an element of the ternary structure, for it is for the sake and the benefit of the 
subject that the general will is deployed in laws and in their execution. It could be argued that 
the ternary structure Bonald articulated in the Théorie pertained to sovereignty and its means, 
while that put forth in the Essai Analytique seeks to account for society as a whole.  
 
Bonald’s inclusion of the subject in his structure of society, while it does make perfect sense 
in the light of the development of his own system, is also not devoid of direct polemical intent. 
For he does mention the Abbé Sieyès’s famous pamphlet “What is the Third Estate?” in the 
                                                          
155 Essai Analytique, pp.6-7. 
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second paragraph of the preliminary discourse of the Essai Analytique. Bonald contrasts his 
aims in this work with that of Sieyès’s: the latter in his pamphlet announced that the revolution 
was imminent, whereas he, Bonald, was announcing its end. He opines that while the subject 
always starts a revolution, the public power always ends it. Against Sieyès’s identification of 
society to the mass of subjects, Bonald opposes his threefold unity of the social persons. The 
motif of the analogy between the divine and the social has not entirely disappeared from 
Bonald’s thought, who at one point uses the word “trinity”156 to refer to the indissoluble unity 
of the three social persons, without which society could not be conceived. Again, the stress 
remains on the conservative action of the public power that aims at protecting man, as subject 
to the general and public will, from the errors of his will and from the tyranny of his passions. 
It is only then that he can be made to enjoy with a genuine freedom that agrees with the end of 
his nature. Bonald was convinced that in order to be good, man needs to be enlightened in his 
will and guided in his actions, which leads him to a paradox, namely, that for man to be free 
he must be a subject. The subjecthood of man in society is not antithetical to freedom rightly 
understood. Man is born in chains and must be made free. The chains are primarily moral ones: 
man is born captive of his passions. It is not the law that must take man’s imperfections into 
account; rather, the law must itself be the supreme and inflexible rule of man’s wills and of his 
actions, given to him so that “its strength may sustain his weakness, and its rectitude may 
correct his inclinations”.157 Weak laws only suit those societies that are at an early stage of 
their history. The strength of laws is proportionate to their age: in an historical advanced 
society, relations between men multiply leading to an increase in duties and obligations. The 
ever-present temptation to fall into the anarchic rule of the passions is to be treated even more 
seriously at such a stage of society in that its outbreak may threaten the whole social fabric. 
Yet, while revolutions are, indeed, great scandals and constitute a most existential threat for 
societies, they may also be the providential occasions for the regeneration of the latter. Thus, 
subjects start revolutions but do not direct them. There where the public power is powerless to 
repress human passions, revolutions, through the trials they entail, may even help in leading 
the subjects to their natural perfection.158  
 
As man’s inner struggle with the passions inevitably spills into the socio-political sphere, so it 
is with the inner struggle between truths (especially, moral and social) and errors. For society 
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“is a true state of war, of virtue against error, of good against evil, of nature, that desires the 
communion of all, against man, who tends to isolate himself from all society”.159 While the 
origins of revolutions are to be found in the existing ills of society, the result of the momentary 
victory of the passions, or even, vice, and error, the end of revolutions may well be 
accompanied by the manifestation and vindication of virtue and truth. It is not clear whether 
Bonald thought that this aspect of revolutions was an infallible rule or a probable tendency. 
But what is remarkable is that, once more, he takes up a fashionable trope of the Enlightenment, 
namely, the natural perfectibility of man without the aid of divine grace, and seeks to correct it 
by replacing it in its necessary socio-theological context.  
 
B. Sovereignty between theism and atheism 
 
Bonald pursues this theological interpretation of politics by comparing the respective 
applications of atheism, deism and theism to one of the central concerns of modern political 
philosophy, namely, sovereignty. His approach is to start with what he deems to be observable 
anthropological facts, which are likely to be agreed by both atheists and theists. Man has a 
power over himself that is not tied to any animal necessity of his nature, in other, he is endowed 
with the free will to dispose of himself according to the stipulations of his own inner counsels. 
It is this power, when not perverted by the passions, which makes all men truly free and equal. 
No other man can remove this power a man has over himself, unless he reduced him to 
complete and abject slavery. It is this power, therefore, which “constitutes human dignity”.160 
Free will and free action seems to be the characteristics proper to a free man. It seems also that 
actions proceed from the will as its effects, while the will determine actions as their cause. The 
will itself and the process of willing are abstract and only have images attached to them insofar 
as these are images of their actions or effects. Nature offers to the senses a multitude of sensitive 
effects, that must have been imagined, “designed”. These effects seem to bear all the 
characteristics of a universal action of incommensurate immensity, which Bonald calls 
“universe”, which can only be the result of the application of “a powerful and universal will, 
the primary cause of all these effects”.161 Theism, for Bonald, starts from the contemplation of 
the realm of effects and ascends into the realm of causes. The first cause is ideated162 from the 
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160 Essai Analytique, p.24. 
161 Ibid., p.25. 
162 Literal translation and equivalence, e.g. Bonald uses expressions such as “on idée la cause” on p.25. To ideate 
is to form an idea.  
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ordered multiplicity of its effects. Through this method of anagogical induction, the existence 
of a cause is inferred from the observation of effects. This is the step that atheists, according to 
Bonald, refuse to take. They deny the cogency of any inductive reasoning that, starting from 
the world of material perception, would conclude to the existence of a creator of such a world. 
While they do not deny the existence of actions and effects in nature, they do not acknowledge 
that these must derive necessarily from a will that is also a first cause. A word does not 
necessarily correspond to an object: to say “cause” or for men to have said “cause” does not 
mean that there is such a thing, an object that exists independently of (that is, ontologically 
separate from) that which it is supposed to cause. This leads Bonald to claim that atheists only 
acknowledge that whose image they perceive or sense. To the empiricism of these atheists, he 
seeks to oppose an ideal realism163. 
 
In Bonald’s understanding, as much as theists derive a supreme will from the observable facts 
of cosmic order, in a similar way, they derive the existence of a sovereign will, of a cause, from 
the observation of the general laws of society that tend towards the preservation of beings. For 
the Bonaldian theist, there is, then, a necessary identity between the cause of the universe and 
the cause of society. The one supreme cause of the universe is also the one supreme cause of 
society, and all public power proceeds from it. Both the universe and society, as effects, testify 
to the sovereignty of God. That there might well be atheists who reject popular sovereignty or 
theists who deny divine sovereignty is only to be explained by men’s lack of logical coherence. 
Deists are those, who while recognising the existence of a primary cause, do not believe that 
the human mind could conclude to its existence from the order of the universe, or that the cause 
could ever intervene directly in the universe or in society. Returning to the dichotomy between 
theists and atheists, Bonald compares their diverging views by using similes. Theism places 
supreme power over men in society outside of these very men, similar to an Archimedean lever 
that would move the world from the outside. Again, the underlying assumption being that men, 
left to their own devices, cannot be relied upon to discipline themselves. Atheists, in vesting 
sovereignty in the subject, seem rather to expect that the dam (that is, the power that restrains 
passions and preserves society) itself will grow out of the torrent it is meant to contain. Bonald 
argues that this political atheism comes from mistaking society, that is, civil society for a 
commercial association, which, unlike the former, is always a voluntary and contingent 
association. This confusion comes from the confusion of man, of his being, with his 
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commercial interests: it is comparable to a confusion between being and its properties, between 
the auxiliary verbs “to be” and “to have”.164 In the Législation Primitive, he highlights the 
difference between the two auxiliary verbs in order to stress the radical difference between the 
two types of society. “To be” expresses action and pertains to causes, that is, to sovereignty, 
whereas “to have” expresses passivity and pertains to effects, that is, to causes165. The premise 
of the atheist doctrine of popular sovereignty is a fundamental confusion between cause and 
effect, sovereignty and subjects. That all men have an interest in the preservation of society 
does not require they all men enjoy political sovereignty. Man’s will, under the rule of his 
passions, may very well interfere with the rational appraisal of this essential interest and 
substitute its own desires for the realisation of the common good and preservation. If man has 
no rule other than that of his own reason, when that reason fails, he stands little chance of 
improvement.  
 
C. Mediation, or the true nature of power 
 
For Bonald, man is, indeed, not left to his own devices. He does not exist in a world where he 
is faced inexorably, together with his responsibility and obligations, with God’s immutable 
laws and order. The subjecthood of man, it bears repeating, is not a slavery to the blind fate 
ordained by a distant deity. It is a regimen of discipline whereby man’s sense of duty, 
commensurate with, and ever ordained to the end of the preservation of society, is nurtured and 
perfected. Man’s inner sense and desire for order, while in itself, noble, cannot be relied upon, 
and is liable to fall under the lure of passions and the spell of enthusiasm. Nor does God impart 
to every man the knowledge of his moral duties and obligations by a direct verbal revelation. 
There needs to be an external and visible person in society, “a visible authority that writes and 
speaks”,166 that would communicate the truths of God’s order to man and enforce them. God, 
being a spiritual and simple being, cannot communicate with men immediately, or rather, he 
chooses to communicate himself, according to the laws that he himself has ordained, and not 
according to any arbitrary act of his will. It is crucial to note here, that for Bonald, God’s 
communication with men only happens through his potentia ordinata, not through the potentia 
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absoluta. Legitimate authority always acts according to the law; even exceptions to the law 
take the form of laws.  
 
Given that men must be able to see, or at the very least, to hear the ordinances of morality and 
of the social order, the authority that speaks and acts in the name of divine sovereignty is truly 
the power in and over society, and the mediator between God and men in society. The public 
power in society is thus truly the minister of the sovereign divine action of preservation. Even 
in societies organised upon the principle of popular sovereignty, there needs to be an agent of 
the people, who is different from the mere ministers. This public power is, thus, the executive 
power, whose function it is to execute the legislative will of the sovereign, be it God or the 
people. Not only is the executive power to be found in all forms of societies, Bonald even 
suggests as a fact that such a power is almost invariably unitary, always vested in one person, 
whose proclaims the legislative will and who remains in charge of the social action167. It is a 
person in whom the ultimate decisionary power lies. Even in the legislative organs of 
democracies, the ability to propose a law is usually confined to one person, who does so either 
as an individual or in the name of a faction. A multiplicity of mediators can only serve to 
weaken and hinder the executionary duties that are essential to the public power.  
 
The public power mediates between the sovereign and the subjects in order to unite them, to 
make the subjects’ wills conformable to the sovereign will, and thus, communicate to it the 
conservative action of the sovereign. The public power is the intermediary, the mean between 
the sovereign and the subject. And as such, it participates of the natures of both: there is in the 
public power both a perpetual element, comparable to divinity, and a transient element of 
mortality. The truth of this mediatory nature of public power is more readily recognisable in 
the Church, where the power himself, that is, Jesus Christ, partakes of both the divine and the 
human natures168.  
 
Against Rousseau, Bonald maintains that the power in society, that is, the mediation, or 
personified in the mediator, is not the result of a contract between the sovereign and the 
subjects, nor is it subject to their consent169. It is not so much matter of the subjects’ 
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(disordered) will as one of the necessary laws of nature, in the same sense, that there can be no 
social compact between the parents and the children. Nor is there a social compact in the 
religious society between God and man- the covenants of the Old and New Testaments not 
being contracts between equals. No contract can ever take place before the institution of the 
public power, because society could not exist without a public power. And should this pre-
social and pre-political institution of power even be granted, the decision to gather all men and 
to deliberate on such a matter could always be traced back to one person, who, being listened 
to, must necessarily have disposed of some authority. Power precedes society and constitutes 
it, the reverse would be illogical and untrue.  
 
In the Législation Primitive, Bonald seeks to formalise this notion of mediation in re-
articulating the ternary structure of society as that of cause, mean, and effect170. As much as 
the power in society is the mediator between the sovereign God and the subjects, so is the 
ministry the mediator between the public power and the subjects. The ministry is the agent of 
the power as much as the power is the agent of the sovereign. And it is through this chain of 
command that the principle of the preservation of society is communicated and applied to the 
members of society. Relations between the social persons are proportional each to their 
respective functions and ends, and the similarities and differences between the intricately 
interconnected levels of organisation are also proportional to the nature of the causes and 
effects at the different levels.  
 
D. The Bonaldian Political Summa  
 
In his last political treatise, Démonstration philosophique des principes constitutifs de la 
société171(hereinafter Démonstration) published in 1830, Bonald endeavours to sum up his 
whole political philosophy, developed throughout his entire oeuvre, while at the same time 
bequeathing us his last word on the relation between the political and the theological. The 
Démonstration is truly the synthesis of his entire system, taking the themes he introduced and 
developed in all this former political tractates. This time, his starting point is the family. The 
inquiry starts from a considering of the domestic family to arrive at an exposition of the 
principles governing political society. The importance of speech as the originary and primary 
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means of the preservation of society is stressed (this is in deep connection with his theory of 
primitive revelation, discussed in the next chapter).  
 
As in his former works, Bonald here seeks to imagine the beginnings of the public state of 
society as distinguished from the domestic or the religious. The need to refute the claims of 
contractarians is also present. It is not the state of nature that precedes the public state of 
society, rather, it is the loose and diffuse state of domestic societies, bound by natural and 
customary laws. And the establishment of the public power is not the result of agreement, 
contract or consent, nor yet, of conquest. No doubt an element of recognition is involved, but 
it is the recognition of something that pre-exists and that has been manifested. That the “rite of 
recognition” in the order of coronation of monarch could have been mistaken for a rite of 
consent and contract and have presented the contractarians with evidence for their doctrine is 
understandable172. For the power, if not agreed upon contractually, if not created by contract, 
is manifested in situations of necessity, where the coordination of all families is crucial for their 
survival. The need for an overarching arbitration over the families’ disputes regarding (scarce) 
resources, the need for leadership in moments of natural and human calamities, the need for a 
class of men whose sole function would be the support of the leadership in its function of 
preservation, all together explain the origins of the public society173. It is doubtless an argument 
from nature and necessity that is tinged with a strain of providentialism, or, indeed, of the 
providential election of the public power. This providential dispensation, that is also the 
founding event of the political, is truly an act of divine sovereignty while the formal-historical 
conditions of security and safety, implicit in such a dispensation, precede and inform the 
establishment of the public state of society.  
 
The founding act of the public state of society is a divine act, or partakes of a divine act, though 
this is not always evident. It is only through such an act that France could have been uplifted 
from the abject state of anarchy brought about during the revolutionary period: “When 
Bonaparte appeared, France was not a society”.174 Bonaparte was the providential man who 
reintroduced the principle of monarchy, and, in doing so, re-founded society. And the 
succession to the imperial monarchy would have been settled in his heirs and his family, if 
                                                          
172 See, for example, Sid Ray. Holy Estates: Marriage and Monarchy in Shakespeare and His Contemporaries. 
Susquehanna University Press: Selinsgrove 2004, pp.112-113. 
173 Démonstration, p.459. 
174 Ibid., p.461. 
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providence had not again intervened, brought him low through defeats, and thus recalled the 
legitimate family to the throne. In ancient times, people did not always understand the relation 
between divine sovereignty and the emergence of providential men, often making the latter, as 
founders and legislators, the offspring of their gods.  
 
i. The Properties of the Public Power in Society  
 
The formation and preservation of the public state of society requires that the public power be 
vested with certain properties, without which it could not possibly function. Bonald proceeds 
here to expand upon the general laws of political society already set forth in the Théorie (see 
previous chapter). The public power is to be unitary, that is, it has to be vested in one person. 
The reason political power causes so many divisions and contentions amongst men is precisely 
because its possession and exercise cannot really be shared. Though its exercise can, indeed, 
be momentarily delegated to a multiplicity of agents by virtue of its many functions, it is 
essentially unitary. If there happen to be two powers within a society, it means there is not one 
society, but two. The analogy can be extended either to the domestic society (no two fathers in 
one family – the power of which shares the same properties as those of the power of public 
society) or to religion (monotheism). The competition and fight between parties and factions 
further testify to this unitary nature, for all desire the same thing.  
 
The public power must also be independent, for a power that were dependent upon another 
would cease, by the very fact, to be a power. Here, Bonald quotes Hobbes with approval: 
“Summum esse, et aliis subjici, contradictaria sunt”,175 that is, it is a contradiction to be at 
once power and subject. It is from this position of independence, material and legal, that the 
power can fulfil its duties. Thus, the public power cannot be independent if it is not also the 
major landowner of the country, if it does cannot dispose freely of such resources that are 
essential in the duty of preservation.  
 
The public power is not truly independent if it is not also final. Its decisions and ordinances 
must be final and command genuine obedience. Appeals against its decrees (which are 
presumed to be according to the general laws of society) cannot be tolerated. In this sense, it is 
                                                          
175 The quotation is from De Cive, 13.2, found in the second volume of the Latin edition of the philosophical 
works of Hobbes published by Sir William Molesworth, London: Johannes Bohn, p.293. In the translation of 
1651, it is rendered as follows “to be chief, and subject, are contradictories”.  
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an absolute power. Bonald maintains that absolute is not synonymous with arbitrary. One can 
only guess who were the “ignorant or perfidious men”176 who made this confusion 
fashionable. Bonald marshals a number of authorities – Cousin, Bossuet, and Montesquieu – 
to justify the distinction between arbitrary and absolute power. Absolute power, unlike 
arbitrary power, bears the stamp of legitimate legality, and is itself bounded by the overarching 
system of laws. The contrary of absolute power is the power of particular wills, which fall 
under the sanction, not only of the general laws of society, but also of the Christian religion 
and of morality. Bonald, therefore, contends that it is absolute obedience, and not absolute 
power, that constitutes a true burden for the people. Absolute power is always more theoretical, 
more the object of the lawyer’s and philosopher’s meditations, whereas obedience, being the 
application of power, is a fact. He even quips that “the absolute power of the kings of yore 
would never have asked of the people what the constitutional power of the monarch, armed 
with two chambers, have been able to obtain from them”.177 Again, this absolute character of 
power is universal, to be encountered in the other forms of natural society, and it is, indeed, so 
general, that one could conclude that there where the power cannot demand and obtain 
obedience, society could not exist.  
 
The reason why absolute power, understood in the Bonaldian sense given above, is necessary 
pertains to the fact that the power is the active principle in the preservation of society. Action 
requires freedom for the agent and submission to the will he expresses and applies. 
Furthermore, the law of preservation requires that is action be permanent and continuous; 
should it lapse, society would fall with it. The law of heredity, followed traditionally by most 
monarchies in Europe, enables this crucial continuity in the government of society. In turn, this 
continuity of action requires that the government sleeps not and it be perpetually vigilant about 
the dangers besetting society from within and from outside. Its visible presence in society 
enables it to direct the social action. The absence of the public power from society, its 
disinterest in social concerns opens the door to social disorders, and ends in usurpation. The 
society in which the power is the result of a usurpation is a negative society, where instead of 
power, minister and subjects, the negative social persons are despot, satellites and slaves.  
 
                                                          
176 Démonstration, p.466. A reasonable guess would perhaps identify those men with Voltaire and Condorcet 
(see, for example, The Life of the former by the latter, Robinson: London, 1790, vol.1) who were so vocal in 
their denunciations of arbitrary by the absolute monarchs of their time.  
177 Démonstration, p.467. 
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Through the properties set forth above, it becomes how the public power in a society, being the 
mediator, truly partakes of what may be called divine attributes. The intrinsic perfection of the 
public power consists in the most perfect submission to the divine will, and in the perfect 
political command of its own physicality and corporeity. Without these perfections, it could 
not undertake the function of preservation. The public power is, thus, in imitation of God, all 
activity. Any passivity – the pre-eminence of particular wills through the violation of laws and 
the subversion of the government, outrages from foreign countries, etc., – on its part ought to 
be immediately corrected, either by penal means within the borders of the polity, or by means 
of war abroad.  
 
ii. Bonald’s constitutional typology: From wills to persons  
 
The process of the formalisation of the ternary structure of society, mentioned above, from the 
analysis of the internal structure to the external structure, is made manifest in the way Bonald 
articulates his typology of political societies. After all, the treatise under consideration is meant 
to be an exposition of the constitutive principles of society. In this version of his typology, 
Bonald seems to unite the latest developments of this thought on the analogies on the different 
but related types of societies that coexist together compared with those societies that are 
antithetical to one another. In the Théorie, the typology was understood in terms of the exercise 
of the inner faculties of societies (e.g. the general will), while in the Essai Analytique, it was 
the interplay of the social persons in different societies that enabled some sort of classification. 
The Législation Primitive is not so much concerned with the typology as with the formal 
enunciation of the universal characters of political societies. The austere sequence of the 
laconic maxims of this particular work will be given due consideration in the next chapter. Yet, 
the articulation of the ternary structure of cause, mean, and end is very clearly set forth in the 
Législation Primitive, and is included in the doctrine of the Démonstration as well.  
 
The notion of the distinctness and integrity of the social persons together with their unity is 
essential to Bonald’s argument and typology. Thus, the social persons, taken separately, can 
only be unities, and not plural entities. Thus, in the monogamous family, formed out of the 
marriage of one man to one woman, the father is one, the mother is one and the children are 
one. In polygamous families, there is one father, united with a plurality of families, consisting 
of mothers with their respective offspring. Polygamy is a deviation of the normative 
understanding of marriage as the union of two individuals who are also two social persons. In 
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a comparable way, political societies can be either monocratic or polycratic. Polygamy, in the 
family, affected principally the social person of the minister, that is, the mother, whereas 
polycracy affects the social person of the power itself, in stipulating a plurality that contravenes 
the Bonaldian norm of monocracy.178  
 
However, not all monarchic regimes are similar to one another. Bonald distinguishes between 
royal, despotic and elective types of monarchies. In monarchic regimes, all three social persons 
are distinct. To this quality of distinctness, Bonald also adds that of homogeneity, a similitude 
in the particular constitution and functioning of each social person. In a royal monarchy, such 
as that of France, the homogeneity was entrenched in the fact that all three social persons were 
vested in a number of families and perpetuated themselves according to particular rules of 
hereditary succession. While, there can be elevation and demotion of families from one social 
person to another, it is never the result of an arbitrary, unregulated or unlawful act – in other 
words, such social mobility should be the result of the application of the general will to a 
particular situation.  
 
Additionally, the mobility was not so much of individuals as of families, and once the new 
position attained, it would be legally fixed. In both despotic and elective monarchies, such as 
those of the Ottoman Empire and of the Polish Commonwealth respectively, there was no 
homogeneity of social persons, especially regarding the power and the minister179. In the 
Ottoman Empire, while the power was fixed in one family, the membership of the ministry was 
subject to the pleasure of the Sultan and was not tied to the membership of a class of families 
within Ottoman society. There were classes of people from which the Sultans drew the greater 
number of their servants, officers and agents, but the positions and the membership of such 
classes were not legally secure. In Poland, also the power and the ministry were not 
homogeneous, given that the kingship was elective. This elective kingship, which was probably 
a necessity in those days when the Polish Commonwealth was in need of a warrior king to 
defend it against invaders, became a weakness, which, for Bonald, which led to the various 
divisions and partitions of Poland in the 18th century, until its absorption into the territories of 
its neighbours. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the power is characterised by violence and 
arbitrariness, whereas in Poland it is weak and at the mercy of the aristocracy. In both cases, 
                                                          
178 Démonstration, p.475. 
179 Ibid., pp.479-482. 
100 
 
by virtue of the state of weakness or uncertainty the power or the ministry finds itself (because 
of the lack of homogeneity), public society is imperilled. In such situations, it is difficult for 
the general will to manifest itself with any clarity, and the issue can only be either anarchy or 
tyranny180.  
 
Democracy, unlike monarchy, purports to be the government of all by all. There are no social 
persons anymore, or rather, the distinction between social persons simply does not obtain. If 
there are still families and social distinctions, these are no part of the constitution and cannot 
claim any legal status. There are only individual citizens. Bonald’s understanding of democracy 
was that of pure or direct democracy. The perfection of democracy lies in the direct 
involvement of the individual citizens even in the minutest question of daily government and 
administration. Most of the democracies that were established from the late 18th century 
onwards did not start with provisions of direct government, universal suffrage and political 
equality. A perfect democratic government, be it even of the smallest village, where all are 
constantly involved in every aspect of government is an impossibility and would, instead, 
constitute an hindrance to the common weal. Hence, the introduction of censitary measures to 
limit the number of electors and deputies, or, of the attempt at resolving deliberative dead-locks 
through the casting vote given to the president of an assembly. It is this decisive casting vote 
that would carry the assent of the majority of such an assembly one way or the other. For 
Bonald, a real, almost unitary, power was exercised in such cases by the fiction of the casting 
vote. The final decision of one seems to emerge and prevail even in the midst of democratic 
institutions and processes. While mediocre men start democracies, strong men always end 
them: “the strong man will only be a democrat because of his ambition to take power and to 
wield it himself on his own”.181 Democracies seem to live in constant expectation of some 
strong leaders that would give it the direction it constitutively lacks by the constant recourse to 
consultations and deliberations. This constant expectation also contains the ferment of constant 
dissatisfaction, dissensions and manipulations that either end up in civil war or in foreign wars. 
The danger, if not the reality, of the instrumentalisation of public passions by ambitious 
politicians is ever present. Democracy can only maintain itself by virtue of certain exceptional 
circumstances: in large states, such as the United States of America, it is thanks to the 
dispersion of the population over a large territory, and in small state, it is due to the friendship, 
                                                          
180 Cf. p.482. Bonald even distinguishes legal despotism from personal despotism. The latter is properly tyranny 
for it is the unbounded and unlimited exercise of power.  
181 Démonstration, p.483. 
101 
 
if not the direct interventions, of a larger power, or still, as it is in Switzerland, thanks to the 
power of religion.  
 
Unlike democracies, the social persons are not all compressed or forced into one in aristocratic 
regimes. Instead, the power and the ministry are made to form one social person distinct from 
the subjects. Aristocracies partake of the same power of conservation found in monarchies by 
the fact that the means for effecting such conservation is merged with the power of 
preservation. They are, properly speaking, “acephalous monarchies”,182 some of which still 
maintained an image or symbol of the unity power, as for example, Venice with its Doge. When 
the ministry collectively takes power in its own, it ceases to be properly the nobility or the 
peerage, which are political designations that are strictly constitutive of a monarchical regime. 
It is, therefore, more convenient to speak of this ministry-power as being a patriciate, in whom 
the supreme power of the state is vested. While the character it retains of a monarchy gives it 
more stability, the patriciate is nonetheless liable, by virtue of the collective nature of its 
government, to fall into the vices of democracies. It must be guarded both against the career of 
ambition and the sway of popular passions. The danger of the democratic, or more strictly, 
collective principle within aristocracies cannot be overstated. While aristocracy, as a form of 
government, can be said to be a democracy of nobles, democracies tend to become aristocracies 
of the bourgeois.  
 
This confusion was none the more apparent than in what Bonald calls “representative 
government.” He specifically refers to the Charter of 1815 and the influence of the English 
Constitution upon its framers and apologists. Under the constitutional provisions of the Charter, 
the separate existence of the three social persons was maintained. However, it also stipulated 
that they all had a part in the public power of society. Concurrently, there was also a separation 
or division of power into the three functional organs of the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary. The fact that power came to be shared under the English Constitution was the result 
of long historical processes, including the change of religion at the Reformation, the change of 
dynasties (from the Tudor to the Stuarts, from Catholic Stuarts to the Protestant Stuarts, etc.), 
the civil wars, the fortunes of the English colonial and mercantile ventures abroad, and the 
enrichment of the middle classes. The English Constitution as it stood and the way the sharing 
of power was settled was the result of national experience that combined “fortuitous events 
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and irregular human passions”.183 Its merit as a model for an a priori reorganisation of a 
government, for example, that of France was debatable. For Bonald, then, the criticism of the 
representative government of the Charter hinges upon both the circumstances of the model of 
the Charter and upon the latter’s concrete provisions.  
 
The diffusion of power also entails the diffusion of responsibility, which is, in fact, enshrined 
in the notion of the responsibility of agents, or ministers. The legislative processes are split 
between the monarch, the ministers and the chambers. The fragility of ministries in the 
legislatures and constantly confronted with the opposition of the press was a matter of greater 
concern in France than in England. The latter had the better experience with representative 
government, with ministerial responsibility and with the expression of public opinion in the 
press. Furthermore, the French, unlike the English, are endowed with “a greater liveliness of 
impressions and emotions that makes them engage in politics with more danger for the state 
and for their own good”.184 The apologists of the Charter, in their desire for France to imitate 
England, do not see that representative government cannot be everywhere the same, and that 
for it to be successful in France, it will have to be adapted to the conditions of that country. 
England disposes of more resources that can help it counter and contain the democratic 
excesses of representative government: a strong land-based aristocracy that controls the 
legislature (Bonald was writing before the Reform Act of 1832), a mercantile empire and a 
prosperous merchant class, an episcopal hierarchy, all of which provided a tacit, if not explicit 
support for the monarchy. After the restoration, the French monarchy did not dispose of 
supports of comparable weight and influence in French society, but for one exception, that is, 
the Church. In the account given of Bonald’s life in the first chapter, it was seen that he 
consistently endeavoured to help restore some of the prestige and property that the Church 
formerly enjoyed. Bonald’s criticisms of representative government, especially with its 
tendencies to weakness, will be verified not only in the fragile and transient ministries of the 
restored monarchy, but also in those of the Third Republic. And once the republican 
government was firmly established from the late 1870s onwards, notwithstanding the unstable 
ministries, the association of the Church with the monarchy will remain, and constitute for the 
former a source of conflict with the new republican regime, that will only cease in intensity 
with the outbreak of the First World War. 
                                                          
183 Démonstration, p.490. 
184 Démonstration, p.493. 
103 
 
 
The confusion of persons and, more crucially, the sharing of power with subjects were things 
quite unconceivable for Bonald. That subjects, historically, could be and were selected to be 
agents of power cannot be denied. However, to vest a portion of power in subjects amounts to 
creating a contradiction, or to making a political concession to contingent events, which in the 
long run cannot but contribute to the decline of society, instead of its preservation.  
 
iii. On Religious Society  
 
Bonald wrote extensively in his Théorie on the subject of the religious society as part of that 
overarching society of humans that he called “civil society”. As with most of the concepts he 
expounded in his previous works, in the Démonstration, he reiterates the fundamental points 
made in his first published work and develops them further.  
 
The religious society is the mutual society of God and men, for the mutual spiritual preservation 
of both, whereby God preserves men by virtue of his love for them, and men transmit and 
preserve the knowledge of God for the benefit of present and future human societies. There 
society is at all possible between God and men proceed from the fact that they both have 
spiritual natures – God being pure spirit, and, men being compounds of spiritual and corporal 
natures. The difference between God and even his most spiritual or intellectual creatures is 
infinite. Yet, the latter, by their creation, was given to participate, in their own creaturely and 
limited way, in the spirituality of the divine nature.  
 
The emergence of religion is not to be attributed to a revelation to a lonely, single individual, 
with no links or obligations to others. Instead, Bonald believes that religion, in its earliest 
phases, emerged concurrently with the domestic society, that is, the family. In such remote 
antiquities, in this domestic religion, the father himself would be the minister or priest of the 
deity, and the members of the family would be its votaries. Natural religion was inseparable 
from natural society, and religion, itself, in its outward manifestation was, both naturally and 
historically, strictly a social phenomenon185. The degeneration of domestic and natural religion 
occurred when confused and erroneous notions of the deity came to prevail. This occurred, 
according to Bonald, when the fundamental and primitive dogma of divine unity was 
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abandoned in favour of polytheism. Thus, he ascribes to polytheism in religion, the same effects 
he ascribed to polygamy and polycracy upon the domestic and political societies respectively.  
 
The knowledge of God’s unity, that is, the unity of the universal power, was nonetheless 
preserved in the families of the patriarchs of the Old Testament, and when the families together 
became a people, it saw itself as the unique custodian of this dogma. The whole of the history 
of Israel is the history of its faithfulness or unfaithfulness to the revelation of divine unity given 
and transmitted to its patriarchs, legislators, prophets, judges and kings. The patriarchal religion 
corresponds to the domestic state of the religious society whereas the Judaic religion, as Bonald 
calls the religious society of the Jews after the return from Egypt, was public and national. The 
ternary social structure was present in all these phases of what may truly be termed “Jewish 
Antiquities”, and in the times of the monarchy, it was even doubled, that is, the religious and 
the political societies each had their ternary structure. This public state of the Jewish religion 
did not last long, as they were repeatedly reduced, conquered and finally dispersed. The public 
ministry of the priesthood lapsed and the kingship was never fully restored. With the dispersion 
of the Jewish people, the Judaic religion reverted to the domestic state of the patriarchal era.  
 
While it was the vocation of the Jewish religion to proclaim the dogma of the unity of the 
universal power over the universe and societies, the task of the Christian religion was to 
broadcast the historical manifestation of the ministry, of the mediator between God and the 
universe. A universal power required a universal minister. And it is in Christianity, called to 
be the universal religion, or society, that the mediator of the universal power would himself 
teach all men186. The homogeneity of the social persons would require that the mediator be at 
once similar to both the power and the subjects, to be at once human and divine (cf. Section C 
above).  
 
To preserve, teach and transmit the dogmas of divine unity and of universal mediation, the 
universal mediator himself founded a new society, of which he himself was the power. But the 
purpose of this new society was not only to preserve, teach and transmit the revealed truths. In 
a short excursory chapter that preceded the one on religious society, Bonald gave an 
explanation of sacrifice in terms of the relations between the social persons. He defines 
                                                          
186 Démonstration, p.512. Here Bonald also plays on one of the meanings of the word “catholic” to signify his 
belief that this universal society could only be the Catholic Church.  
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sacrifice as “the gift of oneself that the minister makes to the power in the name and for the 
sake of the subjects, by offering both men and property, which together make society”.187 The 
sacrifice of oneself, of one’s service for the sake of social preservation, of “life and limb”, was 
present in all societies, and has ever been the privilege of the ministry, the nobles, to offer 
willingly. The purpose of the sacrifice was to thank God for the blessings received, to ask for 
more such blessings and to propitiate for sins committed against his justice. In doing so, it was 
thought fit to offer only what is best and dearest to man: himself or his property. It was only in 
idolatrous religions that man thus offered was also immolated and thus truly sacrificed, 
whereas, in the Judaic religion, as for example, in the history of Isaac, commands the sacrifice, 
accepts the offering, but does not require the immolation of the human victim.  
 
Hence, it was only fitting that the universal mediator should offer himself in a sacrifice to the 
universal power for the sake of the universal society, and, indeed, of the whole universe. 
Indeed, this supreme sacrifice of himself, willingly offered, and freely accepted by the 
universal power, constituted the supreme act of salvation and reconciliation between the 
universal power and the subjects. As power over this new, universal society, the mediator 
needed to be made present to it at all times. His presence is already ensured by the precepts and 
the visible hierarchy he left, but, even more especially, in the sacrament of the Eucharist 
whereby the sacrifice he made is ever rendered present.  
The entire Christian religion, then, depends upon the mediation of Jesus Christ, the universal 
mediator between God and men. This mediation, with all that is implies of the communion 
between God and men, together with the blessings derived from it, is made tangible and 
communicable only in the universal Christian society, or the Church.  
 
For Bonald, the importance of the union of the religious society with the political society cannot 
be overstated. It is only in such a union that he saw the possibility of the preservation of states 
and of civilisations: “It is the identity of principle and of constitution between the religious 
monarchy and the political monarchy that has made the perfection and the true strength, the 
strength of preservation or of restoration of Catholic states”.188  
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iv. On the Reformation and its sequels  
 
Bonald viewed the reformation as bringing about both religious and political divisions. The 
divisions were clearly expressed in the divergent doctrines of the Catholic Church and of the 
Reformed Churches on the subject of the religious society. Bonald held that in the Catholic 
religion, the three social persons were clearly distinct from one another. Ordination and 
consecration into the order of the clergy imparted its members a character that set them apart 
from the laity. The order of the clergy also perpetuated itself, through the apostolic succession 
of its hierarchs, in a hereditary or spiritual filiation. Authority was vested in them, as they were 
the mediators between the universal Mediator and the laity.  
 
In the Reformed religion, in Calvinism in particular, the distinction between the minister and 
the layman is a purely functional one. Any layman can be, and indeed, is a minister, whenever 
the appointed ministers happened to be absent. Bonald even argues that everyone can be his 
own power by virtue of one’s private judgement and individual authority to interpret the 
scriptures for oneself. All persons are conflated into one, the believer, who communes directly 
with God, without the benefit of the ministry of any ecclesial hierarchy. Calvinism, then, 
corresponds, as a religious society, to democracy in politics. Attempts at order were made in 
the promulgation of creedal confessions and in the organisation of regional churches and 
congregations into consistories and synods, but the confusion of persons and the utter license 
in belief and practice did not disappear.  
 
One of the consequences of this absence of inner authority was the increasing reliance of such 
churches on the civil magistrate189. In turn, this resulted in the confusion of the religious with 
the political society. The churches became extensions of the civil administration and lost a 
considerable independence. The lack of authority also produces a lack of unity. Hence, one 
should not be surprised at the variety and number of different Reformed denominations. Bonald 
also attacks Calvinism for having reintroduced divorce, and by this act, to have introduced 
laxity in moral matters and dealt a serious blow to the traditional notion of the domestic society. 
He also attacks it for weakening the belief in the immortality of souls by proscribing the 
invocations of saints and prayers for the dead. By doing so, it also weakens the connections 
between the living and the dead, that sometimes can be bring consolation to the bereaved. In 
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saying that Calvinism is more of a domestic than public religion, Bonald no doubt meant that 
it was above all a private religion, with no priests and no altars. There can be no fruitful union 
between a private religion that hardly acknowledges any external authority and a public society 
that is dedicated to social preservation.  
 
If Calvinism corresponds to democracy, Lutheranism corresponds to aristocracy. While it 
preserves a clergy, that is, a distinct ministry, it does not acknowledge the visible representative 
of the power on earth (the Roman Pontiff). In this, it is similar to the Greek Church. Bonald 
here tries to force the analogy between dissident sect and imperfect form of government by 
remarking that while Calvin depended upon the bourgeoisie of Geneva to implement his 
reformation, Luther, on the other hand, relied on the support of some German princes. When it 
comes to Catholicism, Bonald, opines that it can accommodate itself of all forms of 
government, but that not all forms of government can and will accommodate Catholicism. 
Being the most perfect religion, it is truly fruitful only when united by the most perfect form 
of government, that is, monarchy.  
 
The apologetic and polemic intent of Bonald is here unmistakable. The continuity between the 
democratic revolutions of the late 18th century and the religious revolutions of the early 16th 
century becomes more definite in light of the sociological analysis and assessment of the effects 
of those major changes. As Bonald himself puts it: “I have not professed to explain the nature 
and the sense of mysteries; rather, I have tried to show their necessity and their reason”.190 
There is a nature and a structure of things that always eludes the dictates of human will. This 
is highly suggestive of a distinction that emerges now and then in the treatises considered so 
far: that of substance and accident. Revolutions and reformations do not, and cannot, affect the 
substance of societies, but only their accidents.  
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Chapter 4 
Bonald’s Critique and Renovation of Philosophy  
Bonald’s views on the history and problems of philosophy can be found dispersed throughout 
his entire works, intricately bound up with his analysis of the constitution of societies and the 
nature of revolutions. However, he also felt the need to express and develop those views at 
great length and depth in several places, namely, the “Discours préliminaire” of the 
“Législation primitive”, in the “Recherches philosophique sur les premiers objets des 
connaissances morales”,191 and the “Dissertation sur la pensée de l’homme et sur son 
expression” that follows either the “Essai Analytique” or the “Recherches” depending on the 
                                                          
191 The text referenced here is that of the Œuvres de M. de Bonald, Librairie Adrien Le Clere, Paris 1875 with 
occasional reference to the complete works published by Migne, 1859, vol.III.  
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edition. The aim of the essay on philosophy in the “Discours préliminaires” is to give an 
account of “widespread philosophical doctrines that have hitherto divided men, amidst the 
diversity of opinions”,192 and to show their connection with political and social ideas. In the 
“Recherches”, Bonald aims at articulating his definitive theory of philosophy through 
disquisitions on the theory of language, the so-called theory of the “primitive revelation”, and 
a theory of causality that encompasses both God and man. It is in these philosophical works 
that Bonald will attempt at showing the inherent unity of theology and politics through the 
deployment of a social philosophy that aims at encompassing and accounting for the totality of 
human experience.  
A. The Allegory of Philosophy and Revolution 
The first problem identified and commented upon at length by Bonald is one of definition. The 
confusions and errors to be found in philosophical doctrines must be ascribed to erroneous 
notions regarding the true nature of philosophy and to the ways in which the word 
“philosophy” itself has been used or misused. The problem of definition is inherently 
connected to a crisis in the self-understanding of philosophy. For the ancient Greeks, 
philosophy, following its etymology, was the love of wisdom193. Following them, the word has 
come to designate a type of enquiry, relying upon the lights of natural reason, into the principles 
of human knowledge, the rules of intellectual judgements and the grounds of obligations and 
duties194. It has also come to mean a type of enquiry based upon an absolute and fundamental 
questioning of the grounds of all beliefs, practices and social arrangements. It is from this 
diversity of meanings, reflecting the multiple composite systems in which philosophy is but an 
element among others, an element wedded to others, that the attempt of extracting an authentic 
understanding of philosophy must be made.  
This is precisely what Bonald endeavours to do in a piece from 1810 entitled “La Philosophie 
et la Révolution”, which is an allegory (he calls it an “anecdote”) of his understanding of the 
history or progress of philosophy from ancient Greece down to the present time195. In this 
allegory, Philosophy is depicted as a young lady, who after having held considerable sway in 
ancient Greece, fell away from such eminence into the poverty and confusion of the scholastic 
systems of the successors of the first philosophers and of the Middle Ages. It is then that she 
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meets Reason who sought to revive her with the ideas of Descartes and by imparting to her a 
prudent doubt about the foundations of her knowledge. With the more religiously inclined 
disciples of Descartes, namely, Malebranche, Fénélon, and Leibniz, she is initiated into the 
heights of religious truth and morality; they taught her “to think with greater depth and to 
express herself with more elegance”. However, this gain in elegance was also accompanied by 
her acquaintance with Literature, who seduced her away from Religion, or rather, made her 
rather too curious about it, and being unable to satisfy her curiosity, she left it altogether. 
Literature, in turn, led her to the school of Voltaire. There, philosophy found Wit, and from 
this moment, all her habits and practices changed. Bonald depicts the moral degeneration of 
philosophy in terms of the coming out of a debutante that went wrong: leaving the retreat in 
which she used to thrive, she introduced by Wit into the fashionable society of Credit, 
Opulence, Pleasure, and Impiety. It was in the house of Impiety that Philosophy met Atheism; 
the latter attached itself to Philosophy and the two were inseparable. This last liaison was a 
great scandal, and after a while, Philosophy gave birth to Revolution. The birth took place in 
secret, Politics became the infant’s nurse, while Wit became its tutor. The strength of the infant 
Revolution was considerable – “already it was reading with ease the Encyclopédie, it could 
make sense of Diderot, and was understood with facility in all European languages, especially 
German”. Finally, the infant was revealed to the world by its mother, who vaunted its 
progresses, and its constitution, which gave cause for much hope in the world. A few voices 
were raised that criticised Revolution, but these were opposed by Enthusiasm and Foolishness. 
Meanwhile, the constitution of the infant was changing: it became hideous and fierce, and 
started to abuse everyone, including its mother’s friends. While it professed great respect for 
its mother Philosophy, in reality, the infant Revolution loved its father Atheism most. Attempts 
were made to rein in its excesses but all these were to no avail. Philosophy wanted to disown 
her progeny and give it over to Politics, who would have none of it and who now regretted ever 
having anything to do with it. Some recommended it be killed, while more moderate opinion 
proposed to ban it. The last solution was agreeable to the mother and the infant was sent abroad, 
where it was received by the relatives and friends of its mother. Philosophy is reported to grieve 
bitterly over the fate of her child. She openly expresses the hope that one day it will return, 
more reasoned and moderate. When it seems difficult, if not impossible for her to justify its 
excesses, she goes as far as to disown Revolution, and that there was an exchange of babies at 
birth. Her friends, to placate her, pretend to agree with her.  
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In this allegory, Bonald situates clearly, howbeit imaginatively, his conception of the 
predicament of philosophy. It is not a coincidence that he depicts philosophy as a woman, a 
companion and a mother. If one were attempt a vague analogy and ascribe a social personality 
to philosophy based upon the ternary structure of society, one would ascribe to it a position 
similar to that of the ministry. In fact, it appears that philosophy, under the pen of Bonald, has 
a tendency to become the instrument of the spirit of the age. In itself, it has no content, it 
receives its content and determination from whatever ideology happens to be dominant within 
society. It is that which enables the articulate expression and communication of such an 
ideology. Before going into a more detailed consideration of the particulars of the allegory, it 
would be pertinent to give an account of Bonald’s own sketch of the history of philosophy.  
The theme of philosophy as the minister or handmaid of something or of somebody else is 
what helps to situate the inescapable social context of philosophising. Were one to cast one’s 
mind back to the highest antiquity about which records are available (which, for Bonald was 
the Hebrew antiquity) one finds an absence of a need for philosophy, in this technical or 
instrumental sense. Rather, the love of wisdom and religion were quite inseparable and, even, 
undistinguishable. The Hebrew “philosophy” contained the knowledge of a first and supreme 
transcendent cause, whose general will was also known and communicated, and formed the 
basis of the social organisation of that people.196 This knowledge was maintained and 
transmitted among the Hebrews and the Jews, first exclusively orally, and then subsequently, 
in writing. In other peoples, the original revelation of a single divine transcendent cause was 
forgotten, and a confusion between cause and effect arose which led to the identification of the 
deity with natural phenomena. Religion, comprising of the outward rituals and ordinances of a 
people, and the quest for the physical and moral truth of the universe diverged until they finally 
separated. 
It was in ancient Greece that this separation was the most perceptible. There came to be two 
philosophies, as it were, one was a divine philosophy, which was coterminous with religion 
and theology, and the other a human philosophy, which was exclusively preoccupied with the 
grounds of human knowledge and with moral questions. Religions other than the Hebrew or 
Judaic had so far fallen away from the original knowledge of the divine cause, and been 
debased in anthropomorphic or zoomorphic ideas of the divine, that the philosophers came to 
doubt the traditional cosmogonies could ever yield a knowledge of the truth of the universe. 
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Yet, by virtue of the social context of the Roman Empire, which enabled the interaction 
between different cultures, religions and schools of philosophy, Judaism and Christianity came 
into contact with Greek philosophy. Christianity attempted a reconciliation of the two 
philosophies, divine and human. The patristic synthesis of faith and reason reposed upon a 
certain Platonism, while the endeavours of the Scholastics were the result of their appropriation 
of the Aristotelian system. Bonald took a rather dismissive view of the exertions of the 
Scholastics whereby “the mechanic rules of the art of reasoning displaced reason, while some 
would fain find in universals and categories the universality of human knowledge”.197 
However, in spite of the disputes between schools and movements, there was an outward and 
visible principle of unity, which gave the works of the Scholastics a certain orientation, 
inasmuch as they submitted themselves to the ecclesial authority when the latter came to 
pronounce itself upon matters of faith and morals. The loss of this unity was also accompanied 
by the recovery of ancient Greek learning and by remarkable advances in the sciences, which 
combined together to discredit Scholastic philosophy and limit its sway.  
A new philosophy was needed that would enable human reason to start all over again. Bacon 
attempted to renew philosophy and reorganise its methods upon an empirical basis. This 
empiricism was further developed and systematised by Locke in his “An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding” (1689). Condillac, in turn, will help propagating the ideas of Locke, 
while creating his own sensualist philosophy. Bonald then moves to the work of Descartes and 
his subjectivist rationalism, which was to influence much of modern philosophy. For Descartes, 
the renewal of philosophy is dependent upon the analysis and renewal of one’s thinking 
process, which required a method and the deployment of universal doubt. From Plato, he 
borrowed the notion of innate ideas, which was criticised by Locke, who, following Bacon, 
believed in the empirical origin of ideas. Malebranche and Spinoza were the continuators of 
the Cartesian school, the first in the direction of theism, and the other, in that of atheism or 
pantheism. The empiricism of Locke was countered by the rationalism of Leibniz, who came 
to dominate philosophy in Germany until the advent of Kant. Kant sought to recapitulate both 
empiricism and rationalism, and also overcome their respective difficulties. This he did by 
appealing to the critical and structuring power of pure reason. For Bonald, there is a significant 
parallel between Luther’s reformation in religion and Kant’s revolution in philosophy, in that 
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both intended, relying upon their own strengths, to overturn the wisdom of the past and 
radically refound whole religions or academic disciplines.  
In the allegory of Philosophy and Revolution, the turning point is the reintroduction of a 
particular scepticism, which was the result of the application of doubt not only to physical 
truths of the natural world, but also to moral and religious truths. The legacy of Cartesian 
thought is thus ambiguous. On the one hand, there is an attempt to bring philosophy back to its 
foundations, and on the other, there was a disregard for what was already established and 
confirmed by the historical practice of society. This new scepticism, or the application of 
methodic doubt, to social truths leads to the notion that society can be legitimately changed 
and be made to agree with the solutions propounded by such scepticism. The distinction 
between physical nature and moral nature is here fundamental. The changes in man’s 
understanding of nature can only affect the way he utilises nature. These changes can only have 
a bearing upon him and society as far as their material organisation is concerned – that is, they 
can help improve his material existence through technological progress and the advances of 
medical science. When it comes to the moral realm, however, and the question of social power 
and duties arises, the presumption must be that the structure of society is justified by some 
truth, which may or may not be hidden or forgotten. And the social task of philosophy is not 
so much to overturn the structure, as to seek to understand it, and thereby, rediscover and reveal 
the truth of the social order. As much as truth and order are inseparable, so are error and 
disorder198. The mistake of certain trends of the Enlightenment has been to put moral and social 
truths on a par with physical truths. The naturalism and immanentism prevalent in the physical 
sciences could not fail to redound upon the moral and religious sciences as well. The alliance 
of philosophy with atheism rendered this even more likely. The divine origin and legislation of 
the world and of society was now excluded, or, at least, severely limited. The function of 
philosophy or of the new social science was not thenceforward merely descriptive, but came to 
be seen and accepted as prescriptive as well. The cultivation of moral truths and virtues were 
deprivatised and politicised. The improvement of man’s lot was not conceived in terms of 
personal perfection that was enabled and fostered by society. On the contrary, it was the 
improvement of society that was sought through a structural reform of social institutions. 
Political activism achieved to transform this impulse for reform into a full-fledged 
revolutionary movement. Thus, in Bonald’s mind, it is beyond any doubt that what passed for 
philosophy for much of the 17th and 18th centuries bears a rather heavy burden of 
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responsibility in the preparation and outbreak of the revolution, not so much in structural and 
physical terms, as in ideological and moral terms. For Bonald, a genuine understanding of 
philosophy entails a critique of the Enlightenment idea and practice of philosophy that he 
satirised in the allegory of Philosophy and Revolution. True philosophy, unlike the philosophy 
of the (radical) Enlightenment, is not about the creation of truth, social, moral, etc., but it is 
truly a quest for truth199, that is bounded by social traditions, and ultimately, by revelation.  
B. Bonald’s Restoration of Philosophy  
i. The Theory of Ideas  
In order to renew philosophy as a discipline, one would need further to identify the problem or 
the set of problems, upon the resolution of which previous endeavours in philosophy have 
invariably failed. In other words, one would have to seek the substantive question that is 
common to all schools of philosophy, and to propose a new answer. For Bonald, this 
fundamental question was that of the origin of ideas and of the principles governing human 
knowledge200. While commending the ancient Greek philosophers, especially Plato, he rarely 
has anything good to say about their followers and their mediaeval scholastic commentators. 
His exposure to the Scholastics and to the variety of their doctrines appears to have been quite 
limited. The study of the mediaeval scholastics was notoriously neglected in the educational 
system of his age. His time at the Oratorian school would have earned him at most a familiarity 
with the common topoi of the ancient philosophers, while the rest of his philosophical 
education would be occupied with the study of Cartesianism, especially through the 
interpretation of Malebranche. Behind his attacks, then, against what he perceived to be the 
debased philosophy of the mediaeval schools, the real object of his critique was the absence or, 
rather, a lack of overarching authority in or over the discipline of philosophy that might have 
given it direction. The pursuit and cultivation of wisdom must be free from the weight of 
contradicting schools and opinions. The interventions of the Church were limited to those cases 
where philosophy and theology overlapped, or where the development of philosophical 
premises and arguments might lead to conclusions that went against the sense of Church 
teaching. The formal exercise of philosophy, if it were to be of any relevance to society or to 
religion (that is, ordained towards the preservation of society), needed to be at once oriented 
and circumscribed. The morale of the allegory of Philosophy and Revolution was precisely that 
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philosophy left to its own devices may well attach itself to doctrines that could imperil the 
stability of the social and moral order. But the question of authority, together with that of the 
principle of philosophical enquiry, is not only external, but also internal to philosophy. That is 
to say, in the absence of this formal and external authority to direct the course of philosophical 
enquiry, there must be an authority internal to philosophy that could fulfil a comparable 
function. Now, the notion of an internal authority may be misleading insofar as it seems to 
endow philosophy with a sort of agency separate from that of its practitioners. Rather, it is 
precisely because of this obvious lack of agency (about which little can be done unless one 
hypostatises philosophy itself) or of a commonly recognised authority that he perceived the 
academic and public profession of philosophy to be in disarray: “Men, being naturally 
independent of one another, govern themselves in their actions by their wills, in their thoughts 
by their reason, and human reason only accepts the authority of demonstration, or the 
demonstration of authority”.201   
This problem, in turn, is compounded by the fact that in Bonald’s account, it has been framed 
in terms of either a dualism or a dialectic of idea and sensation. When man looks for the 
principle of knowledge either in his ideas or in his sensations, he is looking for it in himself. In 
such a case, his conception of the principle of knowledge will depend upon his reception and 
understanding of his sensations, or upon his perception of his own thinking. Yet, in order to 
avoid falling into subjectivism, the activity of the mind receiving and processing concepts, 
notions and sensations must not be confused with knowledge itself. For such an activity can 
only be appraised by the mind itself. In this case, the mind is not only the organ of knowledge, 
but is also reflecting upon its own activity. The danger may then arise to mistake this self-
reflective activity of the mind for the cognitive apprehension of the intellectual world of innate 
ideas or of the external world of social facts. An objection may be raised here about the 
equivocal use of the word “idea”. What the more radical philosophers of the Enlightenment 
actually understood by “ideas” were fundamentally different from “innate ideas” or “general 
ideas” as Bonald calls them. The former are really conceptual abstractions that were derived 
from sense-perception, through the aid of which man describes his experience of the world. On 
the other hand, Bonald’s notion of innate or general ideas differs from conventional accounts 
of innatism by his insistence on the a priori correspondence and concurrence between general 
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ideas in men and the external social fact independently of men’s conscious and voluntary 
experience.  
What all philosophers look for or, ought to look for, is an authoritative beginning, a starting 
point that would govern the practice and inspire the achievements of philosophical enquiries. 
When one makes of the question of the origin of ideas and of the principle of human knowledge 
the fundamental question of philosophy, any answer that may be attempted to this question will 
no doubt constitute this authoritative inception. But this authoritative inception cannot be 
perceived by the mind self-reflectivity upon its inner life, nor yet in the mere apprehension and 
description of the objects of our experience. Instead, one must look for an external fact, which 
is primitive and originary, historical and social: “This fact is, or seems to me to be, the primitive 
gift of language that was made to humankind; which gift is the fundamental question 
underlying all moral questions”.202 The primacy of human language or speech is fundamental 
for Bonald in his attempt at reforming the whole of philosophy. In order to understand this 
primacy and its social character, one must first seek to understand the correct relations that 
exist between thoughts, images, ideas and words, between the contents of the mind and of 
language, and their expression.  
Bonald’s theory of language, then, seeks to be a theory of the knowledge of truth, not one of 
doubt, based upon methodical belief but not methodical doubt. The standard of this truth is not 
to be sought in the naked individuality of man engaged in an inward activity of self-analysis, 
but in seeking the evidence of the perpetual witness of societies throughout history and 
throughout the world, and in articulating one’s assent to it. Again, while the physical sciences 
may well start with doubt, it ought not to be so with the moral sciences, in which one needs to 
give existing beliefs the benefit of the doubt, unless and until they be disproved. To the light 
of the individual man’s own reason that seeks to query everything, Bonald opposes the light of 
a universal and social reason, “the reason of all peoples and of all societies, the reason of all 
times and places”.203 He goes even further to argue that, in the moral sciences there is a more 
immediate adequation of knowledge with received beliefs and faith (here a sort of social assent, 
not to be confused with the theological virtue) than there is in natural sciences. The knowledge 
and cultivation of universal truths is essential to the preservation of society – a merely private 
adherence to them, while doubtless beneficial for the moral advancement of the individual man 
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or woman, does not suffice, for the moral health of societies directly relies upon the social 
application of these universal moral truths.  
For several of the atheists and the deists of the Enlightenment, those universal truths, or rather, 
the ideas underlying what purported to be universal truths, were not objective realities that were 
independent of men’s perception and judgment. Rather, they were the result of his sensations 
and of his experience. In this view, the external social fact, too, was understood to be result of 
human perceptions and desires. It was not endowed with any objectivity that was independent 
of human will. The notion of God, his attributes, and the entire system of theology, in this 
perspective, are but artifices devised by rulers, throughout the world, to demand and enforce 
the obedience of their subjects204. For Bonald, such a line of reasoning was fraught with what 
he perceived to be an insurmountable contradiction. It seemed to him that the recourse to such 
a device was premised on the a priori and universal existence of certain ideas in men regarding 
the divine, its attributes, and moral obligations in general. Instead of doubting the truth of these 
truly general and universal ideas, philosophers should rather attach themselves to the discovery 
of their origins as ideas and not as alleged devices of social control.  
The question of the origin of ideas was not merely another topos in the works of natural 
philosophers. It was, and perhaps remains, of the utmost political significance. If ideas were 
the creations (physiological or voluntary) of human minds in their experiences of the world 
through sense-perception, they were contingent aspects of human experience, and not 
intellectual objects as such. Hence, they were liable to change. For Condillac, there could be 
no doubt that ideas, whether simple or complex, were the result of perceptions, and were not 
intellectual objects that could exist independently of a human mind or will205. Thinking and 
other types of intellectual activities were also dependent upon sense-perception, and could only 
be said to create ideas as a result of experience. The contingency of ideas, their purely natural 
and, even, physiological origin together with a view of nature as constantly changing and 
evolving all seemed to contradict a traditional account of a stable human nature, and therefore, 
of stable substances in general. For Condorcet, for example, the external general “fact” was 
understood primarily in terms of the observable developments in human faculties, from the 
simple apprehension of the senses to the contrivance of society in terms of human interests206. 
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Moral perfection proceeds from physiological perfection, to which, together with the advances 
of science and technology, Condorcet believed, the whole of mankind was destined. The idea 
of change, or progress had to be a universal rule as it was based upon universally observable 
facts. For Bonald, this sheer naturalism was not acceptable principally because it was premised 
upon an erroneous understanding of ideas that informed and inspired the equally misguided 
revolutionary activism of the 1790s in France.  
In his account, general ideas, being true, are by definition free from error. Whence, then, the 
erroneous accounts of physical and moral reality to be found in philosophies and religious 
systems? Error is the result not merely of mistaking the images of sense-perception for the 
general ideas, but it also consists in the misapprehension and misunderstanding of the necessary 
relations that exist between general ideas and social reality, between God and his creation, and 
between created beings among themselves. Bonald invites us to consider what he deems to be 
an erroneous proposition, namely: “the people is the supreme power”.207 In this proposition, 
man did not invent or create either “the people” or the “supreme power”. Rather, these are 
words referring to objects that exist independently of man as general ideas. The error of the 
proposition lies in a relation of identity established between general ideas that are not, in fact, 
identical. Similarly, atheists, when considering the natural world, would not identify the 
necessary cause of the world with a divine being. While the atheist rules out the very possibility 
of entertaining the idea of divinity, even as a hypothesis, he nevertheless admits to the necessity 
of a cause. Here, he disagrees with the theist regarding the identity and nature of the cause, and 
displaces the necessary relation between God and creation, to some other causal principle 
within creation and the rest of creation. Thus, in the notions of popular sovereignty and of the 
eternity of the world, or of matter, the right, natural and necessary relations existing in reality 
are subverted. In this subversion, or inversion, sense-perception and the mental images derived 
from it come to determine the order of these relations, to the exclusion of general ideas as such. 
The apprehension and knowledge of reality is confined to a pure domain of experience, 
supported by empirical evidence, purporting to be free from prior determinations, such as 
preconceived notions and prejudices that are held to obstruct and hinder the course of such 
experience.   
Bonald’s own doctrine seeks to comprehend and transcend both the rationalist and 
sensationalist theories of ideas. While he opposed the generation of ideas out of sense-
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perception, he nevertheless recognised the benefits of the empirical method used by the 
sensationalists208. Thus, in his inquiry into the origin of ideas, the discursive apprehension of 
ideas and the observation of their external expression are joined together - a combination of 
the “esprit géométrique” and of the empirical method. If ideas are, indeed, innate, or natural 
to man, their external expression requires nonetheless the aid of the senses. In other words, in 
order for ideas to be fully present to men both intellectually and operatively, they need to be 
named, and the names need to be transmitted to the successive generations of human beings. 
Ideas, then, must be considered both as intellectual objects that are “in” man, and the 
expression of ideas, that can be communicated to man. Man can only be made aware of the 
“innate” ideas by means of words, and it is through words that the ideas can be expressed. If 
man possesses the “potentiality” of ideas in himself, it is only through language, words and 
speech that they can have any actuality for him. Otherwise man could not name his thoughts, 
express them and communicate them in any meaningful sense to others. The correspondence 
between ideas and words that express them is of the very essence of any meaningful 
communication between human beings. The constancy of the correspondence is assured 
through the use of a language is that contains all the words, names, signs that enables the 
identification and use, as it were, of ideas. The nameless awareness of ideas does not constitute 
their actuality, or even, their proper intentionality. Therefore, the operations of the mind itself, 
on its own, cannot be relied upon. Thus, for Bonald, the question of the origin of ideas is not 
so much one of their putative creation ab nihilo and their implantation in man by the deity, as 
of the social conditions that attend their expression and communication.  
ii. The Theory of Language: Primitive Revelation and Tradition  
Speech, then, or language, is that through which ideas are made present to man. In Bonald’s 
vivid words, the understanding “is that obscure place where we do not perceive any idea, not 
even those of our own intellect, until speech, entering through the senses of hearing or of sight, 
bringing light into the darkness, summons, as it were, every single idea who answers back (…) 
: Here I am”.209 Without this active mediation of speech, of words, spoken or written, man 
cannot be said to be in conscious and operative possession of ideas. One could go so far and 
note the truly demiurgic function that Bonald attributes to language. Language truly brings 
ideas into a social existence, ere which they subsisted in potentiality.  
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Even an empiricist210 may well concede the role of language in the expression of ideas, 
inasmuch as, in his system, ideas remain the result of sensations. The truth of ideas, received 
from the sensations that produced them, would be expressed in language. However, the 
empiricist will soon be confronted to a host of words that, in his estimation, could not be 
connected with the experience of anything that exists in the world, or that has not yet been 
proven to exist. These words do not refer to anything that falls within the reach of human sense-
experience, and that can be abstracted from human experience. This probably means that man 
invented those words and ascribed to them fanciful meanings. And that if man could invent 
those words, there is nothing to prove that man did not himself invent language as such. For 
the empiricist, there is no necessary correspondence between audible and visible linguistic 
signs and their referents, and language is purely a matter of human convention that arises out 
of human needs.  
Bonald’s philosophical opposition to the theory of the human invention of language articulates 
itself in a series of descriptions of mental states and external acts, culminating in a conclusion. 
Building upon his theory of ideas expounded in the previous section, he seeks to comprehend 
the phenomenon of thinking in relations to its linguistic expression. Thus, the fundamental 
axiom that governs his philosophical demonstration is that “Man thinks his speech, before 
speaking his thought”.211 The activity of thinking comprehends both the intellectual production 
and consideration of images and of ideas. It is “the attention that the mind gives to images and 
to ideas in order to combine them together”. Thus, speech, as the expression of thinking, can 
only be the expression of images and ideas. There are sounds that express either images or 
ideas, or even both, and that suggest them to man’s mind. When one hears and reads words or 
groups of words that describes certain objects of the physical world, the mind produces the 
mental images of those objects. The images thus produced in the mind, can be reproduced 
either by gestures or by drawings, and can be communicated without the benefit of language. 
The simple and mutual recognition of a physical object by two humans can occur through the 
simple medium of physical images.  
It is, however, not so with ideas. When one hears the word or groups of words describing an 
idea, one does not naturally or necessarily form mental images of the ideas, nor could one 
reproduce them through drawing or any other form of pictorial reproduction as single images 
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that are instantly recognisable. Of course, one could attempt to represent an idea through 
pictures and symbols, but there would be no necessary correspondence between the idea and 
its representation, which would be a matter of sheer creative licence. When one hears the word 
“cause”, or thinks it, one does not mentally entertain the putative image of a cause. The 
presence of ideas to one’s mind is imageless, and can only contingently be associated with 
images. And yet the presence of those ideas is nonetheless real and communicable among men. 
Ideas, together with the abstract objects of the mind do in reality exist, but they do not exist in 
the same way that the physical objects that men perceive through their senses exist. For Bonald, 
the application of methodical belief, instead of doubt, requires the acceptance that all those 
objects, physical, ideal or abstract, are, in fact, beings, either potentially or in act: “All that 
language names either is or can be; only nothing and impossibility do not have names”.212 The 
question of the origin of language, then, is one both of the internal intention and of the external 
recognition of ideas in the course of human interaction. Whereas the communication of images 
between human beings could be deemed natural, that is, pertaining to and continuous with the 
processes inherent to human nature, the language of man was clearly either the contrivance of 
man himself, or that of something else outside of man. If language were a mere aspect of 
human, and even, animal nature in the world, communication by means of images and mere 
sounds would probably have been sufficient for human beings to relate to one another. It is not 
that human language is not natural or necessary – rather, while rooted in human physicality by 
means of the senses, it constantly puts man above his immediate physical needs in enabling 
him to name his ideas, and to contemplate a reality beyond his own, beyond a merely instinctive 
knowledge of time and space.  
Could language, as the expression of ideas, be the fortuitous contrivance of human minds at a 
stage along the path of a process of some physiological evolution? For Bonald, this would 
amount to acknowledging the purely conventional nature of language, and at the same time, 
the conventional and artificial character of all human society. In other words, the theory of the 
human invention of language is, according to him, highly suspect of a formal contractarianism. 
And it is precisely any such formal contractarianism that Bonald opposed, thinking it to be at 
the origin of the notion that man can take it upon himself to make or unmake society. So, if 
language is neither a fortuitous act of nature nor the conscious, deliberate and voluntary 
contrivance of man, where are the origins of language to be sought?  
                                                          
212 Recherches philosophiques. Chapter 2: De l’origine du langage, p.71. 
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Man could not have invented language because the putative act of inventing language would 
require prior thinking and naming of the idea and concept of language itself, or at least, an 
intention of doing something as yet nameless but necessary. Doubtless, the intention of a 
nameless idea would render the expression and communication of the same difficult, if not 
impossible. In addition, the invention of language would also have required a tacit agreement 
upon an existing system of pre-linguistic signs, whose origins would, in turn, need to be 
determined. Thus, no man or group of men could be said to have invented language as such, 
for it seems that as long as there has been man, there has been language as well, and the quest 
for its origins soon falls into a series of regressive steps that inevitably lead to the event of 
man’s emergence or creation. The origins of man as a social and speaking animal were bound 
together, or rather, the origin of language are to be sought in the origins of man. It could be that 
the generation of language would have automatically accompanied the spontaneous 
development of man’s natural faculties. But the language thus generated would have been 
confined to the description of man’s natural needs and environments. Such an original language 
would have ignored the entire domain of ideas and of moral beliefs without which human 
society itself would not have been able to survive. It would also have been a language that was 
essentially pictorial, or exclusively made of images, that could refer to things but not ideas. It 
is impossible that God would have created man and left him without the benefit of an insight 
in his own nature and the nature of the world, and without the capacity to express it. The 
creation of man by God was, therefore, according to Bonald, also accompanied by a revelation 
of God to man. It should be noted, however, it is not Bonald’s concern and purpose to give 
what might be taken to be a historical account of the circumstances of this primitive revelation. 
Rather, while he alludes to a possible, if not probable, chain of events, it is the logical 
demonstration of the necessity of the revelation that is prioritised213.  
Accordingly, in the “Législation primitive”, the belief in the creation of the world, including 
that of man, is the starting point for the elaboration of the Bonaldian social philosophy: it is the 
direct application of methodical belief, against the Enlightenment hermeneutic of suspicion 
and doubt. For Bonald, while God has endowed man with an intellect together with all that is 
requisite to lead an intellectual life, the development of man’s reason is adventitious in the 
sense of requiring an external impulse in order to be fully active or operative. The first created 
human being would not have attained to any knowledge of the truth if he had been left alone 
and untutored, for he would have had no concept of the truth, or of knowledge, beyond the raw 
                                                          
213 Cf. Recherches philosophiques. Chapter 2: De l’origine du langage, pp.87-93. 
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data from sense-perception and mere animal instinct. For Bonald defines truth as the 
knowledge of beings and of their relations among themselves, while reason, defined as the 
knowledge of truth, is the intellect in the state of illumination by truth214. It is the knowledge 
of truth that nurtures man’s reason and provides it intellect with positive content. It is not so 
much that man can or, indeed, does discover truth by the sole light of his reason, as it is truth 
that, in the first place, precisely in a primitive or original sense, enlightens, nurtures and directs 
the reason of man and makes it active. Bonald believes that it is the divine reason that illumines 
man’s intellect and communicates to him the knowledge of his own thoughts through their 
linguistic expression. The first man first received knowledge from God in the manner of a 
revelation or of a teaching that was orally and verbally transmitted and taught, as even, 
throughout history down to our own day, parents instruct their children and schoolmasters 
instruct their pupils. Bonald emphasises here the authority of this primitive revelation as an 
expression of the authority of God himself who instructs mankind in an infallible manner 
through speech and language. If God is the first cause of language, man, in turn, became the 
secondary cause, fulfilling in the context of the domestic society, the functions and duties of 
procreation and (basic) education215.  
From this Bonald argues that wherever man is endowed with speech and wherever the use of 
language is to be found, the knowledge of a being superior to man, the name of that being, and 
the external worship of that being, are also to be found. There is a correlation between the 
universality of languages and the universal belief in a deity. The differences and diversity of 
languages does not preclude the commonalty of the idea of the deity, even though the 
conceptions of the same differ. How, then, are the differences in the conceptions of being to be 
explained? The primitive revelation of the deity and of the duties concerning relations with the 
deity and among men was secured in man through the original illumination, the subsequent 
illuminations (implied in the process of education) and the exercise of his reason. It was reason 
that made him understand the general dispensation of the divine will, through providential 
actions, with respect to the world and to creatures. Man had a notion of his will and actions, 
and, therefore, imagined that God willed and acted in a manner similar, if not identical, to his 
own. The purely rational attributes of God were, then, given anthropomorphic forms that 
corresponded to the structure of human actions, and other anthropomorphic properties such as 
passions and emotions. Later, the attributes were to be also given zoomorphic forms in general. 
                                                          
214 Législation primitive. Book 1, chapter III, p.298. 
215 Ibid. Book1, chapter IV, p.304. 
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This alteration of the primitively pure idea of God through an imaginative interpretation and 
re-ascription of the divine attributes is itself at the origin of idolatry and of the diversity of sects 
and religions. Here, Bonald mentions the Greeks who so “disfigured the idea of the deity that 
their wise men, failing to recognise it any longer, chose to deny its existence”.216  
Man and societies can only attain their natural perfection if they succeed in preserving the 
correct knowledge of God and the accompanying ethical system. Language, or speech - the 
spoken word - is the privileged means for the transmission of such knowledge. Bonald believed 
that there was a correlation between the state of man and society, and the knowledge of truth: 
“it is not the progress of civilisation that develops the knowledge of truth; but it is the 
knowledge of truth that hastens the progress of civilisation”.217 Progress, for him, is nothing 
but the pursuit of truth in view of perfection. It is not that truths change, but that they are 
developed, the extent of their application is better understood. For Bonald, progress and 
development are not qualitative measures of change, but quantitative ones, in the service of the 
common perfection of man and society. In the beginning, the primitive revelation was 
communicated only to one family, and people, and then, only was it extended to others. The 
truth given at the beginning was not lesser than what it became in later stages- rather, it was 
more compact, in accord with the needs of the times, and of the humans to whom it was 
communicated218. The development of truth does not mean that truth is better explained, but 
rather, that it is expounded and interpreted in greater detail. Such an understanding of progress 
is also eminently related to the idea of tradition: as human families expand and grow, they carry 
within themselves the truth received in the primitive revelation and transmit them to succeeding 
generations.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
216 Législation Primitive, Book 1, chapter IV, p.306. 
217 Ibid. Book 1, chapter VIII, p.334. 
218 A comparable idea may be found in Eric Voegelin’s works, especially Order and History (all the volumes) for 
whom human knowledge moves from a state of simplicity and compactness to one of greater differentiation and 
complexity, in the historical elucidation of the order of the world.  
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Chapter 5 
Bonald’s Political Theology: Summary and Appraisals  
A. Summary of Bonald’s System  
The foregoing exposition of the main features of the works of Louis de Bonald was by no 
means intended to encompass the totality of his thought, but rather, to give an outline of his 
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system in relation to the theologico-political themes outlined in the prolegomena. The 
fundamental features may be described as consisting in a theological philosophy of society that 
aims at justifying a certain hierarchical idea of a social and religious order in contradistinction 
with all other “orders” that tend to negate or subvert hierarchical order. This hierarchical idea 
finds its source in divine revelation, supernatural and natural, and manifests itself in a social 
form that is common to all types of properly-constituted natural societies. This form organises 
itself in a triad of persons at every degree of such societies. Individuals do not exist as such – 
for individuals to exist, that is, to have a social existence, they need to be endowed with social 
personhood, which is given to man at the time of his birth. Therefore, it is not the individual 
that is the fundamental datum of society, it is society, as a form that precedes the individual, 
granting him the membership of a human community. The rights and obligations of the 
individual are the rights of an ordinary (in the numerical sense) social person in relation to his 
state in society, which is determined by his relation to other social persons. The hierarchical 
social form is a three-tiered system that is universal and common to all societies, including the 
universe in its relations to its own transcendent cause.  
Thus, in all human societies, there is an invariable structure of social persons comprising of the 
power, the minister and the subject. In the domestic society of the family, the father is the 
power, the mother is the minister, and the children are the subjects. In the political society, the 
king is the power, the nobles form the ministry, and the people constitute the mass of subjects. 
In the religious society, God himself is the power, the clergy is the ministry, and the non-
clerical faithful are the subjects. The union of the religious and political societies is referred to 
as the civil society, in which the care for the conservation or preservation of man both in his 
spiritual and physical natures is pursued. The social form itself, in its hierarchical ternary 
structure, is ordained toward the conservation of social person, and of human society as a 
whole. The monarchical character of this form proceeds from the monarchy of God, who alone, 
possesses and enjoys sovereignty. The monarch in the political society is but the minister of 
God’s sovereignty. But the monarchy of God is not itself a regime of undetermined and 
arbitrary will. On the contrary, the divine freedom is expressed in the motive in God for 
creation: namely, that he should be known and loved by beings other than himself; which 
beings will be called to share in his eternal beatitude. Therefore, God wills and provides not 
only for the creation of such beings but also for their preservation. The providence of God, 
therefore, informs the entire universe, including human society. The organisation of public 
society is ordained to the natural benefit of the subjects, for the establishment of peace and the 
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repression of impulses and passions that do not agree with the proximate end of social 
preservation; similarly, the organisation of religious society is ordained to the spiritual or 
supernatural benefit of the believers in view of a spiritual or spiritual end – the final end of 
society with God in eternity.  
The invariable structure of the social form corresponds to the true and natural constitution of 
societies, which is distinct from the form of government a society may assume. Constituted 
societies are those in which the form of government is based upon the social form, while non-
constituted societies are those in which the one seeks to diverge from the other. Revolutions 
can overturn the forms of government but they cannot affect the social form. Even in the most 
democratic government, the ternary structure would remain, to the extent that, beneath the 
official and legal allocation and division of “powers” and responsibilities, the power, ministers 
and subjects could be identified. The diffuse model of power promoted by modern democracies 
make it difficult not so much to specify the burden of responsibility as to find the locus of the 
exercise of power, and to retrace the structure of decision. The abstract proposition of popular 
sovereignty conceals the natural constitution of political societies by putting forth an artificial 
order based upon a particular understanding of representation. As it was seen in the 
Prolegomena, Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty as decision tries to unconceal the real, 
underlying structure of power. Bonald’s account is not one that relies or promotes legal fictions 
but, rather, one that seeks to uncover them, and expose the disjunction between the political 
doctrine of the revolutionaries and the actual state of society.  
The truth of man’s social nature is, therefore, inseparable, from a politics of truth that constantly 
seeks the conservation of society. This conservation occurs in a juridical framework that 
ensures the freedom of families, of corporate bodies, and of their members. Coercion is to be 
used in the cases where the individual sets himself up against the general will, which is also, 
the general reason of society. It belongs to the magistrates, therefore, to devise those means 
aimed at punishing those who would only follow their own depraved wills at the expense of 
the general will, which is entirely ordained to the preservation of society. This effectively 
denies the modern doctrine of the autonomy of the individual and of politics. Thus, the social 
form is prior and superior to the political form, which derives its legitimacy from the former. 
Similarly, only those political laws are legitimate that express in a political form pre-existing 
social norms. In other words, the legitimacy of the laws of city derives from their conformity 
to the laws of nature. The social, and therefore, the political state of man is a natural state, 
already constituted by virtue of its cause, or God, and in view of its end, or conservation. The 
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social or political state is not a human contrivance that can be changed at will. The immutability 
of political laws proceeds from the immutability of natural laws, themselves, the expression of 
God’s immutable will.  
But man, an isolated man, could never with any certainty discover God’s will on his own, 
unaided by the knowledge of his own thoughts and ideas. A putative man left on a desert island 
from birth could not arrive at any knowledge of right and wrong unless aided by a supernatural 
grace. It is in society, through the medium of speech and education, that man gains the 
knowledge of the first things and of the social facts. Man is endowed with such a knowledge 
in potential, in the form of the inchoate ideas, implanted in him at the moment of his creation. 
For these ideas to be made present to him, he must be taught to recognise and enunciate the 
sounds that correspond to the ideas. For Bonald, the notion of a natural light of reason whereby 
man would be able to know God naturally implies that the stranded man on the desert island 
could not know God naturally, unaided either by supernatural grace or by intercourse with 
fellow humans. Meaningful language is available to man only in social intercourse; it is 
transmitted and given to him together with the knowledge of the first things or principles, 
including the laws of social life and the rights, duties and obligations pertaining to it. This 
knowledge was first transmitted orally, in the primitive revelation from the deity to the first 
man and the first family, and then, within successive generations of families, and only 
subsequently put to writing. The function of external social authority was to enable men to 
name the ideas, contained in his mind, and know their objects.  
Bonald held that the laws of the Hebrews were the oldest and the most perfect among the 
ancient legal codes. Their revealed character together with their recognition of, and agreement 
with, natural laws and natural justice was a proof of the truth of the Jewish religion, which was 
subsequently fulfilled in the Christian religion. While both religions have had laws that there 
either harsh or imperfect, they never advocated laws that were against nature. What abuses 
were to be found there were tempered by the general adherence and commitment to natural 
laws. The knowledge and transmission of the natural laws is less perfect in other civilisations 
and nations where deviations from the natural law are, if not only tolerated, but also entrenched 
in the social system. In the Jewish and Christian societies, the truth of the divine and 
supernatural revelation and the truth of the primitive and natural revelation combined, the 
former in aid of the latter, to maintain the knowledge and practice of natural laws.  
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The patriarchal, monogamous and materially independent family was the basic unit where the 
social form and the natural laws were made manifest. It was the family, thus conceived, that 
was at once the receptacle and channel of the primitive revelation, as much as it was called to 
be the domestic church. There, the authority of the father held everything together, with the 
ministrations of the mother, for the sake of the children. The pre-political state, for Bonald, is 
still a natural and social one, in which a centralised and properly political government is yet to 
be found. It is the native state that precedes the congregation of all families in a given territory 
under the authority of one man (himself the paterfamilias in his own family) according to the 
providence of God. The transmission of knowledge, as said earlier, was in view of the 
inculcation and fulfilment of those duties necessary for the order and survival of society. 
However, in societies, where the memory and transmission of the contents of the primitive 
revelation was perverted, novel notions regarding the social order emerged. This threw society 
into confusion, at the same time that intervening political upheavals led to the questioning of 
the traditional forms of governments. Doubt was thrown not only on the debased ideas of 
religion that managed to be preserved, but also on the possibility of natural moral principles as 
such. Philosophy emerged as an attempt to regain the lost truths through discussion and debate. 
It is this notion of philosophy that emerged in the 5th century B.C. in Athens amid the decline 
of Athenian power, similar also to that which would arise from the Renaissance onwards 
culminating in the Enlightenment. This notion of philosophy as endless discussion and debate 
was opposed by Bonald for whom the true love of wisdom consisted in the submission of the 
intellect to the authority of reason and the reason of authority.  
B. Bonald’s Critics  
i. Maine de Biran (1766 -1824) 
Maine de Biran’s critique of Bonald may be found in a collection of fragmentary and unfinished 
studies entitled “Examen critique des opinions de M. de Bonald”.219 His reactions were mostly 
occasioned by the publication by Bonald’s “Recherches Philosophiques” in 1818. Maine de 
Biran started his philosophical career as an adherent to Condillac’s sensualism but eventually 
came to reject it. He was more drawn towards the introspective analysis of the mental 
epistemological processes, and gave himself over to the study of philosophical psychology. He 
opposed Bonald on three fronts: on the question of the definition of man, that is, of 
                                                          
219 For an account of Maine de Biran’s thought in general, see Frederick Copleston, SJ, A History of Philosophy, 
vol.IX, New York: Doubleday, 1975. The “Examen critique des opinions de M. de Bonald” is in volume III of 
the Œuvres Inédites of Maine de Biran (Paris: Dezobry, E. Magdeleine et Compagnie, 1859).  
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anthropology, on that of the origin of language, and finally, in a defence of philosophy as he 
understood it.  
Anthropology  
Maine de Biran’s starting point is Bonald’s claim in the Recherches Philosophiques that “Man 
is an intellect served by organs”. The expression “rational animal” would have been 
appropriate as it does more justice to man’s dual nature, in that it does not reduce one element 
to the other, or draw too great a distinction between the two220. Man, thus, is not primarily an 
intellect, or intellectual being, but is first endowed with life, with senses, and is called to move 
from a sensual existence to a more intellectual one. Maine de Biran’s psychology placed great 
emphasis on life in general and in the vital element of human existence, in particular. Any 
definition of man, must first include that which is immediately perceptible, which for Maine 
de Biran, is also temporally prior – namely, that man is a living being with a body, endowed 
with animal life. It is animal life that makes intellectual life possible, by providing it with a 
physiological support without which it could not exist, or be perceived, in the natural world, 
and still less, in society.  
Besides the question of the priority of the intellectual life, there is also that of the actual control 
exerted by the mind, or the self, as Maine de Biran puts it, over the body, in its every individual 
limb and in the coordination of its actions. It was far from certain that the self could exert such 
a control at all. The will is, in fact, rather powerless to exert any power either on all the organs 
of the body or upon physiological processes as a whole: there were limits to the extent of its 
control over the body. Rather, that which appears to move man to action seems to be the need 
to prolong the animal life in him, and it is in the service of such an end that the powers of the 
intellect are deployed. Man would appear to be a living organism served by the intellect. 
However, the latter can not only serve the physiological organisation of man, but it can also 
oppose it, if not lead it to some harm. It would be better if Bonald had recognised that man’s 
intellect makes use of only a few select organs, and that there can be some coordination 
between the activities of the self and the activities of the body. Main de Biran effectively 
reproaches Bonald of not having taken sufficient notice of the possible exceptions and internal 
inconsistencies that would have invalidated his definition of man. One such inconsistency for 
                                                          
220 Maine de Biran, Examen critique des opinions de M. de Bonald, pp.220-221. 
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him was that it could not both be that man is an intellectual being served by organs and that his 
intellectual nature is only revealed to himself by the external agency of society.  
Maine de Biran, therefore, criticism implies that the human act of self-awareness is one in 
which the human self comes to the awareness both of its inner life – the life of mind – and of 
its external, or physical life. At the same time, the physical life may undergo such troubles that 
are beyond the control of the inner life, and of the will, such as disease, suffering and 
incapacitating physical conditions in general. The definition, therefore, cannot be accepted. 
The analogy that Bonald establishes between man and society, wherein the individual intellect 
and the organs are proportionally in the same relation as the public power to its ministers cannot 
be accepted either.  
Origins of Language 
Regarding the question of the origins of language, Maine de Biran thought that Bonald’s 
solution was hasty and rather unphilosophical insofar as it negated the hypothesis of a possible 
human creation of language by having recourse to a divine primitive revelation221. It is not 
clear, in Bonald, how this revelation takes place, and yet, he resigns himself to it. 
Acknowledging a putative miraculous origin of language – for so Maine de Biran understood 
the primitive revelation – does not preclude one from continuing to inquire into the lower levels 
of the causation of language, or even, into different, if not contrary, hypotheses. Bonald himself 
is not settled upon any stable explanation as to of how the primitive revelation could have 
happened, contenting himself with affirming its axiomatic necessity.  
For Maine de Biran, the record of divine revelation itself, that is, the Scriptures, does not 
categorically mention the means, supernatural or not, that God might have employed to 
communicate his will and his laws to man. Even if it be conceded that God might have used 
words to communicate with Adam, the Scriptures are silent regarding whether the words thus 
used were the elements of a prototypical language from which all other human languages were 
derived. The mode of divine communications to men is signally crucial here. For what Bonald 
does not define language, or rather, takes it to encompass the widest possible transmission of 
meaningful from one person (be it the deity) to another, who is presumed to be incapable of 
creating languages. But if the latter is incapable of creating them, the very fact of his being able 
to be taught to speak indicates a natural disposition towards language. Granted that in Bonald’s 
                                                          
221 Maine de Biran, op.cit., pp.231-232. 
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system, the emergence of language and the infusion of moral ideas in man both precede the 
strictly social state of man, the need, then, is not so much for a direct divine gift of language as 
for the activation of a capacity for language.  
Bonald also seems to overlook the fact the deity may use other means to communicate with 
men. For Maine de Biran, the external character of the transmission and knowledge of moral 
laws overlooks the inner life and its role in the moral development of man. By externalising to 
a significant extent the communications of God with man, Bonald actually contributes to lessen 
the legitimately mysterious, if not mystical, aspect of religion. If the diversity of opinions and 
debates among men about the physical realities of the world could not endanger nature, it is 
conceivable that debates and discussions upon moral issues could not either threaten the moral 
realm. Maine de Biran here seeks to disentangle the issues of the origins and development of 
languages, together with that of the emergence of philosophy (as Bonald sees it), from the 
notion of decline or progress of morality throughout history. While no one could conceive that 
one or a few men could have single-handedly created all the languages of mankind, the 
possibility remains that the vast system of languages may have evolved over time before 
attaining more or less comparative levels of sophistication. Maine de Biran maintains that 
Bonald has not sufficiently disproved this latter hypothesis, and that, in view of the other 
difficulties of his doctrine on language, the question is far from settled.   
Philosophy 
Maine de Biran’s main difficulty with Bonald is in relation to the latter’s views on the history 
and developments of philosophy. Bonald’s condemnations of philosophy reposes first, upon 
the idea that philosophy emerged as a substitute for religion when men had come to lose faith 
in religious doctrines as a consequence of the forgetfulness of the primitive revelation, leading 
to the degeneration of religions222. This implied that those without philosophy had either 
maintained a connection with the divine sources of knowledge, or were still in a sort of native 
state. It reposes also upon the idea that the dissensions and variations in philosophy are a proof 
of its incapacity as attaining to any truth. Here, Bonald applies a typical trope of Catholic 
apologetics against Protestants (illustrated by Bossuet): the variation of Protestant sects is a 
proof of the falsehood of the Protestant creed. A third element of Bonald’s condemnation is 
                                                          
222 Cf. Chapter 4A. 
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one which was relevant to his immediate historical circumstances: the alliance of philosophy 
(that is, philosophers) with the forces of revolutionary subversion.  
Maine de Biran interprets the first point as being confined strictly to the positive divine 
revelation to the Hebrews. Everything regarding the Hebrew pertains, he argues, to a 
supernatural dispensation, and not to the natural state of society. The pursuit and cultivation of 
wisdom is not dependent upon either a supernatural dispensation or the elaboration and 
communication of metaphysical systems. Philosophy, itself, as the universal quest for wisdom, 
could not be reduced to systems that have either usurped or are unworthy of its name. The 
whole perspective of Bonald on the history of philosophy in the Recherches Philosophiques is 
vitiated, according to Maine de Biran, by this particular confusion that permeates that the 
treatise in question223. Diversity of opinion regarding metaphysical, moral and human affairs 
is inevitable. The dialectical opposition of ideas and opinions is necessary not only for the 
elucidations of the fundamental problems of any metaphysical science, but also, more simply, 
for the exercise of reason in the most quotidian of circumstances. The unsolvable antinomies 
and aporiae of metaphysics serve to show the limits of that science. Maine de Biran stressed 
“that metaphysics had nothing to say about the objects or the beliefs that transcend the bounds 
of the physical world, without ceasing at the same time to be universal or common to all 
mankind”.224 These objects or beliefs were available and known to conscience, or to inmost 
sentiment of man. The assent of man to revelation and to moral ideas depends not so much (if 
at all) upon rational discourse, but upon the formation of conscience by the divine truths. 
Conscience is where the voice of God is heard, or rather, it is itself the voice of God in man. 
These ideas on the limits of metaphysics are reminiscent of certain central elements of Kant’s 
system, which Maine de Biran praises as having put theological and moral truths out of the 
reach of critical reasoning, thereby preserving them. By insisting on the apodictic rationality 
of the truths of the religious and moral world, Bonald does not help, as it were, the cause of 
these truths, which would be better served, if they were acknowledged to lie strictly within the 
compass of the individual conscience. For Maine de Biran, it is of the nature of a revelation, 
whether internal or external, that its content should elude the purview of rational demonstration. 
Universal and general facts are not necessarily derived from a universal reason, nor can they 
be rationally explained. Any reason underlying them escapes the grasp of human reason, or 
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rather, it is only in the secret of the conscience that any reconciliation between reason and 
revelation can take place.  
For Maine de Biran, the purpose of Bonald in the “Recherches Philosophiques” was more 
rhetorical, even sophistical, than properly discursive or scientific. It was a polemical book 
intended, after the French Revolution, to discredit a particular understanding of philosophy that 
was deemed to be sceptical of traditional order, of religious dogmas and of morality. Bonald, 
according to him, sought to vindicate faith over and against reason, and in the process, 
proceeded to humiliate human reason by showing and exaggerated the weakness and confusion 
of philosophy (through an overly schematic presentation of its history). Maine de Biran does 
not concern himself much with the social or external aspect of him; for him, philosophy, or the 
task of philosophy, comprises almost entirely in the act of being conscious of the inner life, 
and of making the inner life agree with the external one. His fundamental disposition is towards 
a highly psychological, if not, mystical, individualism that privileges conscience over and 
above the external order as a reliable source of knowledge.  
 
ii. Ventura de Raulica (1792-1861) 
Gioacchino Ventura de Raulica (thereafter Ventura) was a Sicilian priest and philosopher who 
took to exile in France after the fall of the Roman Republic (1849) in the government of which 
he had occupied a somewhat prominent position. He was invited to give conferences in Paris 
in 1851 on the subject of the contrast between non-Christian and Christian philosophy225, or as 
he himself put it between “philosophical reason” and “Catholic reason”. He was well 
acquainted with the thought of Bonald whom he quoted several times in the course of the 
conferences. His appreciation for Bonald was not, however, uncritical. The relevance of 
Ventura’s critique was that it was performed from the perspective of Thomism, at a time when 
Scholasticism was only just entering a phase of revival, after approximately three centuries of 
stagnation and retreat from the arena of philosophical discourse and debate. Ventura, himself, 
through his books, conferences and sermons contributed to prepare the ground for this revival.  
                                                          
225 Gioacchino Ventura de Raulica. La raison philosophique et la raison catholique. Paris: Gaumes Frères 1851. 
Ventura’s criticism of Bonald in this book would lead to a polemical correspondence with one of the latter’s son, 
Vicomte Victor de Bonald, at the issue of which Ventura published a summary of the correspondence, including 
a more thorough critique of Bonald’s entire oeuvre: De la vraie et fausse philosophie: en réponse a une lettre de 
monsieur le Vicomte Victor de Bonald. Paris: Gaumes Frères 1852. 
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In the second of his Parisian conferences of 1851, Ventura introduces a distinction between 
“inquisitive philosophy” on the one hand and “demonstrative philosophy” on the other. Both 
types of philosophies profess to seek the truth. However, for Ventura, inquisitive philosophy 
has always started from doubt and scepticism, and rejected any truth that it did not itself 
discover, whereas demonstrative philosophy embraces truth when and where it is found226. The 
modern philosophies Descartes and Bacon, with their common starting point in doubt, together 
with the other inquisitive philosophies of the 16th and 17th century would lead to the 
propagation of scepticism not only with respect to religious dogma but also in relation to moral 
and political truths. The philosophers of those centuries must each be condemned for their 
presumption to rebuild philosophy on allegedly new grounds. Bonald does not escape 
Ventura’s criticism. In his own notes to the conference, Ventura quotes the beginning of the 
first chapter of the “Recherches Philosophiques” where Bonald announces his project of 
renewing philosophy, citing it as an example of the presumption of inquisitive philosophers. 
For Bonald not only rejected the rationalistic philosophy that was associated with the 
revolutionary movement, but also the Scholastic philosophy. He did not do so because he had 
studied it but rather because it had become conventional, by the 18th century, to dismiss 
Scholastic philosophy as outdated and irrelevant. This attitude was no doubt imparted to him 
while he followed his studies at the College de Juilly.  
While Bonald’s general aim was no doubt commendable in the desire to confute a certain 
Enlightenment rationalism, Ventura argues that his own exercise in inquisitive philosophy 
leads him to a position comparable to the rationalists insofar as he seems to reduce theology to 
philosophy, Catholic reason to philosophical. Ventura believes that only an authentically 
Christian philosophy can do justice at once to both philosophy and theology; such a philosophy 
will have to be demonstrative, insofar as its starting will be the truth. If only Bonald had studied 
and acknowledged the contribution of the Scholastics, the character of his own philosophy 
would have been different. This ignorance of Scholasticism together led Bonald to concede too 
much to the modern philosophers, especially Locke, regarding the origin of language and the 
production of ideas. Ideas, for Bonald, are available to us primarily through the senses of 
hearing and of sight; it is thanks to these senses that the mind comes to a meaningful possession 
of ideas, and is thus properly capable of thought227. Were it not for the doctrine of the primitive 
revelation, this comes rather close to Locke’s notion that all senses, not just the two mentioned, 
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227 Cf. Chapter 4B. 
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are the sources of ideas. To this latent, if not manifest, sensualism in Bonald, Ventura opposes 
the doctrine of Aquinas on abstraction and on the active intellect228. According to Aquinas, 
when the mind receives sensory data of things in general, phantasms are produced, that give a 
material image of the things. It is only from this material image that a properly rational 
knowledge of those things must be extracted. For the sensory knowledge of things (as images 
in the mind) present them only as individual and material instances of the species to which they 
belong. Only an active intellect can perform the abstraction of the intelligible species from the 
sensible species, and thus, arrive at a properly rational knowledge of reality. It is not enough 
only to recognise that the mind has a natural disposition to receive images, which most of the 
sensualist philosophers acknowledged, or that words themselves enable the mind to identify 
the ideas that it already contains. For this would amount to reducing the mind to a passive organ 
of knowledge, that relies exclusively on the active and external transmission of ideas. The 
difference between the capacity of receiving images from sensory experience on the one hand, 
and the power to abstract from them a truly rational knowledge, and to act according to this 
knowledge, on the other, is infinite. The natural senses and faculties, including sight, audition 
and speech, are only a partial, and material, cause of knowledge. It is by the active intellect that 
man is distinguishable from the other animals, as it is a participation in the intellectual light 
that originates in God himself. Speech and language are necessary above all for the formulation 
and expression of ideas, not for their formation. Ideas are not, in this view, innate in man, for 
it is the active intellect that is innate and that forms ideas. The necessity for the senses as the 
material cause of knowledge being established, the idea that man is an intellectual being served 
by organs cannot be maintained, because the union between the body and the soul is not merely 
accidental, it is a necessary union of two complementary substances. It is thanks to this natural 
and necessary union that man can know the world; it is also thanks to it that man is able to 
exercise his free will and be held responsible for his moral choices.  
Ventura did not fail to criticise certain aspects of the properly theologico-political thought of 
Bonald. In “Essai sur le pouvoir public”,229 Ventura praises Bonald as being the “first publicist 
of modern times who has endeavoured to seek the origin, nature, and laws of all human society 
in God; who had the great and salutary thought of giving politics religion for its 
                                                          
228 Ventura, op.cit., pp.179-184. Regarding the Thomist doctrine on the active intellect, Ventura relies mostly on 
the Summa Theologia (I, qu. 84, art. 6, qu.79, art.4) and the Commentary on De Anima (book 2, section. 4).  
229 Ventura. Essai sur le pouvoir public, ou Exposition des lois naturelles de l’ordre social. Paris: Gaumes Frères 
et J Duprey 1859. 
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foundation”.230 The high, and somewhat stilted praise, is accompanied by a thorough critique 
of Bonald’s very definition of society as the union of similar beings in view of their common 
reproduction and conservation. This definition of society cannot be applied, according to 
Ventura, either to God, to the angels, or to those who have given up the natural duties of 
reproduction for the sake of religious profession (clerics, monks, nuns, etc.). It is, therefore, a 
definition that is deficient in universality, conceiving of society in strictly materialistic terms. 
Ventura does not seem to have shared Bonald’s own views on heredity, which can be both 
material and spiritual, or that, the conservation of society is not only for its own sake but for 
the sake of its own society with God. Bonald’s materialistic definition must be improved upon 
by introducing the notion of perfection. Thus, society is endowed with two ends corresponding 
to the orders of nature and grace: a natural end and a supernatural end, with the natural itself 
tending towards the supernatural. It is, according to Ventura, because certain publicists, 
conceiving society in purely materialistic terms, have ignored the distinction of the two ends 
that they have subsumed the supernatural end within the natural end, leading to the subsuming 
of religion by the state. This would ultimately lead to the neutralisation of religion, and to the 
subversion of the laws of nature and of nations. Society, then, must be defined as the “concord 
of intellectual beings, united by a common submission to the same Power, towards the end of 
their conservation and perfection”.231 Ventura stresses the notion of concord as he believed 
that without a true and free harmony of thoughts and wills among intellectual beings, there can 
be no society among them either. The restriction to intellectual beings is designed to exclude 
mere animal brutes among whom, Ventura held, there could be no true and proper society. The 
requirement for a single power comes from the proposition that intellectual beings could not 
come together and form a durable society unless they submit and obey one common power. 
Another of Ventura’s difficulties with Bonald’s system consist in the latter’s making the ternary 
structure of the Church as society to consist of God as power, the clergy as ministers, and the 
faithful as subjects. In the Church itself, the proportion of relations is as follows: the pope is to 
the bishops and mass of the clergy, what the bishops and the mass of the clergy are to the 
people. Thus, it would seem that the clericature as whole forms a society in itself- with a power 
(the pope), a ministry (the bishops) and the mass of the clergy (the subjects)- within the broader 
society of the Church, whose power is none other than God. Effectively, this scheme appears 
to restrict the power of the pope in the Church to the bishops and clergy only. For Ventura, this 
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was redolent of the old Gallicanism that denied the pope any power over national churches, or 
rather, limited his power to a strictly spiritual sphere. If God, that is Jesus Christ, were the only 
person-power of the Church, and if the pope were only the first of his ministers, it would follow 
that that the Church, established and based on earth as much as the domestic and political 
societies, would be the only society not to have any earthly power232 at its head. And if the 
nobles in the political state are the ministers of a visible king, it would mean that the pope is 
the chief minister of an invisible power. It would mean that the Church would be bereft of a 
visible government, of a visible and earthly head, who would be the focus of unity. It would 
also mean that the different parts of the Church dispersed throughout the earth and among 
different nations would only be loosely connected with one another, resulting in the Church 
being not so much a body as a confederacy of national churches and orders. Such a state of 
anarchy, especially touching the society founded by Jesus Christ, for the salvation of all men 
in the domestic and political societies, is not compatible with the nature and the purpose of the 
Church. Such a state of anarchy was patently noticeable among the official Protestant churches 
where there was no visible head, except the prince of the nation. While not doubting the 
sincerity of the motives of Bonald, Ventura here censures what he deems to be a Gallicanism 
that is not only wrong in its principles (and inconsistent with the rest of Bonald’s 
“ecclesiology”) but that was also complicit in the takeover of the Church by the State during 
the revolutionary period. If Bonald’s own social form is followed in its ternary logic, it is the 
pope (under God, of course) who is the visible power in the Church. The monarchical principle 
of power is the same for all states of society, including the Church. This power is exercise as a 
delegation of God’s sovereignty, who does not exercise direct rule over societies. Ventura 
ventures to argue that to deny the power of the pope over the Church is tantamount to denying 
the power of the king over the state, and of the father over the family. The natural necessity of 
a ternary constitution of society must be maintained for all types of societies. The Gallican 
infelicities of Bonald’s doctrine, however, do not constitute the main body of his doctrine on 
the relations of Church and State. As was seen in the 2nd and 3rd Chapters, Bonald held that 
both were to remain distinct from one another within the broader “civil society”. This would 
raise the question of an ultimate arbiter of such a civil society, one that would adjudicate in the 
disputes between the two societies. The belief, held both by Ventura and Bonald, that it is 
religion that constitutes or founds the state, would probably require, for the resolution of such 
a question, that the papacy be recognised as the ultimate arbiter of the disputes, not only 
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between the religious and the political societies, but also, among political societies themselves. 
This would fall in line with the doctrine of Aquinas that Ventura sought to revive.  
The subsequent promulgation of the dogmatic constitution Dei Filius at the First Vatican 
Council can be seen as a significant step in the revival of Scholasticism. Indeed, the doctrine 
according to which it is possible that man through the light of natural reason could attain to a 
sure knowledge of God was promulgated as a dogmatic truth that was binding upon all 
Catholics. From the perspective of the official magisterium of the Church, this was a definitive 
act settling a centuries-old dispute. The constitution not only affirmed the possibility of the 
knowledge of God through the light of natural reason but also maintained the distinction but 
ultimate agreement between the realms of reason and faith. Fergus Kerr has pointed out that a 
study of the phrasing of the constitution should not lead to over-hasty conclusions about the 
contents being strictly reflective of Thomist doctrines233. While one of the drafters (the Jesuit 
theologian Kleutgen) of the document was instrumental in the subsequent Scholastic renewal, 
the concerns of some of the conciliar fathers seem to have been to ascertain whether the new 
constitution agreed with certain traditionalistic principles, such as the indispensability of 
society, language and tradition. Kerr argues that this is directly attributable to the influence of 
Bonald. The natural capacity of human reason to know God was thus declared to be a capacity 
qualified and limited by its possibility. This qualification was not only necessary in view of the 
prevalence of the traditionalist views but also because the question whether the reason of a 
fallen nature, yet unredeemed by grace, could possibly attain to such knowledge was still not 
settled. Nevertheless, the document could still be seen as a landmark in the renewal of Christian 
philosophy after the disorders of the Enlightenment and revolutionary periods. Not only does 
it single out the rationalism and the sensualism of the preceding centuries for condemnation, 
but it also seems to tacitly acknowledge, if not the truth, but the concern about the social aspect 
of knowledge and revelation that was at the heart of the traditionalist critique.  
iii. Henri de Lubac s.j. (1896-1991) 
Unlike the authors mentioned above, Henri de Lubac did not devote himself to any lengthy and 
meticulous analysis and criticism of the works of Bonald234. Rather, the latter is briefly 
mentioned and criticised in the course of Lubac’s survey of the heresy of Baianism in his 
                                                          
233 Fergus Kerr o.p. Knowing God by reason alone: what Vatican I never said. New Blackfriars Vol.91, No.1033 
(May 2010), pp.215-228. 
234 This apparently did not prevent Lubac from using Bonald’s system as a foil to his own notion of Catholic 
philosophy and theology: see Eric de Moulins-Beaufort. Anthropologie et mystique selon Henri de Lubac. Paris: 
Editions du Cerf 2003. 
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theological treatise, “Augustinisme et théologie moderne”.235 Baianism had a very restrictive 
view of the whole system of grace – for Baius, the purpose of sanctifying grace was not so 
much to purify man and lead him to the knowledge of God as to enable him to fulfil his natural 
duties. Original sin had impaired man’s capacity to do so, and the whole economy of salvation 
consists precisely in what Lubac considers to be the quasi-juridical fulfilment of 
commandments and laws. The supernatural end of man is either ignored or conflated with his 
natural ends. The work of grace in man, therefore, aims not so at the restitution of the divine 
image in man, as in making him able to fulfil external acts of justice. It is on the grounds of 
this extrinsicism that Lubac would fain find a kinship between baianism and what he terms a 
“rigid traditionalism”.  
Here, he draws an analogy between the Baianist extrinsicist understanding of justification and 
the Bonaldian doctrine of an external and primitive revelation. The supernatural help is to the 
discharge of natural duties what the primitive revelation is to the act of knowing. For Lubac, 
this inverses the proper order of things, whereby nature is ordained to the supernatural, and not 
supernatural to nature. In both cases, it seems that the transcendence of the supernatural and of 
divine revelation is compromise by the purely instrumental use to which they are put in the 
pursuit of natural perfections. The fundamental perspective of Bonaldian traditionalism seems 
to be one where the necessity of the supernatural is confined to the constitution of man and in 
providing an authoritative basis for a traditionalist understanding of his nature and activities. 
Lubac also extends the parallel, without going into further details, with the manner in which 
social traditionalism conceives of the relations of Church and State. It is plausible that it is a 
brand of traditionalism associated with the Action Française that is directly in cause here. For 
this sort of traditionalism, it was not so much the truth of religion as its social value that 
commends it as an essential component of social and political action. Religion was seen 
essentially as a civilising force of tremendous value to the moral life of society, and not the 
supernatural society of Christ, in which salvation was offered and the beatific vision of God 
promised. There is no doubt that there is much in common between Baianism and this purely 
instrumental understanding of the Church. The question nevertheless remains to ascertain 
whether such a purely instrumental and naturalistic view is to be found in Bonald himself, or 
if a modified traditionalism, say a Thomist traditionalism, such as that of Ventura opens itself 
to such a charge.  
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iv. John Milbank (1952- ) 
It is in the context of a critique of positivism and of the social sciences that Milbank enters into 
a discussion of the ideas of Bonald236. Bonald, together with Maistre, is presented as a 
forerunner of the positivist turn in the methodology of the then nascent social sciences. Already 
then, they “understood their social theories as strictly scientific, although they also regarded 
them as theological”.237 Bonald, therefore, presents his work as a “secular theology” that uses 
the same discursive or positive method used by the sceptics of the Enlightenment to vindicate 
the truths that they denied. Thus, Bonald, far from advancing the cause of theology, on the 
contrary, helps to subsume within the domain of sociological discourse. The limited gains of 
trying to defeat the sceptics on their own grounds is offset by a capitulation to a method that is 
intrinsically linked to scepticism. Similarly, the capacity of man to know the natural law is 
reduced to the knowledge of the external manifestation of these laws in social institutions. This 
neglect of introspection amounts to a sociologisation of the natural law. But this is also 
accompanied by an immanentisation of the idea of revelation: it is not only divine and 
supernatural communications that can earn the name of revelation. As much as the natural was 
primitively revealed, the Christian revelation itself became natural.  
Milbank endeavours to show the connection between these formal aspects of Bonald’s thought 
and the legacy of Cartesian philosophy, most notably, as developed by Malebranche. It is under 
the spell of the latter’s philosophy, explains Milbank, that Bonald came to understand the idées 
générales or general ideas not so much as predicaments or categories of being, as taught by the 
Scholastics, but rather in terms of a “very ‘general’ particularity of interrelationship and 
coordination of function”238 that is expressed in the social fact. Ultimately, Bonald’s social 
metaphysics leads to an identification of society with the form of law. In relation to the last 
point, Milbank thinks that the theme of this identification persists in the later sociologists such 
as Comte and Durkheim. Beyond them, it is probable that the identification or a modification 
thereof also came to influence jurisprudence or rather a specific form of juridical thinking 
which could be associated with Carl Schmitt.  
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A Last Word: Bonald’s Contribution, or Social Analogy 
 
It must be distressing situation when a researcher, enthusiastically setting out to articulate the 
particular contributions of an author to a particular field, realises that the criticisms laid against 
his author’s thoughts are actually valid and deserve to be taken into consideration. At first 
glance, a conflict seems to appear, pitting the researcher’s admiration, if not veneration, for his 
author against the demands of academic science. However, the present writer believes that the 
recognition of the validity of criticism is itself an occasion for delineating an honest picture of 
the author, which could only enrich academic science. In the face of the validity of the criticism, 
and notwithstanding the legitimacy of extenuating circumstances, the question of an author’s 
positive contributions takes root in a truly ethical praxis of this science, beyond any cultivation 
of sophistry.  
Ventura, having been an avid reader of Bonald in his youth and ever after retaining a certain 
veneration for him, no doubt found himself in a situation not dissimilar to that of the present 
writer. His subsequent immersion and education in the Thomist school enabled him to 
recognise, from the perspective of a traditional Christian philosophy, the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the Bonaldian philosophical edifice. The weaknesses were rather disconcerting, 
especially when a writer of the Eclectic school such as Maine de Biran also managed to identify 
correctly. The neglect or extreme minimisation of the interiority of man as a legitimate and 
active organ of knowledge is a serious defect. It leaves man entirely in the power of the external 
forces of society not only for his animal subsistence but also, and more importantly, for the 
fulfilment of his spiritual or intellectual nature. The intellect as more immediately the created 
image of God in man, as the reflection of a divine spark, is deprived of all its agency in the 
interior formation of man; the voice of conscience itself is made silent in the face of the 
supreme and ultimate criterion of the social fact. It could even be argued that Bonald took the 
mechanistic anthropology of the early modern period, and replaced the blind, indeterminate 
and unpersonifiable forces of nature with a God who endowed the automaton he created with 
motion. The need for resorting to this minimisation of the individual human’s capacity for 
knowledge and for virtue originates in his experience of the French Revolution, in which the 
private and sectional interests of a few managed to gain in influence, and set out to change 
society in a profound subversive manner. The claims of the individuals against the system of 
the Ancien Régime, the war waged by Voltaire and the other liberal publicists in favour of a 
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more relaxed code of public conduct, together with the festering hatred the orders had toward 
one another led inexorably to a cycle of violence. Such violence could eventually be seen as a 
providential occasion for the renewal of society according to the dictates of order and reason. 
But the fall from a putative pre-existing order or reason had to be so patent and so profound in 
order for men to desire the restoration of order, and if he was so perverse as to no desire it, 
providence would ensure that eventually order would be restored.  
One of the major contradictions of modernity was manifested in the cultivation of a scientific 
methodology it sought to apply to a domain which it defined as pure freedom or autonomy, 
which when taken to extremes, became coterminous licentiousness and arbitrariness. Man was 
held to be born free on terms that were incompatible with the ordered life of society, for this 
freedom, again was to be defined as the unimpeded concession to passions and impulses. Man 
left to himself, therefore, could not be free, as in the absence of authority he would surely go 
down the road of self-indulgence, and, ultimately, self-destruction. If man could not be relied 
upon to save himself, still less could society, conceived as man’s contrivance, be expected to 
help him. As much as man left to his own devices and his passions could not attain, without 
some exterior help, a right knowledge of the truth, so a society that is the product of his will, 
could only bear the deficiencies and taint of that will. Such a society could not endure for long, 
for it was a negative society, that is, one that is not ordained towards its self-conservation and 
the conservation of its members.  
This extremely negative view of man’s nature as depraved was almost certainly not the result 
of Bonald’s religious beliefs, unless it be demonstrated that he was really a Jansenist, or still, 
a Baianist, as Lubac would almost have it. It probably emerged as the result of the observation 
of the depravity of human conduct during the Revolution. If society was to be reborn and was 
to continue, it had to be something other than the artificial contrivance of the human will. The 
idea, structure and moral worth of society must pre-exist as a form in the divine mind, if not, 
perhaps, as a mode of the life of the deity in itself. It must be a form that out of the reach of the 
decay of time and depravity – it must endure even where the outward self-image and self-
representation of society is something deep antithetical to it. This form must not only be out of 
the reach of man’s will, but it must also be out of the reach of his intellect unaided by the 
primitive revelation. It is in society itself, and not in man, that the secret of the eternal 
constitution of society, with its ternary and triadic order, must remain. Man’s access to it can 
only be mediated by society itself. It is, from the Aristotelian and Thomist point of view, only 
from an ignorance of the nature of the intellect that Bonald could have arrived at such a 
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conclusion. The intellect is not entirely passive naturally, it is also active. The effects of 
depravity, whether an original and transmissible one, or a constantly re-enacted one, or indeed, 
both together at once, could not entirely suppress the active nature of the intellect. It could 
perhaps at most hinder it but it could not entirely overshadow it and neutralise the possibility 
of its natural apprehension of God. The Aristotelian-Thomist school provides for a significant 
exercise of free will, in spite of the fact of man’s depravity. In this sense, it secures man’s 
dignity, understood as the dignity that proceeds from the imago Dei implanted in all men by 
virtue of their creation. The necessity for order and society, for the perfection of society, the 
government of the world by One, and the analogy between this government and others need 
not depend, as Aquinas has implicitly shown on the presupposition of man’s utter weakness 
and inability to know naturally239. The recognition of man’s weakness on his own, while 
entailing the prior necessity of society, does not entail that this necessity could only be made 
present to man, by virtue of the same weakness, by an external authority. Sufficient room must 
be left not merely for the active intellect but for that active intellect to be heard by man himself 
in the chamber of his conscience. A primitive revelation whereby God would instruct man in 
his state of innocency is not inconceivable but a proper account of man’s natural intellectual 
endowments must be included in the operation of this primitive revelation.  
Bonald’s deficiencies in anthropology (and implicitly, with respect to the origin of language) 
being granted, the roll of his achievements must now be read out especially as these bear 
directly upon the theologico-political themes outlined in the Prolegomena. Milbank, in his 
attempt to show how thoroughly sociologising the tendencies of Bonald were, to the point of 
possible heterodoxy, mistakenly equates the triadic structure of society with Bonald’s 
understanding of the Trinity. Milbank imagines that for Bonald the structure of power, minister 
and subject could be mapped, as it were, onto the doctrine of the Trinity: “As the divine Logos 
is said to be also the ministre of God, it is clear that a certain Eusebian semi-Arianism is 
present here”.240  
In a footnote to the 6th chapter of the “Démonstration philosophique”,241 Bonald starts from 
the following proposition: if the political power in society is the image and the lieutenant of 
the divine power, then, it is in the image that certain features of the archetype could be found. 
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So, it is not in man, nor in society as such, but it is between the political power of society and 
the divine power that some analogy could be discerned. In the kingship that is constituted upon 
natural laws there powers are to be found: the legislative, the executive, and the administrative. 
There are three powers, but not three kings, rather three distinct persons in the same king. The 
legislative, the executive is king, and the administration, yet they are not three kings, but one 
king. This belief of unity in trinity and trinity in unity, without trinity of substance or confusion 
of persons, and of their equal majesty is professed by the Church in the Liturgy. Bonald refers 
here to the Preface of the Trinity, which is sung on Trinity Sundays and all Sundays after Trinity 
in the liturgical cycle. Bonald could also have referred to the Athanasian creed, also used in the 
liturgy, which contains similar expressions. It is not Bonald’s purpose here to analyse, a la 
Kantorowicz, the application of liturgical acclamations to secular rulers, but rather, to show 
how an analogy obtains not between God and the world as such, but rather between God as 
Trinity and the inner structure of human kingship, admittedly as conceived in a formalised way 
in European monarchies before the age of revolutions. Of course, a critical history of the mutual 
influence of the phraseology of the prayers of the liturgy and the formulations of royal or 
imperial power, as a theologico-political theme, is extremely relevant here. Whether the 
analogy is in the things themselves or whether it is in the mind is somewhat immaterial for the 
juridical sphere where the analogy is to be seen strictly as a device guaranteeing the legitimacy 
of political power. Such, it can perhaps be conjectured, would have been Schmitt’s opinion on 
the matter. What is also interesting here is that, by his recourse to the liturgy as the source of a 
direct analogy between the Trinity and human kingship, Bonald seems to have nullified 
Peterson’s negation of the possibility of a truly Christian political theology. However, Bonald 
himself acknowledges here the epistemological limits of such an analogy, insisting that it is not 
meant to exhaust, but to point to the possibility of the truth of divine mysteries. This analogy 
between the Trinity and the kingship at once complements and transcends the other analogies 
drawn out of the ternary order between levels of society, by virtue of its reference to the 
innermost life of the Trinity about which little, beyond the scriptural witness, the creeds and 
the doxological expressions of the liturgy, can be known in a discursive way. It is significant, 
however, that Bonald should have sought the principle of his analogy in the liturgy and not in 
strictly speculative theological formulations. The ancient and common maxim regarding the 
relationship between belief and worship was that legem credendi lex statuat supplicandi, that 
is, the law of supplication or prayer establishes the law of belief. The liturgy is seen by Bonald 
in this instance as a legitimate source for the establishment of his analogy.  
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In an essay that was only recently rediscovered and for then for the first time published, Bonald 
pursues his analogical scheme even further242. In this unfinished work, Bonald establishes a 
list of dogmas that could be explained by the referring to their similarity to facts founds in 
nature and society. It is his aim to show that, while divine revelation is truly supernatural and 
transcendent, yet, in order to be partially intelligible to men, it must also share some similarity 
with the facts and features of nature and society that men would encounter in their daily lives. 
Those intelligible aspects of dogmas are also to be found in a different degree or kind in the 
realm of everyday experience. Therefore, when dogmas are presented and explained to people, 
they should be presented as being familiar, and not strange. The dogmas that Bonald seeks to 
explain from the perspective of their analogy to certain aspects of human experience are: 
original sin, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Redemption, the sacrament of confession and the 
evangelical counsels. Bonald here expands upon his analogy between the Trinity and the 
Kingship. The eternal generation of the Word from the Father is compared to the generation of 
royal action out of the royal will, while the procession of the Holy Ghost is likened to the 
procession of the royal administration equally from the royal will and from the royal action.  
In the rest of the work Bonald applies a similar method to the other dogmas and sacraments by 
drawing upon similitudes. The identity between the dogmas of religion and the constitutive 
principles of society, being a similitude of their external structure and in the order of their 
constitutive persons, is what draws together a properly monarchy to the Catholic faith. The 
union of throne and altar is not accidental – it proceeds from the homology of the concepts of 
the external organisation of both. The alterations in the one will not fail to have repercussion 
upon the other. It is almost as if Bonald was inviting successive generations to study the effects 
of the separation of Church and State in formerly confessional countries in terms of its 
repercussions both upon public life and religious life.  
Almost one hundred years ago, as the First World War was coming to an end, most 
governments in Europe were still monarchies; one form or another of religion was still publicly 
recognised. Today most governments are republics, with only a handful of monarchies 
remaining. How much has changed in the sense that Bonald understood the change from a 
monarchical to a republican form of government? How relevant were those changes for Europe 
and for the world in general, especially in the context of the Second World War? It could be 
that political theology is not authorised to deal with those questions by virtue of its formal 
                                                          
242 Louis de Bonald. Réflexions sur l’accord des dogmes de la religion avec la raison. Edited by Vincent Bouat, 
presented and analysed by Jean-Louis Pranchère. Paris: Editions du Cerf 2012. 
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objects – and, yet, it would be hard to deny the relevance, tacit or explicit, of theologico-
political themes today. Should the liberal public and international institutions that were formed 
after the last World War be at all seized of a possible relevance of these themes? What are the 
theologico-political themes underlying the distinction between the international regime of 
human rights and the traditional understanding of the rights of nations? It could also be that the 
theologico-political form of thinking, implicit in this work, that is, a form of thinking that 
refuses to capitulate to the postmodernist nominalism regarding the essence of things, is itself 
obsolete and incapable of rising to the task of thinking a future of ever-increasing technical 
conquest and technocratic control. Is there any space in politics for a truly conservative thought 
that insists on the necessity of the limitation of arbitrary political power for the sake of the 
conservation of society? For too long perhaps, the conservative mind-set or thought has been 
associated with the primacy of private interests over public interest, and has sponsored a 
privatised vision of the common good. Such a vision no doubt had its validity in a land-based, 
agrarian society where the private interests of the landowners was commensurate to a degree 
with the local common good. To a significant extent, the materially independent family, able 
to perpetuate itself with material security over many generations, that Bonald envisioned to be 
the model domestic society perhaps does not exist anymore in the same numbers as it did in 
his time.   
No romantic vision, however comforting in its desire for rational politics, is a substitute for the 
rational contemplation of politics. In an ideal scheme of political theology, the latter can only 
be founded upon both an attentive contemplation and a discursive apprehension of being, the 
two being mediated by a personal ethic of conformity to the higher ideals of civilisation. But 
perhaps this is not enough, perhaps this ethic of conformity needs to be supplemented by one 
of obedience to set of transcendent norms in which event political norms find their perfection. 
One could perhaps subscribe to Leo Strauss’s definition of political theology (as political 
teachings based upon divine revelation) without stipulating, as he does, a strict division of 
labour, if not outright segregation, between political theology and political philosophy243. It is 
not the divorce but the right ordering of Athens and Jerusalem/Rome that must be sought. In 
this connection, the idea and the fact of the sociality of being must be acknowledged. The 
consideration of being as social being does not amount to a capitulation to the worldviews that 
inform the positivistic practice of sociology or the cultural Marxist understanding of the social 
sciences. Maritain and Journet, in many ways, the greatest modern Thomist theologians to 
                                                          
243 Leo Strauss. What is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies. Glencoe, Il: The Free Press 1959, p.13.  
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ponder the question of the finite perfection of the political order in relation to the infinite 
perfection of the human person and of the Church, somewhat neglected to articulate a properly 
socio-theological discourse. For, were it to be attempted, a social theology would be one in 
which the highest Being is considered in relation to other beings that are ontologically 
dependent upon him for their own beings. This ontologically dependence covers and also 
includes the political. The triunity of God already indicates that divine unity, being 
fundamental, does not, however, encompass the totality of the mystery of God. Of course, this 
presupposes a hierarchy of tropes within theology itself.  
However, for the purposes of bringing men back to a traditional understanding of society, it is 
the social discourse on the divine that is perhaps the most appropriate. Divine revelation itself 
contains a social idea of God, in the sense that revelation implies a relation, and the history of 
the Hebrew people of the Biblical times was the history of God’s dealings with them. 
Revelation, in all its supernatural grandeur, was not separate from the right worship of God. 
The liturgy makes manifest the social context of revelation, and its social end, namely, the 
sanctification of the members of the Church as a whole. Thus, the deployment of the social 
analogy of order would not only reveal the true structure of authority in all the levels of society, 
or solve the inherently political question of legitimacy: it would also serve to insert 
ecclesiology in a wider discourse about the unity of human society. As a consequence of that, 
the duties of obedience also become clearer, and may provide an answer not only to the 
question of the best political regime, but above all, to that of the virtuous practice of politics. 
The ethic of obedience does not question nor compromise the free and independent exercise of 
the active intellect or the inviolability of conscience, rather it demands that both of them work 
toward greater conformity to the will of God.  
But even in the absence of a positive political engagement on the basis of revelation, the social 
analogy of order could still inform the exercise of political prudence and judgement in the 
interest of social conservation. It is perhaps more realistic to expect this sort of translation of 
the ideas of Bonald into the realm of contemporary political practice. It would entail a refusal 
to consider the ideal regime of human rights as being both descriptive and prescriptive in 
relation to humanity, unless it be explicitly founded on something other than a vague notion of 
human freedom that reposes upon no conception of a universally normative human nature, as 
the need for a renewed jusnaturalist illustration and defence of the social nature and dignity of 
man has perhaps never been greater in the history of Western civilisation than it is currently.  
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